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Abstract 
 
This dissertation ethnographically examines how Chinese-Singaporean gay men articulate 
their aspirations for national belonging within a recalcitrant state and its nation-building 
programs. These men expose the artificiality of the nation and its categories of belonging. 
Even as the state compels them to submit to its call for economic and biological 
(re)productivity, it also chastises them for their allegedly excessive individualism. Yet, in the 
corporeal spaces of everyday life, they navigate a social landscape structured by the very real 
practices of an authoritarian state that criminalizes their sexuality. By ethnographically 
charting how gay men comply with and resist discourses and practices that position them 
both inside and outside their nation, I argue that the illiberal state achieves its political 
legitimacy by successfully convincing citizens that only it can secure Singapore's continuous 
economic growth. I further assert that within Singapore's strongly communitarian political 
framework, gay citizens who stress their commonalities with their non-gay counterparts tend 
to attain more social acceptance than those who focus solely on their sexuality. 
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Chapter 1: “We, the Citizens of Singapore ...” 
 
    Stand up for Singapore 
    Do the best you can 
    Reach out for your fellow men 
    You've got to make a stand 
    Recognize you can play your part 
    Let it come right from your heart 
    Be prepared to give a little more 
    Stand up, stand up for Singapore 
    - Stand Up for Singapore (1984)  
              by Hugh Harrison 
      
    We, the citizens of Singapore, 
    pledge ourselves as one united people, 
    regardless of race, language or religion, 
    to build a democratic society 
    based on justice and equality, 
    so as to achieve happiness, prosperity 
    and progress for our nation.  
    - Singapore National Pledge (1966)  
  by Sinnathamby Rajaratnam  
 
IndigNation and the Unofficial Pink Picnic 
“Singapore,” sociologist Laurence Leong (1997: 142) writes, “appears to be the last 
frontier in the Asian region for positive gay and lesbian developments.” While repression and 
sexual perversions characterize orientalist discourses (Screech 2000: 759), Leong’s assertion 
remains not entirely ungrounded. Of all its Asian neighbors, Singapore shares the dubious 
honor of having laws that specifically criminalize male homosexual acts with Malaysia and 
Brunei. Section 377A of the Singaporean Penal Code punishes such acts with jail sentences 
of up to two years, and provides a legal justification for the systematic social discrimination 
that gay Singaporeans experience. This Section reads: 
 
Outrages on decency 
377A. Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission 
of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act 
of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to 2 years (Source: Singapore Statutes Online).  
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When consenting heterosexual couples perform the same oral or anal sex, however, these acts 
shed their criminality. Singapore's politicians made this distinction during a heated public 
debate in 2007 when they overhauled the Penal Code to correspond laws with contemporary 
social values. Strictly speaking, 377A punishes only male homosex. A most likely apocryphal 
tale I heard long ago traces this bias to Queen Elizabeth I (1533 – 1603 CE). When this 
British monarch's counselors asked her whether they should criminalize female homosex as 
well, she rejected the suggestion by reputedly insisting that “women don't do that.” Whatever 
the law's origins may be, Singapore's current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong promised that 
he would not enforce it – he retained it for its symbolic value only. Nevertheless, the very act 
of retaining 377A cast all gay and, by extension, lesbian Singaporeans as second-class 
citizens.  
The juridical inequality and the resulting social injustice that 377A engenders stand 
out starkly in the light of the two epigraphs above. In the first, I present the opening stanza of 
Stand Up for Singapore, a nationalistic song that radio and television stations often play 
beginning late May as citizens prepare to celebrate National Day on August 9. Grandiose in 
wording, the song rouses Singaporeans and exhorts them to give their heart, body, and soul 
for their country's betterment. The second epigraph reproduces the National Pledge made by 
the live audience of the National Day parade and, more commonly, by school-going children 
nation-wide during every weekday morning assembly in all levels of education from 
kindergarten to junior college (the equivalent of the high school in the United States). Penned 
in 1966 by a former Deputy Prime Minister and reflecting the tumultuous ethno-politics of 
that era, the pledge calls on citizens to work towards a unified Singapore by setting aside 
differences in their ethnicity, language, and religious faith, but conspicuously not their gender 
and sexual identities. The sharp incongruity between the legal and sexual exclusions of 377A 
and the unifying call of the two epigraphs provokes questions about cultural and sexual 
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citizenship in Singapore. Do gay men reconcile their sexuality with the anti-sodomy law? Do 
they see themselves as Singaporeans and proclaim their patriotism? By answering these 
questions in this ethnography, I shed light on the larger dynamics of the state and the 
meanings of belonging in Singapore. 
In recent years, gay men began to publicly assert their cultural and sexual 
citizenships. Angered by the criminalization of their sexuality and other acts of state-
sponsored discrimination in the past, local gay rights activists began organizing a series of 
gay pride events called IndigNation in 2006. Occurring in August every year to coincide with 
the country's National Day, IndigNation highlights the socio-legal discrimination that LGBT 
Singaporeans face daily to their otherwise-unaware straight counterparts, while registering 
their desire to become full-fledged members of the Singaporean nation. Over IndigNation's 
short history, the Unofficial Pink Picnic became a popular event among participants. LGBT 
rights activists named the picnic after the rosy hue partly because of its historical association 
with homosexuality and, more importantly for the activists, because of its symbolic 
patriotism. What better way to assert one's national belonging than with a color that combines 
the red and the white of the national flag? Picnic participants don pink clothing and gather in 
the Botanic Gardens on National Day itself to share an afternoon of food and laughter. In the 
atmosphere of stigma, fear, and prejudice that 377A created, the UPP and other public 
statements of homosexual citizenship encourage non-attending gay men and lesbians not to 
hide their sexualities in public spaces. They also show straight Singaporeans that their fellow 
gay and lesbian counterparts are no more perverse or abnormal than they are. 
After missing the first two picnics, I went to the one in 2009. Two of my gay friends 
offered me a ride to the Botanic Gardens together with their straight friend and their two 
dogs. Caught in El Nino's warm embrace, Singapore's already tropical weather assailed us 
with unusually hot and humid ferocity the moment we left the cool, air-conditioned respite of 
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the car. It did not take us long to spot the picnickers, their pink t-shirts standing out vividly 
against the green of the picnic grounds. They brought an impressive spread. As we laughed at 
the antics of my gay friends' very frisky dogs, we shared, often with complete strangers, pasta 
salad, fishballs, curry puffs, carrot cake, honey-sweet mangoes and Japanese grapes, cocktail 
weiners, and roasted chicken. “I'm disappointed,” I lamented jokingly to another friend who 
did not organize the picnic, “where are the agents from the Internal Security Department? It's 
just not fun without them.” “I know,” he agreed emphatically. The day just before the 
inaugural Pink Picnic in 2007, the picnic's organizers received a government letter denying 
them permission to use the Botanic Gardens for the event. According to some insider 
information the would-be organizers received later, the order to issue the letter came from the 
rarified heights of government. Someone, widely believed to be an intensely homophobic but 
otherwise liberal and brilliant legal scholar of human rights, had called in favors to stop the 
picnic. Unfazed, the organizers decided to not organize the picnic. Instead, they announced 
that interested parties could still gather on their own accord. Surely, individual agency did not 
require official permission. The Unofficial Pink Picnic that nobody organized has since 
become a regular IndigNation feature. 
A gay picnic does not have the same political impact a gay pride parade does. 
Nevertheless, the political powers-that-be still regarded the UPP as a threat. My friend 
claimed that during the inaugural picnic, he saw two men, dressed all in black, conspicuously 
observing and taking photos of the event. “Come on! They'd got to be ISD agents,” he said, 
“why else would a Chinese man be there with a Malay man?” In a country as racialized as 
Singapore, this pairing did seem unlikely. I asked how the picnickers dealt with the 
government interlopers. “Some annoyed lesbians went up and took pictures of them,” he 
laughed. “They really should send more competent agents. Last year, they sent someone 
obviously tasked to count how many of us there were. He actually walked among us and 
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counted,” he continued as he mimicked the agent by repeatedly jabbing the air with his index 
finger in a counting motion. “All we had this year were two fundamentalist Christians. There 
was a straight couple, and the man wore black bermudas. Did you see them? They took 
photos of us, so I got Ali to go up and take their pictures in return. They ran away 
immediately.” 
The above ethnographic vignette illustrates the fault lines of distrust that mark 
present-day Singapore. The numerically dominant Chinese share an uneasy relationship with 
the Malays, just as the state treats its gay and lesbian citizens with suspicions. Since the 
country's independence in 1965, the dominant People's Action Party (PAP) has attempted to 
inculcate a sense of national belonging in Singapore's immigrant society. They do so through 
a series of socio-cultural and politico-economic policies designed to turn the citizens' cultural 
orientations away from their ancestral homelands and inward at Singapore. This includes 
celebrating National Day with Stand Up for Singapore (1984), One People, One Nation, One 
Singapore (1990), Home (1998), Shine for Singapore (2008), and other nationalistic songs. 
Yet, other state policies undermine this nation-building project. For instance, public housing 
policies make it easier for the Chinese to buy and sell apartments, leading the non-Chinese to 
question their place in society as citizens (Chua 1997). These policies also encourage the 
formation of the procreative hetero-patriarchal family, so they allocate grants and priority in 
housing assignment to heterosexually married couples. Yet, because they stipulate neither a 
time limit by which couples must produce children nor penalties for infertility, they trigger 
questions as to why gay citizens should pay taxes to fund policies that do not benefit them. 
Coupled with the criminalization of homosexuality, public housing policies cast doubt on the 
value of citizenship among gay men and lesbians.  
In 2003, gay and lesbian citizens received some respite when the Prime Minister 
announced that the government would now employ them as civil servants, provided that they 
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openly declare their sexuality. Yet, as Weiss (2005: 272) writes poetically, “the blush soon 
faded from Singapore's pink spring.” In 2007, parliamentarians voted to retain the criminality 
of homosex while legalizing the same acts for consenting straight couples. Despite all this 
discrimination, gay citizens demonstrate that they want to claim their space in Singapore. The 
Unofficial Pink Picnic proves this strong patriotism with its nationalistic symbolism. How 
then can we make sense of this desire to belong amidst the country's self-contradicting 
assemblage of nation-building processes, anti-sodomy laws, pro-natalist policies, and 
seemingly gay-tolerant state attitudes? Do gay men react to the state's vision of proper 
reproductive masculinity and femininity? Do they also challenge the state’s hegemonic 
notions of family, citizenship, gender and sexuality, or do they re-inscribe these notions? 
To engage these questions, I will first examine why Singapore attained, in the words 
of cultural studies scholar Audrey Yue (personal communication), a seemingly queer, self-
contradicting state of “modernization without modernity.” In the short time span of less than 
50 years since it became an independent nation-state, Singapore solidified its nodal position 
in the global network of capital and information flows (Chang, et al. 2004). It accomplished 
this largely because historical contingencies forced the PAP leaders to adopt economic 
developmentalism as their state ideology immediately upon independence. Economic 
robustness is often associated with modernity that transcends the old and the backward. Yet, 
these same leaders also style themselves illiberally as Confucianist junzi, morally superior 
scholar-officials mandated by heaven – in this case, popular elections – to govern a citizenry 
they discursively construct as too incompetent to rule itself (Barr and Skrbiš 2008). They 
further cement their political claims by conflating the PAP with the nation-state and the 
country, such that what are in actual fact party interests often masquerade as national ones 
instead. Consequently, critics of PAP governance risk appearing as critiquing Singapore itself. 
Economic prosperity provides the PAP leaders with much of their political credibility, so they 
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vigorously liberalize the economy in the name of pragmatism – sometimes with detrimental 
effects on the citizens – to maintain the party's hold on power. To this end, they also jealously 
guard control of the economic developmentalist discourse and other possible discourses of 
nationhood. 
In particular, homosexuality poses an ideological challenge to the PAP. All the major 
ethnic groups in Singapore – the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians – have same-sex 
practices embedded within larger social structures of age, ethnicity, class, and gender in their 
respective cultural histories (Hinsch 1990; Peletz 2009; Vanita 2002). In sharp contrast, the 
modern gay identity calls for individuals to disregard these structures, be true to themselves, 
and to come out so their inner selves can match their outer ones. The PAP leaders object to 
this asocial individualism. They claim it runs counter to both the communitarianism that they 
profess to contain the socially disruptive effects of the country's rapid modernization (Chua 
2003a), and the hetero-patriarchal family that they promote as the bedrock of society and the 
economy (Heng and Devan 1992). In this light, I argue that seemingly homophobic state 
policies are really more heteronormative in nature, as they suppress homosexuality only as a 
side-effect of promoting hetero-patriarchy. They do not stem from a religiously informed 
position that regards homosexuality as sinful, but rather from a philosophically informed 
communitarian one that frames it as an expression of excessive self-indulgence. It is this 
unbridled individualism that state officials try to contain, as I demonstrate in Chapter 3 with 
examples that feature heterosexual citizens. 
Arguing for the communitarian rationale in state policies, however, does not negate 
the considerable disadvantages that these policies place on gay citizens. After all, these 
policies deny them full-fledged citizenship and reinforce popular misconceptions of 
homosexuality as perverse and immoral. This means that in their homes, workplaces, and 
other spaces of everyday life, gay citizens must conscientiously negotiate the meanings of 
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their sexuality through strategies that range from suppressing their sexuality, to linguistic 
subterfuge tactics, and to coming out completely to their friends and family. In recent years, 
LGBT rights activists invoke principles of cultural and sexual citizenship to proclaim their 
loyalty to Singapore and to challenge state constructions of their sexuality. In doing so, they 
unsettle the PAP's ideological work by conceptually untangling the party from Singapore the 
geographical territory, and from Singapore the nation-state. Surprisingly, they do not always 
receive support from the very people that they help. While some gay men hold back for fear 
of state retaliation, others become homonormative by trading their public rights as citizens for 
the privileges of private consumption (Duggan 2003).  
I make three critical anthropological interventions in documenting Singapore's 
citizenship processes. Firstly, political economists fail to adequately explain how the illiberal 
PAP could have produced a modern economy whose vitality rivals that of many liberal 
democracies. After all, modernity implies a transcendence of one's authoritarian past. Some 
scholars try to explain the PAP by framing Singapore in increasingly complex typologies. For 
example, Diamond (2002) locates the country as the sole occupant of the category of 
"hegemonic electoral authoritarianism" in his scheme. Others ignore and/or dismiss as false 
and ineffective the PAP's many ideological attempts to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizens (Sim 2006). Neither complex typologies nor the rejection of the PAP's ideological 
attempts explains how the party can be both stable and legitimate at the same time. The state 
policies towards reproduction and homosexuality crystallize the political tensions between 
the PAP's need for control and its need to appear liberal to secure political support. In 
exploring these policies, I argue that while Singaporeans (especially those from the educated 
middle class) find the PAP electoral and governance strategies ethically dubious, even 
irksome, they nevertheless tolerate the PAP because its leaders promised and continue to 
deliver a high level of economic well-being. This suggests a certain level of pragmatism 
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among the citizens – they do not mind giving up some citizenship rights if they become 
materially comfortable in return. 
Secondly, I highlight the specificities in gay men's lives. Although feminism took root 
in anthropology to rectify the silencing of women's voices in classical ethnographies, its 
theoretical outlook left gender studies closely associated with women's studies. This resulted 
in the analytical category “man” as a stand-in for the universal category of humanity, as if 
culture does not inform men's lives at all. Consequently, “very few within the discipline of 
the 'study of man' had truly examine men as men” (Gutmann 1997: 385, emphasis in 
original). Some notable English-medium ethnographic exceptions include Boellstorff's (2005) 
study of gay Indonesia, Kong's (2009) study of gay men in Hong Kong, and Peletz's (2009) 
study of gender pluralism in early modern Southeast Asia. To address this scholarly 
imbalance, I focus only on gay men and not lesbians in my study. By highlighting the 
strategies meaningful within local rubrics of society and masculinity that gay men deploy to 
negotiate Singapore's gay-unfriendly social landscape, I locate my work within studies of 
non-normative masculinities vis-à-vis regimes of reproductive underpinnings of national 
belonging and citizenship.  
 Lastly, I provide ethnographic instantiations of the sexual citizenship concept. While 
Evans (1993) pioneered its theorization in material terms, cultural geographers such as David 
Bell and Jon Binnie (2000, 2004) still dominate its study. This study reveals that “perverse” gay 
men and lesbians make only “partial citizens” (Richardson 1998: 88). They owe the state taxes, 
must obey its laws, etc., but they cannot and will not channel their sexuality towards the 
“good” goal of emotionally fulfilling procreation to form the state-idealized nuclear family 
(Rubin 1989). Hence, state officials deem them undeserving of the full range of rights and 
privileges that their “good” heterosexual counterparts receive. As a result, some queers 
privatize their sexuality to trade their duties as “good citizens” for the rights to consumption. 
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Calling this exchange “the new homonormativity,” Duggan (2003) highlights the dangers of 
pitching rights claims around the right of access to the trappings of heteronormative privilege. 
By assimilating, one forgoes the right to critique the possibility and desirability of the types 
of sexual citizen one can become. Only recently did anthropologists begin to incorporate the 
concept of sexual citizenship into their work (e.g. Castle 2006; Parikh 2004; and Phillips 
2008). By studying sexual citizenship in Singapore, I illuminate the limits and possibilities of 
the concept, and ultimately show how the state's disciplining of the unruly sexed body 
underpins citizen-state relationships. 
 
Cultural and Sexual Citizenship 
 Focusing only on gay men for reasons that I explained earlier, I invoke citizenship 
concepts to frame my exploration of national belonging in Singapore. In his seminal essay 
where he analyzes the development of legal citizenship in Britain from civil to political to 
social rights from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, Marshall (1950) claims that a full 
citizen must possess all three kinds of rights. He further links this possession to social class. 
This definition reveals a number of modern citizenship's key characteristics. Firstly, Marshall 
reveals the concept's inherent exclusivity. Typically, states grant membership only to those 
individuals who satisfy their membership criteria. Secondly, states may bestow citizenship 
arbitrarily, even when a citizen has done nothing to deserve it. For example, one becomes a 
citizen of the United States simply because she was born there, or because her parents are 
themselves US citizens. Lastly, citizenship buffers against the material and social inequalities 
that capitalism inevitably produces. Seeking to maximize profits, the capitalistic market place 
has little provisions against unemployment, work-related injuries and illnesses, old age, an 
individual's social (ir)relevance, and other vagaries of life that a worker must endure. The 
redistribution of rights and material wealth implicit in citizenship offsets the negative 
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consequences of an unregulated market (Turner 2009). 
 While acknowledging the utility of Marshall's theory, scholars also criticize it on 
several grounds. Firstly, it fails to analyze coherently and consistently the causal mechanisms 
that produced an expansion of citizenship (Alexander 2006). It does not explain how this 
expansion is driven by ethnic discontent in the United States, and by efforts to minimize class 
inequalities to gain access to housing, education, social security, and other basic resources in 
Britain (Shklar 1998). Secondly, it treats citizenship as a uniform and coherent concept, and 
fails to explain how citizenship forms vary across different historical trajectories. For 
instance, the evolution of citizenship in Europe differs from citizenship in East and Southeast 
Asia. Thirdly, the theory assumes a somewhat homogenous society where regional, cultural 
and ethnic divisions pose less import than those of social class. Such a claim is not even 
tenable in Marshall's native Britain, an island that the British share with the Welsh, the Scots, 
and the Irish, much less the rest of the ethnically complex world. Fourthly, the theory says 
little about citizen duties and obligations. It assumes a passive citizenry that the state protects 
from the market's uncertainties through a system of universal social rights, but does not 
question how these social rights transform from mere formal claims to effective forms of 
entitlement (Turner 2009). Fifthly, critics question the limits of the buffer that modern 
citizenship provides against the free market's vagaries, arguing that it neither altered the basic 
structures of inequality in capitalism (Mann 1987), nor improved the position of women in 
society (Siim 2000).   
 Lastly, Marshall's legal definition of citizenship maps national belonging directly onto 
membership in nation-states. However, such a theoretical framing became overly simplistic in 
a globalizing world of rapid cross-border flows of people, capital and information. Indeed, 
scholars now see citizenship as a set of cultural and social processes rather than simply a 
political status, or a juridical contract of rights, entitlements, and obligations between 
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individuals and the state (Shafir 1998). Crenshaw (1995), Lister (1998), Williams (1991), 
Yuval-Davis and Werbner (1999), and other feminists and critical race theorists complicate 
the notion of universal citizenship further by highlighting the inflections that race, gender, 
class, sexuality, and other categories of difference make upon one's understanding of 
citizenship. 
 Marshall's theory attracted many critiques, but this does not mean that we should 
dismiss legal citizenship as a static category, or simply a status whose conferring depends on 
the fulfillment of certain legal requirements. Daniels (2005) reminds us that the cultural 
values and aspirations of a nation-state inform the legal criteria and opinions concerning 
membership in that entity. As the values and aspirations change over time, so do the criteria 
and opinions. The laws that first allowed, then banned, and ultimately reinstated Asian 
migration to the United States from the eighteenth to the twentieth century illustrate this 
cultural-legal connection. This link also identifies citizenship as central to the studies of 
governmentality by focusing on the constitution of the human subject vis-à-vis itself and 
constellations of power (Donzelot 1979). Furthermore, the lack of formal citizenship does not 
automatically result in a lack of cultural citizenship either. Some people who do not fulfill the 
formal requirements of citizenship may still develop a sense of belonging as they are partially 
incorporated within society (Chavez 1998; Flores 1997). 
 Cultural citizenship provides my second anchoring concept. Such citizenship refers to 
the extra-legal emotional ties that bind one to her country. Within anthropology, two scholars 
wield particularly strong influences in the development of cultural citizenship studies. 
Working among US Latinos, Rosaldo (1997) envisions citizenship as a people-driven and 
continually expanding process of inclusion and enfranchisement. To him, 
 
cultural citizenship refers to the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or 
native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, 
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without compromising one's right to belong, in the sense of participating in the 
nation-state's democratic processes (Rosaldo 1994: 57). 
 
Ong (1999) critiques Rosaldo for privileging the agency of subordinated groups too much. 
Indeed, voluntary grassroots associations may hinder the development of inclusive and 
participatory social relations just as well as fostering them (Hefner 2001). Ong (1996) takes a 
more top-down approach, and treats cultural citizenship as a process of subject formation 
where civil institutions socialize newcomers and integrate them into the nation-state. She 
demonstrates a primary concern with the regimes of governmentality in her study of flexible 
citizenship practices among Hong Kong elites (Ong 1999). She does so again in her study of 
how Cambodian-Americans locate the twin processes of being made and self-making in 
institutional webs of power (Ong 2003). Formulated in either Rosaldo's or Ong's way, cultural 
citizenship proves against the anti-citizenship demands that autochthons in Africa (Austen 
1992), Europe (Caestecker 2000), and elsewhere make to “purify” their nations of 
allochthonic “strangers.” However, neither Rosaldo nor Ong conceive of dominant majorities 
and their qualitative citizenship. Referring to Fijian and Malaysian “natives,” Daniels (2005: 
8) notes that 
 
although members of such groups are conventionally thought to be the default citizen-
members of national communities, they may also develop a sense of second-class 
citizenship or marginalized first class citizenship due to particular social and political 
policies or processes. 
 
Hence, full membership in a dominant group does not automatically guarantee cultural 
belonging.  
 More recently, Siu (2005) combines both Rosaldo's and Ong's approaches in her 
analysis of diasporic citizenship among Chinese-Panamanians. Recognizing that people often 
belong to more than one political community, and that such multiple memberships make 
citizens “multi-layered” (Soysal 1994; Yuval-Davis 1999), she analytically separates 
  
 14
citizenship from both the territorially and conceptually bounded nation-state and the concept 
of a singular loyalty to a particular collective. This enables her to conceptualize citizenship as 
being subjected to global forces even as it operates within nation-state boundaries. 
 Related to cultural citizenship, sexual citizenship provides the third concept that 
orients this dissertation. Arising out of the politics surrounding state apathy over the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States in the early 1980s, sexual citizenship poses “a 
deliberate challenge that any notion of the political being must recognize, and attend to, the 
simple yet often-ignored fact that humans are undeniably sexual” (Brown 2006: 874 – 5). 
Armstrong (1994), Evans (1993), and others note that in many democratic countries, 
sexuality informs judgments on whether groups or individuals can participate in public life in 
a responsible and desirable manner. Those whose sexual proclivities that society deems 
suspect, dangerous, or otherwise undesirable may find politicians and policy-makers 
curtailing their civil rights to define the nation's moral geographies. As such, figures as 
diverse as the single mother, the prostitute, the errant father, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, the 
pervert, and the pornographer have all been demonized as ”bad citizens” in different times 
and in different ways to delimit normal and desirable behavior (Knopp 1995). The state's 
punishment of perceived sexual deviance highlights the liminal status of gay men and 
lesbians as “partial citizens” (Richardson 1998: 88) who cannot marry, foster children, serve 
in the military in the same capacity as straight soldiers do, and receive legal protection from 
harassment and discrimination. 
 In this light, the debate among intellectuals and activists over sexual citizenship 
revolves around the balancing of state-granted rights as pay-off for one's responsibilities to 
the state (Bell and Binnie 2000; Evans 1993; Hubbard 2001; Richardson 2000; Weeks 1998). 
To some critics, sexual citizenship as a campaigning platform has been overshadowed by the 
need to secure rights (especially to consumption) in exchange for duties as a “good citizen” 
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who relegates her sexuality to the private sphere. Calling this exchange “the new 
homonormativity,” Duggan (2003) highlights the dangers of pitching rights claims around the 
right of access to the trappings of heteronormative privilege. By assimilating, one forgoes the 
right to critique the possibility and desirability of the types of sexual citizens one can become. 
 Others, especially geographers, consider it essential to examine issues of citizenship 
in terms of space because ideas of citizenship concern the appropriateness of one's behaviors 
in particular spheres of civil life (Smith 1989). Binnie and Valentine (1999) argue that the 
ways Euro-American societies organize space help to naturalize heterosexuality. These 
societies do so by simultaneously saturating spaces of work, leisure and consumption with 
images and behaviors that encourage people to adopt heterosexual identities and 
performances (Nast 1998), while disciplining those who transgress the sexual and spatial 
order with social and legal codes of conduct (Elder 1998). Such policing ranges from the 
formal sex zones that policy-makers set up to contain the sexed, unruly bodies of prostitutes, 
to the informal (but potentially deadly) homophobic abuse that gay men and lesbians risk 
attracting if they display public homosexual affection, friendship or desire. Similar behavior 
by heterosexual couples go often unremarked and unpunished, so this policing reveals the 
aggressive hetero-patriarchy supporting civil society that poses a high barrier to entry to those 
society judged as “immoral” (Adler and Brenner 1992; Namaste 1996; Valentine 1993). 
 Lastly, academics and activists most commonly associate sexual citizenship with non-
normative practices and identities, most notably those of LGBT communities. Consequently, 
some confuse sexual citizenship with LGBT or even queer citizenship. Such thinking 
perpetuates the sexualization of non-normative groups while de-sexualizing the normative 
ones (Bell and Binnie 2006). This thinking also obscures the fact that the contours of sexual 
citizenship have already been heavily heteronormalized. Those who campaign for same-sex 
marriage, for example, model their claims upon the idea of the romantically bonded opposite-
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sex couple not only as the legitimate form of adult intimate relationship, but also as the basis 
of society. As such, Bell and Binnie (ibid.) insist that any further theorizing of sexual 
citizenship must include both normative and non-normative heterosexualities in the 
intellectual conversation. 
 
Research Methods 
 To examine the dynamics of cultural and sexual citizenship in Singapore, I conducted 
a number of summer fieldwork projects there from 2004 to 2006. I returned again in August 
2007, for a total of 17 months this time, to do my dissertational research. Over the years, I 
built a network of informants, many of whom have since become my friends, but I faced 
difficulties in my initial attempts to know them. I hardly knew anyone from the gay social 
circles when I first started. Nobody answered the advertisements for volunteer interviewees 
that I placed on online mailing lists either. These advertisements rarely worked, I realized 
later, because they were the fieldwork equivalent of the cold call. The basic snowball method 
that fieldworkers use to expand their informant networks also proved ineffective at first, 
because it requires the researcher to have a core group of consultants to start the snowball 
rolling. In anticipation of the field research that I would do, however, I joined several gay-
oriented email lists and off-line social groups even before I began my doctoral studies. The 
friends that I made in these groups later formed my first informant pool. 
 During my dissertation research, I participated widely in the activities that local gay 
groups organized. These activities ranged from the political (e.g. IndigNation events), to the 
professional (e.g. business seminars organized by a local gay net-working group), to the 
entirely social (e.g. potluck dinners, watching movies, picnicking, and taking leisure trips to 
neighboring Malaysia). A local gay group, TheBearProject, organized the bulk of these social 
activities. I befriended the men (and, on rare occasions, the women) of this fat-friendly group 
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earlier, partly out of personal interests and partly due to a previous project that investigated 
the discursive formation of hyper-masculinity and fatness among gay men. These men, in 
fact, formed the majority of my informants. Altogether, I interviewed 29 men. 27 of the men 
self-identify as gay and two as straight. As I discussed earlier, I did this to address the bias in 
gender studies where men typically stand in for humanity and lose their male voices. My 
informants come from a range of different social and demographic backgrounds. Most of 
them were in their late 20s to mid-30s at the time of the interviews, although a small number 
was older. The majority also reported middle-class backgrounds, albeit to different degrees. 
They hold jobs ranging from multi-media designers and trainee teachers, to university 
researchers and retired CEOS. Most also claim Chinese ethnicity. These various biases 
probably stemmed from informants' tendencies to befriend others of a similar social 
background, which in turn influenced the type of informants I got to know through the 
snowball method that I used. 
 As for the interviews, I conducted them mainly in Singlish, a creole that Singaporeans 
in their 20s or younger often learn at home and spoken as a pidgin by others in their 40s or 
older. Reflecting its origins in the language contact between the English of Singapore’s 
British colonizers and the diverse languages of the colonial subjects, Singlish syntax 
resembles that of the southern varieties of Chinese. The lexicon consists mostly of English 
words, but Malay, Hokkien, and Cantonese (the latter two being popular southern Chinese 
languages in Singapore) made significant contributions. To a lesser extent, so did South Asian 
languages such as Tamil and Hindi. As a grammatical description and socio-linguistic 
analysis of Singlish go beyond the scope of this dissertation, I highlight its main features 
instead. Kang (1992/93) characterizes Singlish by its use of local expressions (e.g. kena 
arrow = to receive an onerous task); code mixing/switching (e.g. You siao ah? = Are you 
crazy?); discourse particles that modify a sentence’s meaning or tone but not its 
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grammaticality (the most famous being lah, a particle that simultaneously asserts a position 
and entices solidarity); and direct translations from local languages. An example would be 
You see me no up, from Mandarin Ni kan wo bu qi, meaning You look down on me.  
 Platt and Weber (1980) regard Singlish as a speech continuum that ranges from the 
basilect to the mesolect to the acrolect, with each lect corresponding to the educational 
background and socio-economic status of its speakers. The higher the lect, the closer Singlish 
resembles Standard English. Kang (1992/93) also characterizes Singlish as domain-sensitive. 
State officials demonize it as sub-standard English and try to eradicate it through the annual 
Speak Good English Movement (Rubdy 2001). Consequently, local writers have yet to 
compose any significant piece of literature entirely in Singlish. However, local movie-makers 
often incorporate Singlish lexemes and phrases into their work. Reflecting the popular nature 
of the language, most Singaporeans remain generally well-disposed towards this creole (Kang 
1992/93), especially when they use it in such familiar and intimate domains of talk as the 
interviews I conducted. In more formal contexts, Singlish (especially in its basilectal form) is 
only acceptable for the less educated. My informants come mainly from educated 
backgrounds, so we conversed largely in mesolectal and acrolectal Singlish. 
 I received my formal graduate education in the United States, but my own 
biographical background positions me as a so-called “native” anthropologist in multiple 
ways. Like most of my informants, I am Singaporean by birth and nationality, male, Chinese, 
gay, and fluent in English, Mandarin and Singlish. Sub-ethnically, I am also Cantonese and I 
speak the associated language, a variety of Yue Chinese widely understood in Singapore. My 
privileged position enabled me to befriend my consultants and establish the rapport necessary 
for successful fieldwork relatively easily. I could empathize with my informants' anxieties 
that rose from living with the sword of Damocles of an anti-sodomy law, not knowing if the 
sword will ever drop despite the Prime Minister's promise to not enforce the law. Having 
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returned to live in the family home each time I got back to Singapore, I also understand how 
restrictive hetero-patriarchal housing laws and exorbitant real estate prices greatly inform my 
informants' decision to live with their parents. Like my consultants, I am also frustrated at 
times from having to hide my sexuality from my family and to subordinate my adult self to 
parents who still at times treat me as if I were still a child. 
 I do not deny that being a Singaporean on so many levels aided me greatly in my 
fieldwork. However, I echo Kirin Narayan (1993) in cautioning against exoticizing the figure 
of the “native” anthropologist as a bearer of the stamp of authenticity to such an extent that it 
overshadows commonalities or complexities. The heterogeneity inherent within any given 
cultural system or society immediately calls into doubt any claims one may make of being an 
authentic insider (Aguilar 1981; Messerschmidt 1981). Indeed, my friends already call me 
cheem (Singlish for “complicated”) or “Professor Tan” in jest sometimes, even before I earn 
my doctorate. This indicates that my overseas graduate education set me apart from them. 
Furthermore, sub-cliques exist even within small groups like TheBearProject where a core 
group of about twenty members attend its activities regularly. One of these sub-cliques, for 
example, go to drink and sing karaoke regularly. This group hardly ever an invitation to me to 
partake in these activities, partly because I never signaled a desire for them, and partly 
because I rarely drink. Like the act of sharing food (Carsten 1995), the act of drinking 
together creates a sense of camaraderie among the participants, so my abstinence shut me out 
from the bar-room conviviality.  
 Other barriers to entry into gay bars exist. For instance, my limited expendable 
income as a graduate student makes me feel uneasy being in the bars at times. Unlike the 
United States where they function as a crucial locus of socialization outside of the home and 
the work place for all social classes, gay bars in Singapore bear a distinctively middle class 
flavor. The refreshments they sell, even soft drinks, cost S$10 (about US$7) or more. I 
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remember paying for a glass of Coke at a bar once with a S$10 note. To my surprise, the 
bartender took the money and did not give any change back! Another time when I 
investigated the formation of the cluster of gay businesses in Singapore's Chinatown, my 
friend Eileena brought me to three lesbian bars after she found out I never went inside one 
before. To minimize cost, we only bought one drink each at each bar we went to. At one 
watering hole tucked into a non-descriptive corner on the second floor in a row of low-lying 
shop houses, the owner nearly denied us entry because she operated her business as a woman-
only space. She allowed gay men in – and only gay men, she stressed emphatically – if they 
were celebrating a special occasion such as a birthday. Even then, they must be accompanied 
by women. I did not dress “gay” enough for her, apparently, and I had already celebrated my 
birthday a month earlier. Luckily, Eileena happened to be a well-known figure in the local 
lesbian social circles. Giving Eileena face, the bar owner let us in. Inside, Eileena told me that 
women-only spaces provide important respite to lesbians tired from the stress of living in 
patriarchal Singapore. Not only must they fend off unwanted advances from straight men 
who mistake them for straight women, gay men can also behave insensitively around them by 
unwittingly passing misogynistic remarks. She claimed that as a result, some lesbians 
developed a sense of antipathy, even misandry, towards gay men. Some gay men, she 
insisted, also feel the same towards lesbians. The above examples illustrate that while 
Singaporean bars that cater to gay men and lesbians offer rare spaces where their clientele can 
congregate and socialize across ethnic boundaries in relative safety from the surveillance of 
family and state (cf. Bell 1983), they can also exclude in terms of class, gender and sexuality. 
For example, transitioning transgenders may find their presence unwanted because their 
sexual in-betweenness unsettle normative notions of sex and gender that gay men and 
lesbians adhere to (Valentine 2007). More importantly, the examples show how being a 
“native” anthropologist guarantees neither immediate access to ethnographic information nor 
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authenticity to the data gathered. 
 
A Preview of the Dissertation 
 Having discussed the main concepts that frame my research, I now outline the 
chapters that make up the rest of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I present a brief history of 
nation-building in Singapore as a prelude to the discussions in the following chapters. Using 
race as a theoretical frame, I trace the development of key features of present-day 
Singaporean citizenship through the country's history as 1)  a thirteenth-century CE port in 
the Sumatra-based kingdom of Srivijaya; 2) a British trading port (1819 – 1963); 3) a British 
colony on the verge of independence (1941 – 1965); and 4) finally, as an independent city-
state (1965 – present). As I do so, I advocate a new theory of ethnonormativity to address the 
inadequacies of modern race theories that Winant (2000) observes. 
 In Chapter 3, I discuss theories of nationalism and the nation-state, and the challenges 
they face from globalization. I consider how the PAP leaders use state apparatuses to socially 
engineer Singaporeans into citizens who strengthen both Singapore's position as a modern 
city-state and the leaders' claim to political legitimacy. I thematically divide this myriad of 
citizen-making policies into three groups. The first group seeks to transform citizens into 
living embodiments of their officially designated race and culture. This involves the heavy 
racialization and linguistic standardization of a previously exuberant but messy ethnoscape, 
the result of which determines the languages a citizen speaks, the kind of socialization she 
undergoes, and possibly even her occupation and place of residence. The second group aims 
to maximize the citizens' economic productive capabilities. These policies all demand the 
formation of neo-liberal citizen-subjects with highly flexible work ethics. However, the rapid 
implementation of these strategies produces national discourses that reflect Singapore's 
uneasiness with modernity. The last group portrays the biologically fecund Singaporean as a 
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citizen archetype to alleviate the country's dismal birth rates. Consequently, state policies 
privilege the formation of hetero-patriarchal and extended families over other family types.. 
 In Chapter 4, I compare (neo)liberal theories of citizen-state relationships with those 
of the Confucianism that PAP leaders espouse. Next, I argue that Singapore's economic 
developmentalism produces immense wealth for the country, and much symbolic power and 
political credibility for the PAP leaders (Chua 1997). However, these leaders can only 
maintain their ideology by suppressing all non-state nationhood discourses. This creates an 
affective gulf between the PAP and the people, such that citizens think it shames them to heed 
the citizen-making policies (Lim 1994). Insofar as PAP leaders conflate their political party 
with Singapore as both the geographical territory and the nation-state, this divide also 
effectively inhibits the development of patriotism among the citizens.  
 Next, I examine alternate discourses of sexual citizenship that LGBT rights activists 
put forth. After a brief discussion of the anti-sodomy law and its socio-legal impact on gay 
male lives, I examine the rapid expansion of gay spaces and LGBT rights discourses within 
the last two decades. This includes the emergence of Chinatown as a locus of popular gay 
culture; the rise and fall of the Nation series of gay circuit parties; and the controversial 
public campaign in 2007 to decriminalize homosexuality. I argue here that while these rights 
discourses raise public awareness of the socio-legal injustice that gay men face, their 
ideological focus on pre-social individual rights remains antithetical to the Confucianism that 
state officials use to justify their pro-family stance. This explains why LGBT rights activists 
continues to produce limited success vis-à-vis the state. 
 In Chapter 5, I turn to individual gay men themselves to see if they negotiate the 
everyday meanings of their homosexuality and their relationships with the seemingly 
monolithic state. I begin by discussing theories of gender, gender performance and 
masculinity, paying particular attention to those discourses that make sense to the Chinese 
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men who form most of my informant pool. I question the meanings carried by the sexual 
identity “gay” that overlap with and differ from those borne by local labels that index non-
heterosexuality. Next, I consider the culturally meaningful strategies that gay men use to 
negotiate their sexuality and their relationships with the state, and to evade familial and state 
surveillance of their sexuality. I do so in the two key citizen-making sites of the home, and 
compulsory military service. In the home space, I contrast Cartesian concepts of selfhood 
with local ones. I do so to interrogate the relevance of “coming out,” arguably the central 
ritual in the Euro-American gay identity-formation process, in Singapore. Wary of the trauma 
and direct confrontation inherent within the open declaration of one's homosexuality, many of 
my informants decided not to “come out” but to “go home” with their boyfriends instead 
(Chou 2000). In the military, I argue that while gay recruits can find its highly 
heteronormative spaces very trying, they can have much room to maneuver in, provided that 
they measure up to the standards of masculine performances that the military has set. 
 I conclude my dissertation in Chapter 6. After summarizing how PAP leaders claim 
and retain their political legitimacy, I discuss possible avenues of future research on cultural 
and sexual citizenship in Singapore. I also predict what may happen to the local LGBT rights 
movement there in the near future. 
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Chapter 2: A Short History of Nation-Building in the Lion City 
 
Figure 1: Map of Modern Southeast Asia (Source: Singh and Than 2008: inside cover) 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I present a brief history of nation-building in Singapore to set the stage 
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for the discussions in the later chapters. Although Singapore has a semi-mythical past that 
archeologists ascertained, most histories trace the country's origins to its modern founding as 
an entrepôt by Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East India Company. Like other colonial 
powers the world over, the British justified their territorial expansion in terms of their 
supposed racial superiority. These racial discourses not only shaped the relationships between 
all racial groups in the colonial port, they continue to profoundly configure what it means to 
be Singaporean even after the city became an independent nation-state. Hence, race makes 
for an excellent conceptual frame for the following historical discussion. Yet, existing racial 
theories remain inadequate. Racially based distinctions persist in spite of the scientific 
affirmation that race lacks a biological basis, and the many state-sponsored racial reforms 
designed to overcome such distinctions. Hence, I propose to forward a new theory of 
ethnonormativity to better address these conceptual shortcomings. 
 
Towards a New Racial Theory of Ethnonormativity 
 I begin by first tracing the origins of “race” as a concept. By “race,” I echo Winant 
(2000: 172) and define it as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts 
and interests in reference to different types of human bodies.” Classical scholars such as 
Hannaford (1996) and Poliakov (1965 – 1985) generally agree that while ethnic prejudice 
existed in Greek, Roman, and early Christian thought, a concept truly equivalent to that of 
“race” did not. To the Greeks and the Romans, a civilized person differed from a barbarian 
not by his skin color, but by his residence in the cities and his ability to participate in public 
life. Indeed, the early Christians celebrated the conversion of “barbaric” Africans as evidence 
of the universalism of their faith (Snowden 1983). This acceptance of black people developed 
in the fifteenth century into a negrophilia centered partially on the mystical Prestor John, a 
non-European Christian monarch first identified with India but ultimately with Ethiopia. His 
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prescribed role was to aid European Christians against invading Muslims (Devisse 1976; 
Pieterse 1992). This negrophilia did not last. When Ethiopia failed to impress the Portuguese 
who arrived there from India in the sixteenth century, it was gradually relegated to the fringe 
of the European imagination. 
 Yet, scholars remain uncertain of the etymology of the term “race.” Most modern 
English dictionaries assume that “race” has a Latin root by tracing it to Italian, but no 
scholarly consensus exists. Fowler (1926 [1962]) claimed that he knew of no known Latin 
terms from which “race” could have descended. Dover (1951) argued that “race” came from 
the Arabic ras (meaning “chief head, origin, or beginning) and entered English via Spanish 
(as raza) and other Romance languages. The earliest Spanish dictionary, the Tesoro de la 
Lengua Castellana o Española that Covarrubias Horozco ([1611] 2006) compiled, identifies 
raza as pertaining to the threads in a weave of cloth and, more specifically, to the “caste or 
quality of authentic horses” branded with an iron for recognition. This latter definition 
suggests that “race” originally had something to do with animal husbandry. Trevor (1951), on 
the other hand, contended that “race” derived (through the Italian razza) from the Latin ratio, 
an accusative form with meanings similar to such classificatory terms as “kind”, “species,” 
and “nature” (see also Spitzer 1948). 
 More importantly, Trevor (1951) argued that as a term denoting a group of plants, 
animals, or persons connected by common descent or common features, “race” entered the 
English lexicon no earlier than the sixteenth century. The earliest use of the term he knew of 
occurs in Dunbar’s 1508 poem The Dance of the Sevin Deidlie Synnis, where the poet refers 
to the “backbytarris of sindry racis.” Such use, however, remained rare at this point in time. 
The English only began using “race” as a technical reference to human groups in the 
seventeenth century. One use referred to characteristics or qualities, including one’s inherited 
disposition or temperament, common to certain types of persons. Hence, John Bunyan refers 
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to a race of saints in his 1678 Pilgrim’s Progress. Various learned men, in attempting to 
describe and classify different human groups, used “race” in a second manner by occasionally 
interchanging it with “species” as a general mode of describing people (Smedley 1999). As 
such, “race” had fuzzy semantic boundaries at this point in time and did not denote 
biologically inherited qualities as it does now in American English. 
 The biological shift in the semantics of “race” did not occur until the Europeans 
started colonializing other parts of the world in ernest in the eighteenth century onwards. To 
justify the un-Christian-like domination of non-European peoples during their territorial 
expansions, colonial powers turned to philosophical and scientific discourses that naturalized 
purported differences in humanity between colonizers and colonized. During the formative 
years of their discipline as a professional field, anthropologists aided this scientific racism by 
elaborating typologies and techniques to classify and operationalize the various discrete 
“races” of man (Baker 1998; Gailey 1994; Smedley 1999). They often did so in what Wolf 
(1994: 4) calls “bio-moral” terms that correlated objective physical measurements with the 
subjective European values of civilized humanity. Kipling's transparently racist 1899 poem 
The White Man’s Burden reflects this false sense of European cultural superiority. Here, he 
cast the colonial project as the Europeans' noble duty to uplift the “new-caught, sullen 
peoples, / half-devil and half-child” among the colonized subjects. Yet, contradictions riddled 
scientific racist discourses right from the beginning. On the one hand, European thinkers 
imagined culture as a learned principle of psychic unity that universalized human mental and 
psychic capabilities. On the other, they reserved rationality and cultural perfectability only to 
themselves. Indeed, Europe's sense of self was defined in oppositional relations to the 
invented primitive savagery of the colonized Other (Pandian 1985; Trouillot 1991). 
 In the British Empire, a series of crises at the turn of the twentieth century that 
questioned its viability further cemented the semantic changes. On the international front, 
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Germany, the USA, and Japan began to challenge British global hegemony. Domestically, the 
rise of feminism, decreasing population growth rates (mostly among the middle and upper 
classes), and the revelation of physical inadequacies among army recruits during the Boer 
War (1899 – 1902) all contributed to a rising fear that national degeneracy had taken hold 
firmly. These national anxieties provided fertile ground for the rise of eugenics that promised 
to fix British racial “superiority” permanently in one’s own body. Especially tasked as 
“guardians of the race,” mothers guided their children’s (especially their daughters’) 
developing sexuality towards reproducing the British race, and away from the highly 
undesired goal of pleasurable promiscuity. Discursively, human sexuality became essentially 
and naturally related to love and procreation. In contrast, promiscuous sex became sub-
humanized (given its “lack” of love and the “human” side of sex), purposeless (seeking 
immediate gratification rather than the long term satisfaction of love and procreation), and 
unclean (Bland 1982). 
 About the same time, however, others challenged the idea racial determinism. Boas 
and his students revolutionized anthropology by shifting the explanation of human social 
variances away from physical causes to cultural ones. Boas, for instance, critiqued 
mainstream ideas of heredity by proving that the cephalic index and other bodily 
measurements varied across generations according to changes in nutrition. Outside of the 
discipline, the anatomist T. Wingate Todd demonstrated the absence of racial differences in 
the development of black and white brains (Rankin-Hill and Blakey 1994). Du Bois (1899) 
built a strong base of empirical data to argue for the democritization of racial relations. 
Consciously viewing Chicago as a laboratory, the Chicago School of sociologists focused on 
crime, slums, poverty, and other often-racialized social problems. Examining race from both 
its micro and macro aspects (Blumer 1958; Park 1950), these studies definitively refute the 
racial biologism that characterized earlier racial theories to assert the socially constructed 
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nature of race. 
 After World War II, scientific racism was further discredited because of its 
unwholesome war-time associations with fascism. Post-war racial theories aimed to 
democratize racial relations, and they showed three theoretical tendencies. As Winant (2000: 
178) explains: 
 
Ethnicity-based theories were generally the most mainstream or moderate. They saw 
race as a culturally grounded framework of collective identity. Class-based theories 
understood race in terms of group-based stratification and economic competition. 
Nation-based theories perceived race in the geopolitical terms largely given by the 
decolonization process so prominent in the postwar era. They focused attention on 
issues of peoplehood and race unity, rootedness, citizenship and irredentism 
(emphasis in original). 
 
Nevertheless, problems plagued all three theoretical orientations. All three, for instance, 
showed signs of reductionism that conceptually subordinated race to the more supposedly 
more “real” social structures of ethnicity, class, and nation. Furthermore, none can 
sufficiently explain why racial discrimination endures, albeit now in a less obvious manner 
because of its post-war stigmatization, despite the many state-led reforms designed to 
eradicate it (Winant 2000). 
 Other more specific issues also troubled the three types of theories. Ethnicity-based 
theories suggested that discrimination would diminish with increased contact, integration and 
assimilation of different races, as well as the establishment of more racial equality laws for 
jobs, housing, education and other crucial social domains. These theories, however, were 
severely contradicted by persisting obstacles to integration and the injustice of racial 
minorities being forced to assimilate majority cultural norms. Even England, France, and 
other Western liberal democracies exclude despite their rejection of the racial hierarchies of 
the past. Taking a differentialist approach to these theories, they adopt exclusionary policies 
that hinder racial pluralization amd integration in the name of defending “national culture” 
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(Taguieff 2001; Wieviorka 1995).  
 In contrast, class-based theories argued for racial strife as symptomatic of larger class 
conflicts. These theories presupposed the existence of well-defined racial stratification and 
inter-group competition in the post-war world. It also required both inter-racial solidarity and 
affirmative action-like programs to ameliorate the effects of discrimination (Wilson 1996). 
However, growing class inequalities within racially defined groups saps the group of both its 
political and cultural cohesion to weaken the case for affirmative action. Recalcitrant 
commitments to racial privileges also limit the socio-political gains generated by the 
economic redistributions of affirmative action plans (Winant 2000). Lastly, international and 
intra-national heterogeneity cast doubt on nation-based theories, especially after post-war 
economic globalization triggered unprecedented migration and advances in tele-
communication technologies. Transnational forms of racial awareness remain, but now take 
the form of diasporic identities (Appadurai 1996; Lemelle and Kelley 1994; Siu 2005). Such 
transnational racial solidarity lack the strong unifying political will that marked pan-
continentalist and non-aligned movements. Consequently, nation-based theories have 
degenerated into crude forms of cultural nationalism that brought about the genocidical wars 
in Rwanda and the Balkans (Winant 2000). 
 To explain the persistence of racial discrimination in the current moment when most 
state governments nominally profess anti-racist beliefs, any new theory must satisfy certain 
conditions. As Winant (2000) points out, such a theory must 1) recognize the 
comparative/historical dimensions of race; 2) account for both the micro and macro aspects 
of racial signification and racialized social structure; and 3) acknowledge the political terrain 
of the current moment where old forms of racial and gendered domination have been 
radically changed by the various civil rights movements of the 1960s. The racial formation 
theory that Omi and Winant (1994) formulated begins to address these issues. Treating race 
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as a social construct, this theory argues for the inherent instability of racial meanings; treats 
these meanings as the results of the interactions between larger social, political and economic 
forces that combine discursive elements with structural ones; and views these interactions as 
different sequences of interpretations articulated by many agents who operate on various 
scales (Winant 2000). 
 Working with the racial formation theory as my basis, I propose here a new racial 
theory that I call ethnonormativity. Ethnonormativity draws heavily upon from two theories 
related to sexual normativity. I define the first theory, heteronormativity, as a set of deeply 
rooted (and often taken-for-granted) beliefs that groups people into two (and only two) 
distinct and complementary genders of “man” and “woman.” Treating heterosexuality as the 
normal sexual orientation everyone should have, it aligns biological sex with its normative 
gender identities and gender roles, and stigmatizes those who violate the heterosexual habitus 
as abnormal and perverse (Rich 1980; Warner 1991). As for the second theory, 
homonormativity, Duggan (2003: 50) defines it as “a politics that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while 
promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized 
gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.” In other words, homonormativity 
refers to politically complicitous attitudes where individuals from sexual minorities acquiesce 
to the racism and heterosexism of the existing racial and gender orders in exchange for 
material well-being. 
 Ethnonormativity combines the above two normativities in the analysis of racial 
relations. It recognizes that no matter how natural a particular racial group's social, political 
and/or economic dominance may appear, that group must work to create and continuously 
reproduce that dominance, or risk losing that hegemonic position. These racial formation 
processes should be evidently clear in the following historical discussion. Unlike racial 
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formation theory, however, ethnonormativity also includes the possibility of individuals from 
racial minority groups deliberately adopting the dominant racial group's cultural practices for 
perceived ideological and/or material gains. This assimilation can be fairly innocuous. 
Although the increasing use of veils by Muslim women in Java can be read as an appeal to an 
Islamic, non-Western modernity (Brenner 1996), it can also be read as an attempt to emulate 
the Arabs and their “purer,” more orthodox form of Islam. However, assimilation can also 
have consequences as fatal as language death. Arguing for the use of ethnicity as an analytical 
lens for language shifts, Kulick (1992) argues that such shifts occur when a people link their 
vernacular language with a stigmatized ethnic identity and start to abandon that identity by 
giving up their minority language in favor of the language of the dominant group/s. In East 
Sutherland, for instance, socially ostracized Irish fishermen gave up their Gaelic for English 
to better assimilate into the surrounding population (Dorian 1981). 
 
Pre-Colonial Singapore (before 1819) 
 Now that I have outlined the theory of ethnonormativity, I shall now use it to frame 
the analysis of Singapore's history of nation-building. Such histories typically locate the 
country's modern founding as a British trading post in 1819. In reality, a trading settlement 
already existed near the mouth of present-day Singapore River since at least the thirteenth 
century CE. According to the Sejarah Melayu (or The Malay Annals), a Srivijayan prince 
called Sang Nila Utama founded and ruled Singapura (or “Lion City” in Malay) from 1299 to 
1347. While hunting for deer one day in the nearby Riau Archipelago, he spotted a beach 
shining like brilliant white cloth in the sun on the island of Temasek across the sea. He 
decided to visit the island, but stormy weather forced him and his retinue to land at the mouth 
of the present-day Singapore River. Travelling further inland, he spotted a strange-looking 
animal with a red body, black head and white breast. The magnificent creature moved swiftly 
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into the dense jungles, prompting him to ask what manner of beast he just saw. His chief 
minister replied he spotted a lion. In truth, Sang Nila Utama probably saw a Malayan tiger as 
lions are not indigenous to Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, he took his sighting as a good omen. 
When he founded a new trading port on the island later, he named it after the great cat. 
 Sang Nila Utama and his descendents ruled Singapura until 1401, when invaders from 
the Java-based empire of Majapahit forced the prince's great grandson Parameswara to flee to 
Melaka. There, Parameswara founded the famous sultanate named after the place. 
Archeological excavations conducted on Fort Canning Hill, known as Bukit Larangan or 
“Forbidden Hill” in Malay, confirmed local Malay beliefs about the hill as the site for Sang 
Nila Utama's palace. Digs conducted on other sites near the Singapore River also ascertained 
the existence of a regional trading hub called Temasek that dates back to the tenth century 
CE. The Singapore River sites yielded gold armlets that came from the Majapahit Empire 
(late thirteenth to early sixteenth century CE) and Chinese glass beads, pottery shards and 
coins. The coins originated from China's Song dynasty (960 – 1279 CE) (Low 2004). 
 
Colonial Singapore (1819 – 1959) 
 By the time Raffles arrived in Singapura in 1819, the former regional trading hub had 
been reduced to a fishing village in the Sultanate of Johor. Despite strong objections from the 
British East India Company, Raffles wanted to set up a new trading post to challenge the 
Dutch monopoly over the highly lucrative spice trade originating from the Moluccas. Raffles 
chose Singapura because of its deep natural harbor. Its strategic geographical location at the 
southern terminus of the Straits of Malacca along the China-India trade route also made it an 
ideal location for a port for Southeast Asian jungle products. The Sejarah Melayu's favorable 
description of Singapura further convinced Raffles of his choice, a fact that most people still 
under-appreciate (Miksic 2004). Having aligned himself politically with the Dutch, then-
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Sultan of Johor Tengku Abdul Rahman would never agree to a British base in Singapura. Yet, 
he did not have a solid claim on the throne. His elder brother, Tengku Hussein, should have 
become the sultan when their father died in 1812. Tengku Hussein was away getting married 
in Pahang at that time (Figure 2), so he could not attend to the dying sultan to legitimize his 
claim on the throne as local customs dictated. Tengku Abdul Rahman became sultan instead. 
Taking advantage of this political feud, Raffles offered Tengku Hussein both official British 
recognition of his status as Johor's legitimate ruler and a generous yearly stipend of £5000 (a 
princely sum of several hundred thousand pounds in today's economy). In return, Tengku 
Hussein allowed the British to colonize Singapura, which Raffles renamed Singapore. Both 
parties ratified this treaty on 6 February 1819 (Turnbull 1989). 
 Naturally, Raffles' move incensed the Dutch. Insisting that Raffles intruded into their 
sphere of influence, the Dutch threatened to reclaim their territory by force. Tensions 
persisted until the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. Besides granting the British 
access to the Moluccas, this treaty also established clear boundaries of influence between the 
two colonial powers. It relegated Sumatra and the Riau Archipelago to the former, and 
Peninsula Malaya to the latter. The Dutch withdrew their opposition to Singapore, and 
exchanged their control of Melaka for that of the British port at Bencoolen in Java. With the 
Dutch threat now neutralized, Singapore grew rapidly. In 1821, the new cosmopolitan town 
boasted a population of some 5,000 inhabitants who comprised of 3,000 Malays, more than 
1,000 Chinese, about 600 Bugis from what is now Sulawesi in Indonesia, and a smattering of 
peoples who traditionally traded in the region. These included Indians, Armenians, Arabs, and 
Europeans (especially the Greeks). By 1867, the population mushroomed to more than 
81,000, of whom 65 percent (or 55,000) hailed from China (Turnbull 1989). This established 
Chinese numerical dominance on the island. This growing population lived in an ethnically 
segregated city that Raffles deliberatedly planned to keep the British from their non-European 
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subjects (Figure 3). This town plan reflected both a “divide and rule” policy that maintained 
British ethnonormative hegemony (Abraham 1983; Cham 1977; Stenson 1980), and Raffles' 
own belief that enclaves facilitate the development of occupational niches associated with 
particular ethnic groups. Such a belief originated from Southeast Asian urban planning 
traditions (Reid 1993), traditions that he undoubtedly learnt during his tenure as the Governor 
of Bencoolen. Such early urban planning gave rise to the government district, and the major 
ethnic quarters of Chinatown and Kampong Glam (for the Malays) in present-day Singapore. 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Colonial Malaya (Source: Hirschman 1986: 335) 
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Figure 3: Raffles’ Planned Layout for Colonial Singapore 
(Source: Huang, Teo and Heng, 1995: 30) 
  
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 also hastened the British take-over of Peninsular 
Malaya, a process already in progress given the strong political influence that British planters 
wielded in many areas there. One such planter, for example, negotiated successfully with the 
Sultan of Kedah for the British to lease Penang. Furthermore, the British controlled the India-
based production of opium, a commodity much sought after in Malaya. In 1826, they re-
organized Singapore, Melaka, Penang and the adjacent Wellesley Province on the mainland 
into a single administrative unit called the Straits Settlements. Singapore became the capital 
of this new unit. Over the next 50 years, the British built “British Malaya” where they came 
to indirectly rule the rest of the peninsular through a series of complicated political 
maneuvers. Indirect rule maximized the effectiveness of colonial rule, while minimizing its 
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costs by incorporating local officials into its structure. Thus, it saved the imperial government 
the cost of setting up and staffing an entirely new administration. The British also hoped to 
forestall any possible revolts by accomodating local customs (Crowder 1964).  
 In 1896, the British made Kuala Lumpur the capital of the Federated Malay States 
(FMS) that they organized from the states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang. 
Officials from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur jointly administered the FMS. The British called 
the other five states of Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu the Unfederated 
Malay States (UMS) (Figure 2). Although the British wielded much influence in these states, 
they never did so to the same degree as the Straits Settlements and the FMS. The main 
difference between the FMS and the UMS laid in the degree of political power their sultans 
retained. FMS sultans relinquished their political power, and acted only with the due consent 
of their respective British Residents. UMS sultans, in contrast, retained their autonomy 
(Turnbull 1989). 
 The British administration of the diverse ethnic groups living in Malaya strongly 
influenced how present-day Singaporeans understand “race” as a citizenship category. For 
example, the CMIO model that the Singaporean state officials now use to classify citizens as 
“Chinese”, “Malay”, “Indian,” or “Others” originates from the census categories that the 
British used. First conducted in the Straits Settlements in 1871, these censuses employed 
categories in increasing numbers and complexity over the years. This growth reflected not 
only an expanding awareness of the immense variations among the colonized subjects, but 
also a critical shift in the meaning of “race” from that of “sharing the same characteristics” 
(see Chapter 2 of Smedley 1999 for the etymology of “race”) to one that denotes different 
inherent capacities when eugenics became popular at the turn of the twentieth century (Bland 
1982). The modern CMIO model inherits this idea of biological potentiality from the old 
censuses. When applied in its current rigid form, it determines what a citizen speaks, the 
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socialization process she undergoes, and possibly even where she lives. I will discuss the 
social implications of the CMIO model on Singaporean citizenship further in Chapter 3. 
 We can also trace the origins of certain racial stereotypes that circulate now in 
present-day Singapore to the colonial period. In the eyes of the colonial administration as 
well as many present-day Chinese Singaporeans, Malays suffer from “traits of complacency, 
indolence, apathy, infused with a love of leisure and an absence of motivation and discipline” 
(Rahim 1998: 49; see also Hussein Alatas 1977). In truth, this stereotype originates from 
colonial British thought. Hirschman (1986) argues that the Malays historically lacked a niche 
for wage labor. Peasants typically engaged in small-scale farming and fishing for sustenance, 
and worked in tin mines belonging to their chiefs and sultans only under duress. The 
likelihood of peasants running away to the under-populated frontier limited excessive 
oppression, but frequent confiscation of surplus produce by the aristocrats provided the 
peasants with little incentives to produce more and accumulate to maximize profits. When the 
British arrived, they improved peasant life somewhat by outlawing debt slavery and 
absorbing the Malay elites into a pension scheme that made them less dependent on peasant 
labor. However, accounts of life in British tin mines and plantations by Blyth (1947), Sandhu 
(1969), and others paint a dismal picture of high mortality rates, low wages, and entrapment 
in debt cycles. Not surprisingly, few found such work appealing enough to abandon their 
traditional means of livelihood. Having just developed their own Calvinism-informed 
Protestant work ethics at that time, the colonial administrators interpreted the lack of the 
same beliefs among the Malays as indicative of an indolent pleasure-seeking nature. They 
branded the Malays as such and depicted them discursively as living in backward villages, 
despite evidence that shows the peasants as capable of economic entrepreneurship when it 
made sense to do so (Rudner 1970; Lim 1977).  
 In sharp contra-distinction to the figure of the “lazy” Malay stands that of the 
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“hardworking but materialistic” Chinese. To counter the unavailability of cheap and abundant 
labor from the Malays, the British administrators authorized the massive in-migration of 
Chinese and Indian laborers. Indeed, Hirshman (1986) argues that the British depended 
almost entirely on the Chinese for their economic base. Taxation on such popular Chinese 
pastimes as gambling and smoking opium, and Chinese economic interests in tin-mining 
formed the main sources of revenue for the colonial administration. Nobody denied Chinese 
entrepreneurship, but this quality generated both European admiration and resentment. Walter 
Anderson, a merchant in Singapore, commented that  
 
[the Chinese] are, as a race, capable of civilization of the highest kind. They are at 
once laborers and statesmen. They can work in any climate, hot or cold, and they 
have great mercantile capacity ... we are pleased to see them flocking [to Malaya] as 
they do in thousands” (quoted in Kratoska 1983: 76 – 7).  
 
Newbold (1839 Vol. 1: 10), however, derided Chinese wealth because of the competition that 
the Chinese pose to European economic interests: “Whenever money is to be acquired by the 
peaceful exercise of agriculture, by handicrafts, by the opening of mines of tin, iron ore or 
gold, amidst savage hordes and wild forests, there will be found the greedy Chinese.”  
 The ethnic segregation that characterized colonial Singaporean society helped 
perpetuate the above stereotypes. As immigrants, the Chinese and the Indians bore a 
sojourner mentality. They had far more interests in striking it rich in Malaya and returning 
home in glory than in learning about or making social connections with other ethnic groups 
that they came into contact with. Chinese expansion into the highly lucrative tin-mining 
industry also brought them into direct competition with the Malay chiefs that occasionally 
broke into fights that pitted one Chinese-Malay coalition against another (Khoo 1972). Lastly, 
colonial land policies tended to dissuade the Chinese and the Indians from leaving the urban 
areas and the tin mines to go into subsistence agriculture (Kratoska 1982; Lim 1984), even as 
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they encouraged the Malays to remain in their rural villages by granting them reserve land as 
natives (Hing 2000). Some Malay intelligentsia also manipulated colonial racial discourses to 
strengthen the Malays' claims on the land (Manickam 2009). Others actively fostered the idea 
that the Chinese really did not belong to local society, no matter the length of their residence, 
and that only the British and the Malay aristocrats should have access to full participation in 
political and administrative roles (Hirschman 1986). These policies strengthened the ethnic 
segregation idea and reified British ethnonormativity, but more importantly, reflected a 
deeper antagonism the British felt towards the threats to their economic expansion in Malaya. 
 In theory, schools could have helped to break down ethnic divisions by providing 
valuable opportunities for structured inter-ethnic interactions. Yet, the British saw education 
as a welfare expense and a possible source of social discontent. As such, they opened 
English-language schools in urban areas attended usually by European, Peranakan, and 
Malay aristocratic children. Graduates from the latter two groups typically worked as 
interpreters and clerks in the colonial administration. In this capacity, they served as crucial 
intermediaries between the colonizers (who did not always have the necessary linguistic and 
cultural training) and the colonized. In particular, this cultural brokering role suited the 
Peranakans well because, as products of marital unions between Malay women and Chinese 
men who settled in Melaka in the early fifteenth century, they had already been acculturated 
to both the Malay and the Chinese worlds (see also Clammer 1983 for his challenge to the 
idea of Chinese-Malay inter-marriages produced the Peranakans).  
 Children from the other ethnic groups went to the schools set up by their respective 
communities. They did so not because the English-medium schools refused to admit them. 
Rather, their parents seldom planned to stay in Singapore on a long-term basis, so it made 
more sense for them to go to community schools instead. These institutions featured both 
ethnically homogenous classrooms and non-standardized curricula oriented towards their 
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homelands in China, India, and Malaya (Hirschman 1986). In short, colonial Singapore 
functioned as a Furnivallian plural society, where “there was a racial division of labour. All 
the various people met in the economic sphere, the market place; but they lived apart and 
continually tended to fall apart unless held together by the British Government” (Furnivall 
1948: 123). 
 The British also adopted a generally relaxed stance towards sexual matters in 
Singapore. As Stoler (2002) points out in her case study of Dutch Batavia, the Dutch colonial 
office initially sent young male officers to its outposts alone and without their wives. This 
policy propped up the illusion of the ever-virile and powerful white man in the eyes of the 
colonized, while reducing operation costs. Had the wives gone along, the colonial office 
would have to pay officers higher salaries so that they could maintain a respectable middle-
class lifestyle. It would also lead to the proliferation of a lower-class European settler 
population that would contradict white prestige. The head colonial office, however, remained 
fully aware that the heat, the dust, the solitude, and the general lack of intellectual stimuli in 
the colonies made life there very miserable. Officers might try to relieve their ennui and 
sexual frustrations by visiting prostitutes, despite the associated moral degeneracy, and risk 
exposure to potentially debilitating venereal diseases. Worse, in the eyes of the head office, 
the officers might even turn to each other for sexual release. Finding a suitable safety valve to 
release these pent-up tensions challenged the colonial administration. As the Dutch East India 
Company's first governor-general famously noted in the early 1600s: “Everyone knows that 
the male sex cannot survive without women” (quoted in Taylor 1983: 12). 
 The British faced similar problems. Like the Dutch and other European colonial 
powers, they found their solution in concubinage despite the obvious contradictions it 
presented to their Christian values of monogamy and marital fidelity. “Concubinage” indexes 
the extra-marital co-habitation between British men and colonized women, but glosses, in 
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reality, a wide range of social arrangements including sexual access to a local woman, and 
demands on her physical labor and legal rights to the children that she bore (Taylor 1983). 
The concubines cooked and cleaned (often as live-in servants) to keep the men physically and 
psychologically fit for work. They should not distract or urge the men to get out of line, nor 
should they impose the heavy responsibilities that British family life would otherwise 
demand. Despite their importance in maintaining the British Empire, concubines could not 
marry the men they made arrangements with. Marriage would confer white privileges onto 
them, and blur the colonizer/colonized distinction that the British wanted to maintain (Hyam 
1990). Instead, concubines were liable to dismissal without reason, notice, or severance pay. 
They could also be passed to other Europeans when the men departed for leave or retirement 
in Europe (Taylor 1983). Naturally, mistreated concubines might attempt to escape, even 
resorting to violence to do so (Jones 2010). Given that concubinage benefited mostly men, it 
came as no surprise that many important male figures supported it. Charles Brooke, the 
Second White Rajah of Sarawak, openly encouraged it (Reece 1985). William Farquhar, 
Singapore's first British Resident from 1819 to 1823, retained a Malay mistress. Even Raffles, 
the founder of Singapore, was also thought to have kept a Chinese concubine. 
 Stoler (2002) gives a seminal account of the sexual labor concubines provided to 
make empire-making possible. Yet, she neglects to comment on the sexual lives of the other 
colonized subjects (Loos 2008). Colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, Loos highlights, only 
kept track of and legitimized monogamous marriages involving Europeans and other elites. 
They did this to regulate access to the rights and privileges of the ruling class (Stoler 2002), 
so they intervened less in the sexual lives of their colonized subjects. For example, the British 
applied their laws in all criminal, commercial, and civil matters, except in arenas of religion 
and custom that encompassed familial and sexual issues such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and funerary practices. Hooker (2002) theorizes that the British regarded 
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marriage as an essential component of one's cultural identity. Had they attempted to alter such 
ingrained behavior, they feared it would cause rebellions that hinder governance and 
economic extraction. Yet, the early colonial policy of restricting female immigration, along 
with the male migrants' own sojourner mentality, resulted in a heavily skewed ratio between 
foreign male and female migrants throughout British Malaya. As a result, bachelors who 
sought sexual release faced a stark choice between celibacy, homosexuality, and patronizing 
prostitutes. Most found the first two options unacceptable. Chinese manual laborers from the 
Ming (1368 – 1644 CE) and Qing dynasties (1644 – 1912 CE), for example, knew of 
homosex because their literati enjoyed these practices immensely. These practices generally 
remained within the elite circles, because most peasants simply did not have the sexual 
inclination to willingly partake in what they saw as elite indulgence (Wu 2004). 
 To most bachelors, visiting brothels became the only viable option for intimacy. 
Extreme poverty in China and Japan during the nineteenth century forced many peasant 
families to sell their daughters, albeit often unknowingly, to prostitution rings in major cities. 
The ever-increasing sexual demand from the throngs of thousands of Chinese laborers and 
foreign sailors in Singapore fueled the growth of an extensive organized traffic in girls and 
young women. The British could not fully suppress this trade. Neither did they wanted to, as 
the prostitutes also serviced their lower-ranking soldiers and sailors in the army and navy 
who hailed mostly from the working class. From the perspective of the senior colonial 
officials, these men lacked both the education and the high moral standard for sexual 
continence (Warren 1990). In reality, they visited brothels more probably because they could 
not afford to marry on their meager salaries. 
 Unlike local marital customs, prostitution became an arena that witnessed heavy 
colonial intervention. Strong Victorian interests in sanitory reforms led legislators in London 
to pass a series of Contagious Diseases Acts between 1864 and 1869. These Acts sought to 
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curb the spread of syphilis, gonorrhea, and other venereal diseases, especially among the 
military, and they gave rise to the Contagious Diseases Ordinance in 1870. Motivated 
primarily by fears of high infection rates among its armed forces but lacking the lal bazar (or 
regimental brothels) operated in British India (Hyam 1990), colonial Singapore adopted the 
CDO and mandated official registration and health examinations for all prostitutes. In 1864, 
CDO officials registered 346 brothels and 2061 prostitutes. In 1871, brothel keepers and 
prostitutes totalled 1635 (Manderson 1996). These officials would issue cards that certify a 
prostitute's good health if she passed the health checks, but would send infected ones to lock 
hospitals for treatment. Not surprisingly, they encountered resistance from both brothel 
owners and prostitutes. Owners sometimes professed to retire from their occupation and 
closed their businesses. Prostitutes resisted by changing their names and locality, getting 
brothel servants to impersonate them and absconding when they got hospitalized. 
Alternatively, they just simply refused to submit themselves to the examinations. Ironically, 
the CDO officials undermined their own work. Victorian sexual mores treated any women 
who became infected with venereal diseases as punishable deviants. The same values did not 
criminalize infected soldiers, sailors, and upper-class men to protect their privacy as carriers. 
This moral double standards exposed the sexual prejudice the “respectable” classes harbored 
against the poor (Warren 1990). Puritans repealed the Contagious Diseases Act and the CDO 
in 1888 by successfully arguing that the Act perpetuated prostitution instead of suppressing it. 
Although the CDO did little to contain the spread of venereal diseases, infection rates 
increased dramatically in the wake of its repeal. From 1884 to 1888, hospital admissions of 
infected men averaged 144.28 per thousand, with over 50% of them having gonorrhea. The 
rates from 1892 to 1896 shot up to 434.17 per thousand, with two thirds from syphilis 
(Manderson 1996). 
 British Malaya began to deteriorate during World War II when the Japanese invaded in 
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December 1941. The Japanese overwhelmed the defending Allied army using superior 
weaponry and tactics in a campaign that lasted less than two months. For example, the British 
deployed Force Z, a navy fleet comprising of four destroyers and the battleships HMS Prince 
of Wales and HMS Repulse, that they thought could provide an “unsinkable” deterrence to 
the Japanese. Commanding air superiority, however, the Japanese air force destroyed Force Z 
easily. Using light tanks and bicycle infantry, the Japanese advanced rapidly south to 
Singapore through the thick jungle terrain of the peninsula. Nicknamed the “Gibraltar of the 
East” by the British, Singapore also functioned as the strongest British military base in 
Southeast Asia. Even so, Singapore fell ignominiously in merely eight days in February 1942, 
partly because the British expected the Japanese to invade by sea from the south, not by land 
from the north. Consequently, the British positioned their large-calibre coastal guns along the 
island's southern coastline, and equipped them mostly with shells designed to pierce the hulls 
of heavily armored warships, not highly explosive anti-personnel ones (Thompson 2005). 
Effective use of these guns might still not prevent Singapore's defeat, but it would cost the 
Japanese more dearly to capture this British stronghold. 
 
The Road to Independence (1942 – 1965) 
 The Japanese occupied Singapore for three years and eight months from January 1942 
to September 1945, during which they re-named the colony Shōnantō, an abbreviation of the 
longer name Shōwa no Jidai ni Eta Minami no Shima 	
 (or 
“Southern Island Obtained in the Shōwa Era). They claimed to liberate Singapore from 
colonialism, but they ruled far more harshly than the British. Terrorizing local women with 
rape while forcing others to become comfort women, they also carried out the Sook Ching 
Massacre, a systematic extermination of perceived resistant elements among the local 
Chinese. Sook ching means “purging through cleansing” in Cantonese, a variety of Yue 
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Chinese spoken in southern China. In this campaign, the Japanese set up designated screening 
centers all over the island to inspect Chinese men between 18 and 50 years old. Those who 
passed the inspection would receive a piece of paper indicating that they passed, or had a 
square marked on them in ink. Those who failed were stamped with triangular marks, loaded 
onto trucks, and sent for execution at such remote locations in Singapore as Changi and 
Tanah Merah. The Japanese had no means of determining the real anti-Japanese elements, so 
they selected those sent to the slaughter beaches arbitrarily. To avoid getting killed this way, 
one could become a secret informer for the Japanese, and point out those who did harbor anti-
Japanese sentiments (quite often falsely) in exchange for safety. In this environment of fear 
and distrust, nobody knew who sold out and who did not. Later, the Japanese would extend 
the purge to the rest of Malaya. Thankfully, they had stretched themselves too thinly in the 
region by then, and they stopped soon after (Blackburn 2000). 
 Despite their cruelty, the Japanese ironically set Singapore upon the path towards self-
rule. When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the British returned to reclaim their colony. 
Although the local population welcomed them back jubilantly, their failure to protect 
Singapore weakened their ethnonormative hegemony. In particular, their defeat – at the hands 
of “inferior” Asian natives no less – shattered the civilizational myth of the White Man's 
Burden and galvanized the local intelligentsia to push for political self-determination. The 
growing call for independence, fueled by the emotional bonds that the Japanese rule forged 
among the colonized subjects, led the British to hold Singapore's first ever general elections 
in 1955. David Marshall won on a pro-independence platform, but he resigned a year later as 
Chief Minister after failing to secure complete self-rule. The British denied his request after 
questioning his ability to suppress growing communist influence and worker unrest it 
inspired. His successor, Lim Yew Hock, succeeded where he failed. Taking more aggressive 
measures, Lim used tear gas to disperse rioters and he also detained many key pro-communist 
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union leaders under the Public Security Act. Yet, these moves alienated him from a large 
portion of the Chinese-speaking electorate. His transfer of the administrative rights of 
Christmas Island to Australia in 1957 made him even more unpopular. This discontent 
enabled the People's Action Party (PAP) to win the 1959 general elections to form 
Singapore's first completely self-determined government. 
 Marshall, despite his brief tenure as Chief Minister, did start working towards an 
inclusive society built on Singaporean citizenship, multi-lingualism, and mutual respect 
between the disparate ethnic communities. He set up the All-Party Committee on Chinese 
Education in 1955 to address issues concerning the future of Chinese education and culture 
raised by Chinese-educated students and union leaders through insurrectionary violence. The 
Committee proposed to create a quad-lingual education system that aimed to emphasize 
equally on English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil as Singapore's four official languages. 
Parents could choose any of these languages to school their children in. The non-English 
presses accepted these suggestions, albeit at differing rates (Barr and Trocki 2002). To 
address the reification of ethnic boundaries that this move effected, the Committee 
recommended encouraging the use of Bahasa Melayu, the Malay language, as Singapore's 
lingua franca, and revising all existing textbooks to foster a locally focused Malayan 
consciousness (as opposed to one directed on a distant homeland) (Drysdale 1984). While 
these measures could not completely resolve the Chinese educational issues and the 
associated violence, they shifted the ethnonorm away from the British to the Malays. 
 The PAP continued to implement the Committee's policies after it ascended to 
political dominance. In 1959, the PAP leaders did not imagine Singapore as distinct from 
Malaya. In fact, no one else did either. Everybody thought that Singapore was too small to 
possibly survive as its own politically and economically independent entity, so instead of 
declaring independence, these leaders worked towards merging with Malaysia instead. 
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Malaysia had just risen out of the remnants of British Malaya to form its own independent 
country earlier in 1957. Merger would grant Singapore access to Malaysia's larger market and 
overcome the inhibitions to economic development incurred by Singapore's lack of natural 
resources. It would also stabilize Singapore on both the economic and domestic fronts by 
ameliorating social unrest induced by widespread unemployment and under-employment. To 
achieve this union, the PAP leaders adopted a Malaysia-centric worldview where they 
envisioned Singapore as the “New York of Malaysia” (Homes for the People p. 30). 
 In 1961, the PAP leaders succeeded in persuading Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman to approve the merger. Singapore did so formally two years later along with 
Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo. Despite his reservations that Chinese-majority 
Singapore's entry into a Malay-dominated Malaysia would exacerbate an already tense racial 
relationship, Abdul Rahman authorized the merger hoping that it could neutralize the 
communist threat in Singapore. As feared, the merger worsened the racial situation. To 
address the perceived Chinese dominance of the Malaysian economy, Abdul Rahman 
advocated affirmative action for bumiputras – “sons of the soil” in Malay – a group of 
purportedly original inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula made up largely of ethnic Malays. 
Mearns (1986: 76) writes: 
 
It is in Article 153 of the constitution that the notion of the necessity of protecting the 
“special position” of the Malays, or the bumiputra, is elaborated and given the force 
of legal sanction. Among other things, Article 153 provides for a quota system of 
opportunities in three main areas; the public service, the general economic field, and 
in education (emphasis in original). 
 
These pro-bumiputra policies include making stock exchange-listed companies find 
bumiputras to take up a minimum 30% of equity, and allocating bumiputras comparatively 
more university seats to help them catch up educationally. In contrast, the PAP and its leader 
Lee Kuan Yew rejected Malays setting the ethnonorm, and envisioned instead a non-
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communal and multi-racial “Malaysian Malaysia.” The PAP's reputation at that time as a 
radical socialist party also made Malaysian political leaders extremely wary of its appeal to 
the Malaysian electorate. When these leaders tried to organize a party in Singapore to 
challenge Lee's position there, Lee retaliated by threatening to field PAP candidates in 
Malaysia's upcoming federal elections in 1964. This threat violated an earlier agreement that 
Lee made with Abdul Rahman, and contributed to the 1964 Race Riots in Singapore that left 
36 people dead and another 556 injured. The police also made over 3,000 arrests. Enraged by 
Lee's audacity and the ethnic strife he sparked, Abdul Rahman demanded unruly Singapore to 
withdraw from Malaysia (Turnbull 1989). 
 
Independent Singapore (1965 – present) 
 In what he later calls “a moment of anguish” in his biography (Lau 1998), Lee found 
himself the Prime Minister of a newly independent Singapore on 9 August 1965. To this day, 
orthodox history still presents this moment as an expulsion. In truth, Singapore wanted to 
separate too. In an interview with Melanie Chew (1996), former Minister of Finance Dr Goh 
Keng Swee revealed that he convinced the second-tier Malaysian leadership of the need for a 
negotiated separation. He then won Lee over as the Malaysian leaders consulted with Abdul 
Rahman. No efforts are made to censor these facts, as students learn them as part of their pre-
university history syllabus. Yet, the myth continues to be perpetuated, perhaps, as Barr and 
Skrbiš (2008) surmise, because it resonates so well with the national mythology of Singapore 
as an underdog that prospered in spite of the overwhelming odds.  
 The new state faced three immediate problems. Firstly, it must determine the 
citizenship eligibility of its residents. Citizenship was granted to residents, as members of a 
self-governing British colony, through the Singapore Citizen Ordinance in 1957. This 
Ordinance liberally provided for a person to obtain citizenship through one of the following 
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means: 1) by having parents who were already citizens; 2) by registration; 3) if she was born 
in the Federation of Malaya; or 4) in a country of the British Commonwealth; or 5) if she 
resided in Singapore for a total of 12 years. She could also become a naturalized citizen if she 
resided in Singapore for two years (as a British citizen) or an aggregate of 10 years in the 
preceding 12 years (if she were not), or after three to four years of service in Singapore's 
armed forces (Tan Tai Yong 2008). Upon Singapore's merger with Malaysia on 16 September 
1963, all Singaporean citizens became Malaysians.  
 When Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965, the new state repealed the 1957 
Singapore Citizenship Ordinance through its new Constitution. It did, however, grant 
Singaporean citizenship to all persons who were citizens as of 16 September 1963 by virtue 
of the Ordinance. Eugene Tan (2008: 76 – 7) discusses how citizenship laws now operate: 
 
Singapore citizenship laws had remained largely unchanged since Singapore’s 
independence in August 1965 ... Under Article 120 of Singapore’s Constitution, a 
person may acquire Singapore citizenship through any one of four means: by birth; by 
descent; by registration or, before the commencement of the Constitution, by 
enrolment; or by naturalization. Citizenship in Singapore is accorded either on the jus 
soli or jus sanguinis principle although both are applied in a limited manner. To 
acquire citizenship by birth (jus soli), the person must be born in Singapore and either 
parent must be a Singapore citizen. For citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis), the 
transmission of citizenship from generation to generation was not always automatic 
but only available in specific instances. 
 
The limitations that Tan mentions include not granting citizenship to a child born in 
Singapore to a foreign male diplomat and a Singaporean mother because of her father's 
diplomatic immunity. However, should the child be born to a foreign diplomat mother and a 
Singaporean father, the androcentric language of this clause will allow that child to claim 
citizenship by birth. 
 The economy presented the new Singapore with its second pressing issue, as its brief 
merger with Malaysia did not solve its severe problems of massive unemployment and under-
employment. PAP leaders knew they must secure foreign investments to attain economic 
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stability, so they rejected the then-common wisdom of implementing import-substitution 
strategies. Instead, they adopted the principles of the developmental state. Low (2001: 413) 
defines such a state as “one which promotes long-term entrepreneur perspectives among the 
industrial elite comprising key business groups and resists growth-compromising demands 
from special-interest groups.” It does so by intentionally altering market incentives to 
influence producer, consumer, and investor behaviors. It also possesses a high capacity and 
potent capability to anticipate and to respond to external economic shocks and pressures 
(Low 2001). To realize their vision of the modern developmental state, state officials set up 
legislation to appropriate “ineffectively” used farmland for further development. They then 
relocated the previous tenants into public housing apartment blocks that Tremewan (1994) 
likens to prisons and barracks. By depriving citizens of the means to grow their own food, 
they produced a working class dependent on the state for shelter and on wage labor to pay for 
it. Squatters from inner city slums were similarly dealt with. Officials met resistance with 
violence by deploying the military and the police. 
 State leaders aided the economic transformation further by adopting English as the 
country's working language. They abandoned their previous Malayo-centrism in favor of a 
globally oriented worldview where English, as the colonial but ethnically “neutral” language, 
replaced Bahasa Melayu as the country's lingua franca. They also made English a 
compulsory school subject in 1966. Bahasa Melayu would, however, remain as the country's 
national language. These changes in state linguistic ideology would strongly influence on 
how Singaporeans understand ethnicity and culture. For instance, non-Malay-Singaporeans 
no longer speak Bahasa Melayu except in such ceremonial contexts as the singing of the 
national anthem during the morning school assembly. Few children learned English at school 
before 1965, but parents in the post-independence era soon realized the upward social 
mobility English afforded, and started to send their children to English-medium schools in 
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increasing numbers. By 1985, English-medium schools enrolled 97% of all students. Not 
long after, the government announced that all schools must switch to English as the medium 
of instruction. This ruling also affected Nanyang University (Nantah), founded in 1956 as the 
region's only Mandarin-medium institute of higher learning. State officials  compelled Nantah 
to adopt English as a parallel language of instruction in 1975, ostensibly to help its graduates 
to find employment more easily. In 1980, it merged Nantah with the National University of 
Singapore. This dealt a severe emotional blow to its many supporters among the Chinese-
Singaporeans, as it meant that all tertiary education would be conducted in English (Mauzy 
and Milne 2002).  
 The rise of English indicated the country's success in its industrialization and 
modernization drives, but the political leadership feared that Singaporeans would also be 
exposed to the negative influences of westernization. Although industrialization, 
modernization, and Westernization are not always coterminous despite their close conceptual 
associations, Lee Kuan Yew still decreed in 1968 that all school-going children must also 
receive instruction in their officially designated “mother tongue,” i.e. Mandarin for the 
Chinese, Bahasa Melayu for the Malays, and Tamil for the Indians. Lee believed that the 
cultural values transmitted along with the knowledge of the ancestral language would provide 
a much-needed “cultural ballast” to resist western fads (Lee 1991). This bilingual policy 
initially failed to raise the standards of fluency and literacy in both English and mother 
tongues because, as Barr and Skrbiš (2008) report, schools did not treat it with the same 
nation-building urgency that Lee did. The state addressed this shortcoming by making it 
compulsory to pass one's mother tongue examinations to gain entry into junior colleges (the 
local equivalent of the high school in the United States) in 1980, and universities in 1981. 
 The state further attempted to reinforce “declining” moral values by introducing 
compulsory Religious Knowledge (RK) courses in the secondary school curriculum in 1982. 
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Prior to this, the PAP leaders already instituted various ethics and civics programs that 
schools taught in Chinese, Malay, or Tamil in the belief that instruction in the mother tongue 
could best transmit moral values (Ong 1979). Neither teachers nor students took these non-
examinable subjects seriously. This lackadaisicality, coupled with Ong's observations that 
mission school teachers tended to teach these subjects more effectively because of their 
strong religious background, prompted the Ministry of Education to make RK courses 
compulsory for all upper secondary students. Each student must choose one of six options: 
Buddhist Studies, Bible Knowledge, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge, Confucian 
Ethics, or Sikh Studies. Students could use their RK grades for admission into junior colleges. 
Lee Kuan Yew, in particular, insisted that Confucian Ethics be included to promote upright 
moral behavior and to educate students about their cultural and moral heritage. He figured 
that because the family as a social unit transmits Confucian social values through the 
generations, Confucian Ethics presented an opportunity for Chinese students to rediscover 
their roots (Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
 Confucianism soon became caught up in issues of ethnicity and Singaporean 
identities. Chinese women saw the campaign as a thinly veiled attempt to subjugate them to 
an archaic and patriarchal code of conduct, and the English-educated Chinese saw within it 
authoritarian political implications (Englehart 2000). In contrast, the non-Chinese viewed the 
campaign as yet another state project to expand Chinese ethnonormative dominance, despite 
assurances from PAP leaders that the teaching of Confucian Ethics as a code of conduct (as 
opposed to a political ideology) makes it suitable for Singaporeans of any ethnicity or creed 
(Barr and Skrbiš 2008). In any case, Chinese students considered Buddhist Studies as an 
easier option and took that instead. Despite the disproportionate resources allocated to 
Confucian Ethics vis-à-vis the other RK courses – state leaders invited Tu Weiming and 
seven other famous Taiwanese and American Confucianist scholars to design the Confucian 
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Ethics curriculum – only 17.8% enrolled in it while 44.4% took Buddhist Studies (Englehart 
2000). In 1989, after a six-report study that demonstrated how RK actually heightened 
religious consciousness and differences, the Ministry of Education finally jettisoned the 
program (Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
 In place of the RK courses, then-First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
suggested in October 1988 that Singapore's core values should be formalized into a national 
ideology that would define and encourage Asian concepts of morality, duty, and obligations 
to society and community, in contrast to more individualistic Western modes of behavior. 
After two years of formulation, Lee Hsien Loong presented the White Paper on Shared 
Values in Parliament in January 1991. The five Shared Values are: 1) Nation before 
community and society before self; 2) Family as the basic unit of society; 3) Community 
support and respect for the individual; 4) Consensus, not conflict; and 5) Racial and religious 
harmony. Lee discarded the term “National Ideology” in favor of “Shared Values,” in 
Brown's (1993) opinion, to placate non-Chinese fears that the PAP leaders could impose 
Confucian values on them via a National Ideology. Brown also argued that these suspicions 
prompted Lee to promulgate these values via the education system rather than as a state 
ideology. The public reacted to the Shared Values with disinterest, but Clammer (1993, 1998) 
criticizes them as essentially Chinese principles in disguise that addressed neither human 
rights nor the socially corrupting effects of capitalism on Singaporean society. Ultimately, the 
Parliament approved of the White Paper, but did not endow it with any constitutional 
standing or legal power. Its long-term impact, if any, remains to be seen. 
 In 1997, the government introduced a new approach to civics called the National 
Education (NE) program. Considered part of the Total Defense initiative that includes the five 
components of defense security, civil defense, economic defense, psychological defense and 
social security, the NE program aims to enhance students' national commitment. Teachers 
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incorporate lessons about Singapore's unique historical, geographical, and demographical 
constraints and vulnerabilities into their pedagogy. In doing so, the program intends to foster 
patriotic pride and a shared sense of nationhood as students learn how their country rises up 
to the challenges it faces. NE also became examinable as part of the new Social Studies 
course introduced in Secondary 3 classes in 2001. Unlike previous civics programs, NE aims 
to integrate the themes of nation-building, principles of governance, and the international 
issues that may affect Singapore's national and economic well-being into all subjects at all 
levels (Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
 Singapore's rapidly expanding population presented the state with its last pressing 
issue. The immediate post-World War II period witnessed the population exploding from 
938,144 in 1947 to 1,499,929 in 1957 at an annual rate of 4.5 percent. Saw (2005) attributes 
this growth to women marrying young, a universal desire to have large families, an 
accelerated decline in mortality that resulted from improving public health standards, and 
positive net in-migration from the hinterlands of Peninsula Malaysia. Fearing that unchecked 
growth would overwhelm the country's meager economic resources, officials in the newly 
independent state advocated family planning through anti-natalist policies. Representing a 
clear break from the hands-off approach towards sexuality and procreation that the British 
colonizers took, these policies made IUDs, condoms, diaphragms, and other contraceptives 
affordable and easily available. For example, six condoms cost S$0.50, while spermicide cost 
only S$1 per tube. Furthermore, these policies strongly advocated families to have only two 
children, regardless of the children's sex. Couples who already bore two or more children 
were urged to undergo sterilization. Clinics performed vasectomies at $5 per patient. 
Recalcitrant parents faced numerous disincentives. Not only did they receive fewer economic 
rebates, their third and fourth child also had lower priority in school admission. Overeall, 
these policies succeeded in reining in the expanding population. The total fertility rate (i.e. 
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the average number of children a woman would bear over her lifetime) plummeted from 4.62 
in 1965 to 2.08 in 1975. 
 Unfortunately, the anti-natal policy worked too well. Fertility continued to drop even 
after it reached the replacement level of 2.1 children. Distressed over the shrinking 
population, PAP leaders attempted to increase fertility through a two-pronged approach. 
Firstly, they began reversing their previous anti-natal stance by implementing a series of pro-
fercundity policies. In 1983, Lee Kuan Yew triggered the so-called “Great Marriage Debate” 
when he levelled an extraordinary charge against the nation's womenfolk – he accused them 
of jeopardizing the country's future by becoming too individualistic and wilfully distorting 
patterns of biological reproduction. While university-educated women failed to produce the 
1.65 children per married couple needed to replace themselves, he pointed out, their lesser 
educated peers reproduced too freely at 3.5 children each. Since the completion of university 
education indexed both superior genetic inheritance and mental faculties, Lee reasoned, this 
lop-sided procreative pattern would lead to Singapore's demise as a seething, proliferating 
mass of the unintelligent, untalented, and genetically inferior overwhelmed the tiny gifted 
minority within a few generations (The Straits Times 1983a). In his misogynism, Lee ignored 
how declining fertility characterizes all industrialized nation-states, and the fact that men 
share equal responsibilty with women for the lowering birth rates. Nevertheless, to forestall 
Lee's prophecy of impending demographic doom, state leaders began offering cash awards of 
S$10,000 to working-class mothers who volunteered for sterilization after having two 
children. Those who insisted on not restraining their fertility faced increased maternity 
charges in public hospitals (The Sunday Monitor 1984). 
 Simultaneously, cabinet ministers also exhorted graduate women to marry and have 
children early as their national duty. Just as men bear arms during their two-and-a-half years 
of compulsory military service to defend the country against enemies from without, graduate 
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women should also bear children to reinforce Singapore from within (The Straits Times 
1983b). To entice these women into motherhood, state leaders promised generous tax breaks, 
medical insurance privileges, and admission to the country's best schools for their children as 
part of the Graduate Mother Scheme in 1984. That same year, the Social Development Unit 
was also set up as the state's matchmaking agency for university graduates. Members of the 
upper echelons of the Civil Service, too, must submit highly intimate personal information on 
themselves and their families, including their marital status, the educational qualifications of 
their spouses, and the number of children they had (The Straits Times 1983c). Singapore's 
then-only university followed suit by altering its admission criteria to favor male over female 
applicants. This change reflected Lee's misguided beliefs that graduate men tended to marry 
and have children early (The Sunday Times 1983b), and that women's suffrage and a liberal 
university education innoculated women against the anachronistic patriarchal practices of 
enforcing a daughter's marriage regardless of her consent (The Straits Times 1983a). Lee even 
contemplated legalizing polygyny by revoking the Women's Charter of 1961, as he openly 
voiced his admiration for virile Chinese patriarchs of the past and their large retinues of 
wives, concubines, and children (The Sunday Times 1986). 
 Quite expectedly, the PAP paid dearly in the electoral polls for its blatantly 
discriminatory eugenic views. Although the party won 77 out of the 79 available 
parliamentary seats against eight opposition parties in the 1984 elections, its share of the 
popular vote slipped an alarming 13 percent to 62.9 percent. In 1987, state leaders introduced 
a new bevy of pro-fecundity measures that made no mention of targeted educational groups 
but rewarded childbearing in high-income families with large tax rebates and other benefits. 
Since a strong correlation exists between income and education levels, the re-fashioned 
policy echoed the Graduate Mother Scheme in its intentions (Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
Despite these measures and other so-called “Baby Bonus” schemes that reward child-bearing 
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in progressively larger monetary sums in the years to come, the PAP still failed to arrest the 
generally downward demographic trend. Fertility rates went up slightly during the zodiac 
Year of the Dragon (i.e. 1976, 1988, and 2000) when many ethnic Chinese consider it most 
auspicious to have children, but even entrenched cultural beliefs could not prevent the total 
fertility rate from hitting a dismal 1.28 in 2008 (The Straits Times 2009b). The “Baby Bonus” 
and other pro-natal schemes made the procreating Singaporean a model citizen type. I will 
discuss these schemes and the possible reasons for their failure further in the next chapter. 
 The second of the two-pronged approach to arrest demographic decline consists of 
relaxing immigration laws so that those attracted by Singapore's political stability and 
economic prosperity can become permanent residents and citizens more easily. These laws 
used to make the obtaining of work permits, permanent residence, and citizenship for 
foreigners a difficult and expensive affair. In the 1980s, PAP leaders decided that they must 
augment the population with new immigrants while maintaining the island's ethnic ratio. 
However, they did not want just any immigrant; only skilled and professional foreigners were 
welcomed to stay. These skilled migrants, or “foreign talents” in the local parlance, are 
admitted using two types of employment passes. “P” passes are intended for the highly 
skilled or university-educated who seek professional, administrative, managerial, or executive 
jobs. Entrepreneurs and investors also qualify. “Q” passes, on the other hand, are issued to 
those with a lower salary level and evidence of “acceptable” degrees, professional 
qualifications, or specialist skills. Both “P” and “Q” pass-holders can work in any economic 
sector. They are not subjected to levies, and they may bring family members with them (Yeoh 
2004). The government actively recruits these “foreign talents” from all over the world. 
These efforts included sourcing in non-traditional countries like China and India, a major 
campaign to attract Hong Kong immigrants in the period leading up to the return of that 
territory back to China, and a controversial 2003 announcement to recruit openly gay civil 
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servants to cosmopolitanize Singapore. I criticize the latter elsewhere as an exploitative and 
semantically empty ploy (Tan 2009). Overall, however, these various strategies work. 
Between 1995 and 1999, the government granted citizenship to 39,000 immigrants and 
permanent residency to another 130,000. As then-Minister of Trade and Industry George Yeo 
observed in 2000:  
 
For every two babies that are born in Singapore, we bring in one foreign permanent 
resident. Also, one in for marriages [by a] Singaporean is to a foreigner. This has 
doubled in the last ten years. We have become a migrant society all over again (cited 
in Mauzy and Milne 2002: 191). 
  
In sharp contrast, unskilled and semi-skilled foreigners are subjected to a range of 
policies designed to deny them a permanent foothold in Singapore. Admitted with work 
permits, they work as domestic helpers, construction site workers, road sweepers, toilet 
cleaners, and other menial low-paying jobs that Singaporeans no longer wish to work in. 
They face greater restrictions that include non-eligibility for dependent's passes to bring their 
spouses and children with them, security bonds that their employers must put up, and medical 
screenings for pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and venereal diseases every six months. Those who fail 
the medical tests are immediately repatriated with no exceptions. Work permit-holders also 
cannot marry Singaporeans. Transgressors are also repatriated immediately, which means 
forceful and permanent separation from their local spouses. Wong Kang Seng, the Minister of 
Home Affairs in 1997, said that they came only “to earn a decent living, go home and have 
some savings for their families.” (The Straits Times 1997) This obviates the need to create 
any form of social support facilities that may encourage a more permanent presence. 
 Despite the vast differences in treatment, low-skilled workers dominate the migrants 
who come to Singapore every year. In 2000, skilled workers and professionals accounted for 
only about 80,000 out of the 754,524 foreign non-residents (or 18.8 percent of a total 
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population of slightly over 4 million) working in Singapore then (Yeo 2004). The government 
wants the total population to eventually reach six million, so migrant workers will only 
become more numerous in the future. Local-born Singaporeans react to the influx of 
foreigners with unease. Some worry openly in the media that the foreigners will take away 
their jobs. Others complain that the greater number of mainland Chinese workers, brought in 
to make up for an otherwise shrinking Chinese-Singaporean population, sinicizes a multi-
cultural Singapore because they can only communicate in Mandarin. With government 
officials acknowledging that the country needs these foreigners to remain economically 
competitive in the international arena, it becomes only more pressing for the state and the 
people to find better ways to socially integrate the new migrants. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I introduced the new theory of ethnormativity to complement Howard 
and Winant's (1994) racial formation theory. While it recognizes the efforts that racial 
majority groups make to secure and maintain their social, political and/or economic 
dominance, this new theory also acknowledges that some members of racial minority may 
assinilate the cultural practices of the dominant racial group for their own ideological and/or 
material benefit. As such, ethnonormativity provides a cogent analytical frame for the study 
of colonialism, because colonial powers often justified their colonial expansion in terms of 
sharing the benefits of their racial superiority with their racially inferior subjects. Throughout 
modern Singapore history, one can see how the dominant racial group of the day attemptted 
to maintain and extend their ethnonormative hegemony, whether it be the British and their 
deliberate measures to keep their colonized subjects apart physically and ideologically, the 
Malays of Malaysia and their pro-bumiputra policies, or the Chinese-dominated PAP and 
their ill-conceived attempt to entrench moral (read “Confucianism”) values through the 
  
61 
school system. In spite the resistance that racial minority groups pose to these 
ethnonormalizing measures, the same history also shows that individuals do become 
complicit in these schemes. In the colonial period, Malay aristocrats and Peranakans sent 
their children to English-medium schools to learn both the language and English habits to 
better act as cultural go-betweens. Racial minority women also served white men as 
concubines, despite the instability inherent in the position, because of the material comfort 
they accrued from it. 
 In the next chapter, I shift the focus towards nation-building efforts in post-
independence Singapore. As mercantilistic colonial masters, the British made no attempts to 
create a unified identity among their subjects. With Singapore become first domestically 
autonomous and then independent, however, the need to initiate a vigorous nation-building 
project became increasingly urgent. State officials quickly adopted economic 
developmentalism as their governing philosophy and mobilized the population, using the 
military, the police and other coercive state apparatuses when necessary, into a productive 
labor force that made Singapore into an economic powerhouse. However, these officials met 
with lesser success in their attempts to capture the hearts of the citizens by imbuing 
Singaporeans with a concrete sense of national belonging. So far, these attempts include the 
promotion of mother tongues and religious courses in schools, and numerous public 
campaigns that first urged Singaporeans to lower their birth rates before reversing to become 
pro-natal ones. I will appraise these various nation-building policies in greater detail for the 
reasons of their success or failure in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 3: State Ideals of Citizenship and the Globalization Challenge 
 
Being an ideal Singaporean is hard. Singaporeans are implicated, on one side, by the 
state’s aggressive goals for national development, which demand from them ever-
increasing productivity in full-time and formal employment and which require these 
in return for access to social goods. From the opposite direction, they are compelled 
through policies – which again involve social goods – to aspire to particular forms of 
families that are supposedly traditional but that in fact require all sorts of modern 
orientations and habits. Singaporeans are compelled through a series of state 
mechanisms to work hard, full time, for many years of their lives, and to do so while 
also marrying, having children, ensuring that their offspring are upwardly mobile in 
an increasingly competitive middle-class society, and eventually making sure that 
their elderly parents are cared for (preferably within their households) and that they 
themselves have enough money to live comfortably in old age (Teo 2009: 533). 
 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I examine how state officials maintain Singapore's material modernity. I shall 
specifically discuss how PAP leaders create citizens. I begin with basic theories of state-formation 
and nationalism. Herderian notions of the unity of nation, language, state, and territory inform most 
contemporary forms of nationalism. Yet, in a world of rapid cross-border flows of people, capital, 
and information, globalization now poses increasingly stronger theoretical and empirical challenges 
to these telluric nationalisms (Cheah and Robbins 1998). In Singapore, PAP leaders labor to 
transform outward-oriented citizens into inward-facing patriots. For historical and geo-political 
reasons, they cannot ground their nation-building campaign on ethno-linguistic unity and its basis in 
history. Rather, not unlike other leaders of new nations, they invoke a vision that posits Singapore 
as a global cosmopolis endowed with peace and prosperity. Indeed, Singapore instantiates the 
challenges that globalization poses to Herderian ideas of nationalism. 
 To realize their futuristic vision, PAP leaders deploy a myriad of policies that aim to socially 
engineer Singaporeans into state-idealized citizen types. Dividing these policies into three groups, I 
argue that the leaders seek to maximize and actualize an individual's potential as 1) an embodiment 
of her designated race-culture; 2) a proliferate economic producer; and 3) a fecund biological 
reproducer. These policies enable the leaders to attract much economic prosperity to Singapore and, 
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consequently, higher standards of living for the people and political credibility for themselves. Yet, 
the policies also demand the formation of neo-liberal citizen-subjects with highly flexible work 
ethics. The rapidity of policy implementation generates “exceptions to neo-liberalism” (Ong 2006), 
because the citizens fail to adapt quickly enough and/or because they resist the changes. Examining 
state ideals of citizenship will illuminate their ideological bases and the challenges they pose to both 
PAP governance and the meanings of Singaporean citizenship. 
 
The Nation, the State, Nationalism, and Their Globalization Challenges 
 I start by defining what I mean by “nation” and “state.” According to Anderson's (1991) 
classic formulation, a nation exists fundamentally as “an imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (ibid.: 6). No matter its population size or its 
territorial reach, a nation has limits. It always has boundaries beyond which lie other nations. A 
nation also possesses sovereignty, because no dynastic monarchy makes claims to it. In the wake of 
the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, the self-ruling state replaced the older divinely 
ordained, hierarchical, and dynastic realm. The sovereign state both emblematizes and gauges this 
freedom. Lastly, a nation exists as a community, because its members always conceive of it as “a 
deep, horizontal comradeship” (ibid. 7), no matter how unequal their social relationships may be in 
reality. Anderson further asserts that the emergence of print capitalism enabled the rise of the nation. 
By choosing not to publish in the more exclusive liturgical languages, print capitalists empowered 
readers of vernacular languages and dialects to partake in a common national discourse.  
 The last two points echo Gellner (1983), who also argues for a nation's roots in the bonds of 
solidarity between its members. As a condition for the nation' continued survival, this foundation 
pre-supposes the universalization of a shared ethnic tradition in the minds of equal and autonomous 
individuals. In particular, mass education disseminates shared social values to realize national 
cultures. In contrast, Anderson sees colloquial languages only as tools to ingrain the allegorical 
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imagery and empty homogeneous notions of the national community into the social imaginary. He 
resonates with Balibar who views the national form as a repository of previously undetermined 
ideas, images and ideologies (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Hence, both Gellner and Anderson 
regard any cultural notions associated with newly emerging nationalism as reconstructed and future-
oriented, because they transcend what Geertz (1963) aptly terms the “primordial sentiments” of 
tradition culture. This does not mean that new nations do not invoke old values or cannot seek 
recourse in the past. Rather, the basic imperatives of national culture reflect the nation's peculiarities 
more than the contents of the culture itself. “One is not dealing here simply with new ideologies of 
boundedness; one is dealing more precisely with a new kind of boundedness” (Chun 1994: 50, 
emphasis in original). The new kind of boundedness that a nation's birth and its associated 
citizenship concepts engender often do not commensurate with the elite culture of traditional 
societies. Instead, new nations discard older totalities of a broader cosmological vision (e.g. the 
Christian kingdom of God), and demand their citizens to conceive themselves in terms of common 
identities and shared values. These demands form the basis of the bonds of horizontal solidarity in 
Gellner and Anderson's conceptions of nationalism (Chun 1994). 
 By “state,” I invoke Abrams (1988 [1977]) who identifies it as both an idea and a system. As 
an idea, the state projects a “message of domination – an ideological artefact attributing unity, 
morality and independence to the disunited, amoral and dependent workings of the practice of 
government” (ibid. 81). As a system, it exists as “a palpable nexus of practice and institutional 
structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given 
society” (ibid. 82). In both cases, the state has no real materiality despite its apparent concreteness. 
As Abrams notes in the epigraph that opens this chapter, the state's existence as a collective illusion 
makes it difficult to study, as its reification masquerades real power relationships as public interest. 
Foregrounding Aretxaga's (2000) call to attention to the state's “fictional reality,” Abrams (1988 
[1977]: 58) writes: 
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the state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the 
mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is ... It starts its life as an implicit 
construct; it is then reified – as the res publica ... and acquires an overt symbolic identity 
progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account of practice. The ideological 
function is extended to a point where conservative and radicals alike believe that their 
practice is not directed at each other but at the state. The world of illusion prevails. 
 
 Scholars and lay people alike endow the state with a misplaced concreteness by objectifying 
and personifying it, as they mistakenly posit a division between the political and the social. They do 
this through discourses and practices of power produced in everyday encounters at the local level 
through public rituals (Kong and Yeoh 1997), and encounters with the bureaucracy, monuments, 
spatial organization, etc. Effectively, the state functions as a new kind of governmentality with 
multiple boundaries and no institutional or geographical center (Mitchell 1991; Trouillot 2001). To 
pierce the illusion of the concrete state, we ought to first treat the state as a historically constructed 
and contested process in moral regulation and political legitimation. 
 In their thesis on English state-formation, Corrigan and Sayer (1985) show that quotidian 
practices simultaneously construct and are constructed by modern citizen-state relationships and 
forms of discipline. As material cultural forms, everyday state routines, rituals, and policies 
constitute and regulate the social making of meaning and of subjects. Framing state-formation as a 
kind of cultural revolution, Corrigan and Sayer deny such revolutions as merely ideological, as 
ideology cannot be considered separately from the materiality of the process. In doing so, they 
highlight the totalizing dimension of state-formation, from the construction of national character 
and identity to the creation of individual state subjects along the axes of class, occupation, gender, 
ethnicity, and locality. Herein lies the state's power to create, define, and deny new subjects and 
identities (Roseberry 1994). These totalizing and individualizing processes form a common 
discursive framework, a model articulated in both linguistic and non-linguistic forms that shape and 
are shaped by the lived experiences of state subjects (Joseph and Nugent 1994). However, other 
means of seeing and expressing these lived experiences also exist, so anthropologists of the state 
must consider what states are formed against: “Neither the shape of the state, nor oppositional 
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cultures, can be properly understood outwith the context of the mutually formative (and continuing) 
struggle between them” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 7). 
 In contrast, Gramsci (1971) understood state-formation as hegemony. Defining “hegemony” 
as the means by which the ruling elites achieve and maintain domination and rule, he argued that it 
operates when elites persuade the majority to internalize elitist values as their own. Elites 
accomplish this by portraying their values as “natural” or “commonsensical,” resulting in the widely 
held notion of the state as a neutral manifestation of public will that arbitrates conflicting social 
interests. This normalization of elite dominion forms the core of “ideological hegemony.” Not 
surprisingly, those who attain power through ideological hegemonic means rather than outright 
coercion also tend to achieve better results. Dominant groups attain, express, and enhance their 
authority by mobilizing instruments of governmentality, or what Althusser (1971) calls “state 
apparatuses,” that regulates law, health, education, crime, national security, and other areas of social 
life (Scott 1998). These groups infuse the landscape with structural oppositions where they conceive 
of themselves and their landscapes as “normal” and ordinary, while casting subaltern groups as not. 
In effect, these landscapes become “landscapes of power,” or “landscapes that reflect and reveal the 
power of those who construct, define and maintain them” (Kong and Law 2002: 1505). Elites use 
these constructed landscapes to reify their ideologies to legitimize themselves. These landscapes 
can do so because they make elite ideologies appear pre-political and unquestionable, thus 
contributing to the social constructedness of reality (Duncan and Duncan 1988). 
 The effectiveness of political power achieved and maintained through hegemony exceeds 
that of power achieved and maintained through force, but Gramsci (1971) asserted that nobody ever 
achieves complete hegemony. Like Corrigan and Sayer (1985), he also called attention to the anti-
state: other social groups that challenge those seeking power. “No matter how great the scope and 
intensity of control superordinates possess, since their power presumes the active compliance of 
others, those others can bring to bear strategies of their own, and apply specific types of sanctions”  
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(Giddens 1985: 11). Specific forms of resistance may be as overt and material as political action, or 
they can be latent and symbolic when dissenters convey them in such cultural terms as the 
appropriation and transformation of the dominant group's material culture (Hall and Jefferson 1976; 
Hall et al. 1978). Since dominant groups cast themselves and their landscapes as “normal,” they 
interpret the behaviors and landscapes of the resisting “others” as disruptions that they must contain 
and manage, if not purge entirely, through the use of Foucaldian techniques of domination and of 
the self (Danaher et al. 2000). 
 Modern forms of state surveillance and population control depend on spatial homogenizing, 
rationalizing, and partitioning. Furthermore, the transformation of space into territory that makes 
nationalism possible also relies on the conceptualization of people living in a single shared spatial 
frame (Harvey 1989). In the midst of growing homogeneity and fragmentation of space brought 
about by economic globalization, states use tropes to secure their misplaced concreteness. The map, 
for instance, identifies people with territory by visually representing nations as discrete territorial 
partitions. States also make use of botanical metaphors that suggest a nation as a grand geneological 
tree nourished by the soil of its territory. Both the map and the tree reify a nation's sovereignty, its 
limited membership, and its continuity in time (Malkki 1992). Without these tropes, we cannot 
conceptualize the state as “a compulsory organization with a territorial basis” (Weber 1978: 56). 
 Other states invoke powerful kinship idioms. These idioms possess a particularly strong 
potency as the basis of community, because they draw upon the past to both posit a common ethnic 
origin and to claim substantial identity in the present (Brow 1990). The solidarity that allegedly 
exists among nationals rests upon tropes of kinship, reproduction, shared biogenetic and psychic 
substance, and a common code of conduct (Segal 1994). The authority of the state as a morally 
regulating super-subject also rests on similar grounds. Indeed, elites the world over prefer this 
paterfamilia model, as it gives them a choice role (Trouillot 1990). Kinship-based representations of 
nation and state can also be polysemous. State officials in revolutionary Mexico, for instance, play 
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concurrent roles as sons and fathers of the nation by casting themselves as both children of Mother 
Mexico and members of a collective patrimonial state (Nugent and Alonso 1994). In fact, the father-
son-mother trinity in Mexican nationalist discourses sacralize the state and its imagined relations 
with the nation by recalling the relationshups between God, Jesus, and Mary, or between the 
Catholic priests, the Church, and the religious community (Alonso 1994). 
 The substantialization of socio-cultural forms of nationhood enables their embodiment and 
rests upon the naturalization and objectification of gender and sexuality. Not surprisngly, feminist 
and queer studies scholars produce some of the best analyses of the relationships of gender and 
sexuality with the nation and the state (e.g. Chaterjee 1993; Enloe 1989; Mayer 2000; Parker, et al. 
1992). For instance, Parker et al. (1992) correctly highlight the implicit fraternity in Anderson's 
(1991) idea of the nation as a “deep horizontal comradeship,” and his failure to address gender and 
sexual politics entailed in the love of one's country. As kinship tropes naturalize age and gender 
hierarchies in many nationalisms, they also construct vertical relationships between ethnicity and 
class, people and state, and heterosexuals and homosexuals. As such, nations may possess both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions (Brow 1990). 
 For example, while men have been cast in the gender and sexuality literature largely as the 
nation's martial protectors (Cohn 1987; Mosse 1996), women serve more varied roles vis-à-vis the 
processes and practices of state-formation: 1) as biological reproducers of ethnic collectives; 2) as 
reproducers of ethnic/national boundaries; 3) as reproducers and transmitters of the collective's 
ideologies and its culture; 4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and 5) as actors in national, 
economic, political, and military struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). These constructions of 
gender and sexuality play such key roles in the formation of ethnic and national subjectivities and 
collectivities that the state's technologies of bio-power yield different consequences for subjects 
who do not perform them. These outsiders or outsider-insiders include immigrants, ethnic minorites, 
and homosexuals (Lohr 2003; Gaudio 2009), but also socially disenfrancised citizens, ethnic 
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majorities, and heterosexuals on occasion. In times of conflict, the rape, torture, and murder of 
“enemy” women become key signifiers of victory and defeat, while aggressive states use the rescue 
of their own women as pretexts for military deployment (Enloe 1989). In contrast, having failed to 
live up to the standards of heteronormative masculinity, feminized pacifists, deserters, prisoners of 
war, and other non-combatant men risk rape, castration, murder, and other acts of “gendercide,” or 
“the deliberate extermination of persons of a particular sex (or gender)” (Warren 1985: 22). 
 Besides kinship, gender, and sexuality, anthropologists of the state also study state-formation 
and nationalism in terms of affect (Daniel 1993; Elliston 2004), authochtony (Caestecker 2000; 
Ceuppens and Geschiere 2003), language ideology (Gal 2006; Paulston 1997), memory (Boyarin 
1992; Walkowitz and Knauer 2009), post-colonialism (Hale 2006; Gustafsson 2009), ethnicity and 
race (Alonso 1994; Brubaker 2009), religion (Geertz 1980; Willford 2006), rituals and spectacles 
(Kong and Yeoh 1997; Taylor 1997), space (Harvey 1989; Reynolds 1994) and state violence 
(Moodie 2010; Nagengast 1994). For the rest of this section, however, I shall focus on the 
challenges that economic globalization poses to the idea of the Herderian nation-state.   
 During the 1980s and mid-1990s, globalization scholars from anthropology and elsewhere 
point to the modern state's seemingly imminent demise (Appadurai 1996; Kearney 1995; Tsing 
2000a). On the level of theory, Foucault (1978, 1979, 1991) dismissed the myth of the state as a 
unitary center of power and the most important target of polictical struggle with his notions of bio-
power and governmentality. Empirically, warlords, guerillas, and other wartime actors in Africa and 
Asia openly disputed with the state over its monopoly of violence (Steinmetz 1999). Transnational 
migrants, be they barefooted refugees or well-heeled jetsetters, regularly crossed state borders to 
unsettle both territorial sovereignty and ethnically homogenous definitions of the nation-state 
(Malkki 1995; Ong 1999). Such migration resulted in disasporic identities that co-exist and compete 
with national ones (Siu 2005). State-citizen relationships changed as well. The rise of neo-liberal 
economics caused the privatization of the penal system and other state apparatuses (Hallinan 2001), 
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resulting in citizens feeling abandoned and ambivalent towards an apparently remote state that no 
longer wanted to fulfill its obligations (Berdahl 1999). In fact, neo-liberalism proved so luring that 
over-zealous globalization pundits such as Ohmae Ken'ichi (1995) even predicted the end of nation-
states as regional economic blocs emerge to replace them. Under these many dislocations between 
nation and state, no wonder Aretxaga (2003) calls the hyphen in “nation-state” untenable! 
 The dire omens turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Despite the erosion of the functions 
that once defined the Weberian state by the neo-liberal logic of what Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) 
call “millennial capitalism,” the state did not wither away. In fact, the number of states quadrupled 
since 1945. In the five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 22 new states were created 
(Nagengast 1994). Scholars explain the state's amazing resilience by pointing to that quality that 
Bourdieu (1999) calls “meta-capital.” Despite its elusiveness, the state commands an awesome aura 
of power, an aura bolstered by the real capital that flows behind its veil in the form of international 
aid, developmental projects, and various kinds of capitalist ventures. The ethically doubtful 
practices of local bureaucrats substantialize the state even further through the discourse of 
corruption and the public scandals that they generate (Gupta 1995; Nararo-Yashin 2002). Indeed, 
globalization commensurates with statehood by fueling the desire for it, whether to gain access to 
resources and power, or to defend an ethnic group from the predations of other states (Aretxaga 
2003).   
 Rather than rendering the state redundant, economic globalization only transformed its 
functions from those distributing available resources to those of promoting enterprise (Marcuse and 
van Kempen 2000; Trouillot 2001). Just as neo-liberalism re-constituted the individual into an 
active, risk-reducing, and choice-driven subject who relies on her own entrepreneurship rather than 
paternal forms of welfare for her subsistence (Stevenson 2003), states (especially the local ones) are 
increasingly expected to attract their own capital investments instead of depending on the central 
government for economic aid. Indeed, writing on the rise of the “brand state,” van Ham (2001) 
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argues that local states must now act entrepreneurially and actively market themselves to attract 
foreign capital investments.  
 Similarly, Florida (2002) argues that cities must attract the creative class to secure economic 
prosperity. He arrives at this conclusion by correlating the wealth of certain US cities to the 
concentration of the creative class residing there. Not unlike what Isin and Wood (1999) call the 
professional-citizens, this class consists of professionals such as bankers, lawyers, architects, and 
managers. They emerged in the late twentieth century to identify with a cosmopolitan imaginary 
centered on consumption practices. More importantly, they show fewer concerns for their national 
interests and may be more loyal to their jobs than the city or state they reside in. They challenge the 
boundedness of the nature-state with their mobility, especially when they are unlikely to gravitate 
towards those places deemed lacking in diversity. Florida advises cities to make themselves more 
desirable to these professionals by fostering spaces of cultural diversity. In particular, he uses his 
“gay index” to measure how much a city embraces difference. 
 The flexible loyalty of the creative class forces cities to compete against each other in “the 
economy of appearances” (Tsing 2000b). Here, success demands that competing cities set up gay 
villages, ethnic enclaves, cultural festivals, hi-tech corridors, economic growth areas, and other sites 
of cultural diversity. In the growth areas, state officials attract foreign investments and professional 
labor by ceding them semi-autonomous rights. This graduates state sovereignty and variegate the 
workers' basic citizenship rights to labor protection (Ong 2006). However, the cosmopolitanism of 
these zones can be asymetrical (Shih 2001). The foreign investors and professional labor that state 
officials seek to attract typically hail from metropoles. These officials learn metropolitan habits to 
access foreign capital and technical expertise, but the metropolites may only be really interested in 
extracting profit from the zones.  
 Certainly, the practice of commodifying differences is by no means new. By the late 1800s, 
New York’s entrepreneurs were already offering guided tours of Chinatown, the Lower East Side, 
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and other spaces of exotic and dangerous queerness to the white bourgeoisie (Rushbrook 2002). 
These encounters with the racial Other enabled tourists to affirm their own middle-class identities 
and values (Stallybrass and White 1986). Rather, the novelty of the economy of appearances lies in 
the paradox that cities must first build their sites of cultural spectacles to appear successful before 
they can actually attract the creative class that will make that success a reality. This inevitably gives 
rise to a trend of “me-too-ism” where every city that considers itself a player must have the 
requisite sites of cultural difference (Bell and Binnie 2004: 1814). The spectacular economy brooks 
no alternatives; not having these features means not being in the competition at all. 
 
Citizen as Embodiment of Race-Culture 
 Having assessed basic theories of nationalism and the nation-state, I shall now proceed with 
state-formation and citizen-making processes in Singapore. As I already discussed in Chapter 2, 
Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965 plagued by ethnic strife between the Chinese and the 
Malays, economic poverty, and a citizenry more oriented toward its respective cultural homelands 
in China, Malaysia, and India than Singapore itself. In particular, one incident of ethnic unrest 
carved deeply into the nation's collective psyche. On 11 December 1950, outraged Malay-Muslims 
took to the streets to protest the judicial mishandling of the custody case for Dutch girl called Maria 
Hertogh. The judge awarded custody to the girl's biological Christian parents, even though she had 
wanted to stay with her adoptive Malay-Muslim mother. The three days of the Maria Hertogh Riots 
resulted in 18 people killed, 173 injured and many properties damaged (Turnbull 1989).  
 Naturally, preventing the future recurrence of ethnic strife became one of the first tasks that 
officials of the new Singaporean state undertook. Adopting a multi-racial approach, PAP leaders 
started by greatly simplifying the ethnoscape. In colonial Singapore, state officials used “race” and 
“ethnicity” interchangeably. They recognized four main ethnic categories – the Chinese, the Malays, 
the Indians, and the Others that consisted of minor ethnic groups – and a plethora of sub-ethnic 
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groups. The 1957 census, for example, had 30 sub-ethnic headings that included Hokkiens, Tiechiu, 
and Khek (Hakka) among the Chinese; Indonesian, Negrit, and Semai among the Malays; Indian 
Tamil, Telegu, and Malayali among the Indians; and Eurasian, Ceylon Tamil, and Pakistani among 
the Others (Hirschman 1987). As official recognition of the sub-ethnic divisions reified intra-ethnic 
differences, PAP leaders streamlined the census by removing the sub-headings, and retaining only 
the four main ethnic categories. These four groups became the so-called “CMIO model” of racial 
categorization still in use today. This model follows the fluid colonial use of “race” and “ethnicity,” 
and its legitimacy as a state apparatus results in similar terminological slipperiness in both state and 
everyday discourses. For the remainder of this dissertation, however, I shall retain a conceptual 
distinction between “race” and “ethnicity” in my analysis. 
 After simplifying the ethnic categories in the census, PAP leaders elevated the non-English 
vernacular languages already being taught in schools to the level of “mother tongue” of their 
respective ethnic groups. Thus, Chinese children learn Mandarin, Malays Bahasa Melayu, and 
Indians Tamil, along with English as part of their pre-tertiary bilingual education. The PAP leaders 
saw languages as carriers of cultural identity and values, whose differences can become real social 
divisions through the linguistic ideological processes of iconity, recursiveness, and erasure (Gal and 
Irvine 1995). As such, the leaders' linguistic imposition helped to unify each ethnic group by cutting 
down on intra-ethnic divisions. Furthermore, even though modernization does not necessarily result 
in westernization (Appadurai 1996), the leaders still feared that Singapore's rapid industrialization 
would replace the citizenry's cultural heritages with excessive individualism that threatens both 
social cohesion and their vision of a strong paternal state. The teaching of “mother tongues” would 
act, in the words of Lee Kuan Yew (1991: 29), as a kind of “cultural ballast.” English, for this 
reason, does not count as a “mother tongue.” To the leaders, children learn English to access the 
scientific expertise the West offers, but the language does not carry the kind of “correct” cultural 
values to inculcate the children in. They even decreed in 1979 that high school students seeking 
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entry into local universities must first secure passes in both the English and mother tongue 
examinations, a decision that they reversed only in 2004 to accomodate Chinese students who could 
not cope with their Mandarin lessons.  
 The fact that English does not count as a “mother tongue” also means that children racially 
classified as “Others,” having no state-assigned “mother tongue” of their own, get to choose the 
language that they will learn. Many select Bahasa Melayu, thinking its perceived simplicity and its 
use of the Roman alphabet will translate into higher chances of scoring better grades (PuruShotam 
1998). Children from the other three major ethnic groups have no such choice. Parents who seek to 
educate their children in a non-prescribed “mother tongue” must obtain permission from the 
Ministry of Education, and Ministry officials rarely approve. 
 The choice of Bahasa Melayu as the Malays' “mother tongue” generated little controversy. 
Although the Malays originate from different parts of island Southeast Asia and speak their own 
languages – the Minangkabau and the Bugis, for example, came respectively from Sumatra and 
Sulawesi in present-day Indonesia – their various sub-ethnic groups already speak versions of 
Bahasa Melayu as the region's trade language (Andaya 2001). Mandarin, on the other hand, poses 
more problems for the Chinese. The forebears of most Chinese-Singaporeans migrated originally 
from the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Instead of the northern Chinese 
language Mandarin, they spoke mainly Cantonese and Hokkien. Indeed, the 1957 census reported 
that a mere 0.1 percent of all resident Chinese spoke Mandarin as their “mother tongue” (Bokhorsst-
Heng 1999). Nevertheless, PAP leaders still chose Mandarin, because it enjoyed official status in 
China. More importantly, its lack of native speakers made it a highly suitable neutral language that 
could unify the Chinese.  
 To promote the use of Mandarin, PAP leaders relegated the non-Mandarin Chinese varieties 
to the less legitimate status of “dialect” that precludes state support. They also launched the yearly 
Speak Mandarin Campaign in 1979. Free-to-air television and radio stations followed by removing 
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all “dialect” programming (Bokhorst-Heng 1999). In the late 1980s, PAP leaders even attempted to 
change the way the Chinese romanize their names. On top of her name in Mandarin romanized in 
pinyin, a Chinese person also has a statutory name whose orthography approximates how she would 
pronounce that name in her “dialect.” This statutory name appears in all official documents. The 
pinyin one does not, but an individual can opt to include it in her identity card and her passport. 
Thus, a Hokkien man called Chen Yafa in Mandarin will most probably be better known as Tan Ah 
Huat. The strong ties of the statutory name to one's “dialect” group means that other Singaporeans 
can often identify an individual's sub-ethnic background by her statutory name alone. This hinders 
the PAP leaders' goal to homogenize all the Chinese, so in lieu of the old way of romanization, they 
urged Chinese parents to romanize their children's statutory names using pinyin only. Overall, the 
Mandarinization project met with success. From 1990 to 2000, the proportion of Chinese who 
spoke Mandarin as their principle household language rose from 30.1 percent to 45.1 percent. In the 
same time period, “dialect” use dropped from 50.3 percent to 30.7 percent (Singapore Department 
of Statistics 2001). As for the statutory names, some parents did romanize their children's given 
names in pinyin. Yet, they retained the old way of romanizing their family names. The resulting 
names, such as Tan Yafa (to continue with the example above), can sound strange to the 
Singaporean ear, but they demonstrate the resilience of “dialect” use despite overt state 
Mandarinization.  
 Like the Chinese, not all Indians speak their state-assigned “mother tongue” either. In 1990, 
the census reported that Tamils only formed 63.9 percent of the Indian population. Malayalis (8.6 
percent), Sikhs (6.7 percent), Hindustani (2.0 percent), and other smaller “dialect” groups make up 
the rest (Singapore Department of Statistics 1990). The most current census from 2000 no longer 
provides such a “dialectal” breakdown of the main racial groups, but the sub-ethnic proportions 
should not have changed significantly. Before 1990, non-Tamil Indian children could learn Tamil in 
school, or they could choose another “mother tongue” the way their “Other” counterparts did. Either 
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way, the incongruity between school and home languages could mean a lack of adequate home 
reinforcement for what they learnt in school, and subsequently, poor grades and low morale. In 
1990, Ministry of Education officials finally heeded the years of complaints from non-Tamil Indian 
parents and began offering Malayalam, Punjabi, Hindi, and other minority Indian “mother tongues” 
in secondary schools (primary schools followed in 1994). Regardless of what “mother tongue” an 
Indian child ends up learning, the overall small number of Indian-Singaporeans means that any one 
school typically does not have enough Indian students to form their own class. Consequently, even 
Tamil-language students must often go to centralized language centers outside of curriculum time to 
pursue their studies. The traveling to and fro the language centers places an additional strain on 
these students that their Chinese and Malay counterparts need not endure (PuruShotam 1998). 
 Here, I question why MOE officials do not diversify Chinese “mother tongues” the same 
way they did Indian ones. I argue that it has to do partly with the legitimacy of the languages 
involved. The non-Tamil Indian “mother tongues” enjoy official status as scheduled languages in 
India. This status gives weight to the requests from non-Tamil parents for more “mother tongue” 
options. The same cannot be said of the  Chinese “dialects,” even had Chinese parents complained 
just as much. China recognizes only Mandarin as its official language. The number of Indian-
Singaporeans (7 percent of the total population) vis-à-vis the Chinese (75 percent) mattered as well. 
Assuming that the diversification of “mother tongues” does indeed lead to intra-ethnic divisions, 
state officials can better contain these tensions among the Indians better than they can the Chinese.  
 Outside of language policies, state officials also discursively produce the three ethnic groups 
of “Chinese,” “Malay,” and “Indians” by making them publicly observable through their cultural 
activities. Each year, for example, the officials set aside a number of holidays dedicated to these 
groups that include Lunar New Year for the Chinese, Hari Raya Haji and Hari Raya Puasa for the 
predominately Muslim Malays, and Deepavali for the Hindu Indians. These ethnic/cultural groups 
in turn generate their own activities, sometimes with state assistance, such as the annual light-ups 
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and night bazaars in their respective ethnic enclaves as their holidays approach. In turn, these events 
give rise to the impression that Singaporean culture has three vibrant, albeit, frozen traditions. 
These events also reinforce the discursive fluidity of “race” and “ethnicity” by blurring the 
distinctions between “race” (with its notions of biological fixity) and the more culturally mutable 
“ethnicity.” This blurring makes the impression of frozen traditions highly dubious from an 
anthropological viewpoint (Clammer 1985). Nevertheless, state officials promote it because of its 
political and ideological pay-offs. 
 Firstly, the seemingly unchanging cultural traditions make ethnic relation managment easier 
for state officials. Since 1969, there has been no more overt ethnic unrest. This does not mean that 
inter-ethnic tensions disappeared entirely, but it does add to Singapore's international reputation as a 
stable financial center in a politically unstable region. This reputation attracts foreign capital 
investments, which, in turn, translates into rapid economic growth for the country and political 
legitimacy for the PAP. The CMIO model at the foundation of this stability, however, generates its 
own issues. For example, the model's ossified racial categories fail to reflect the ethnic situation on 
the ground. The model determines an individual's ethnicity not as an aggregate of her parents' nor 
by the cultural traditions she identifies with. Rather, it assigns her official racial identity based on 
her father's race, resulting at times in inconsistencies. During fieldwork, for instance, I befriended a 
man who has a Cambodian father and a Chinese mother. Even though he has been thoroughly 
sinicized and cannot even speak a single Khmer word, he is still registered officially as an “Other.” 
Even though the man married a Chinese woman, his son is also an “Other” because children inherit 
their official racial identity through the patriline. The man's “Otherness” became highlighted when 
his son started taking Mandarin classes during kindergarten. The man received a phone call from 
the Ministry of Education, asking him why his son was learning Mandarin. In a move that exposed 
the artificiality of “mother tongue” education in Singapore, the man had to go to the kindergarten 
with supporting documents to justify his decision. 
  
78 
 Even had the half-Cambodian man been fully Chinese, his official “mother tongue” may not 
accurately reflect the actual linguistic situation either. Despite what the “mother” in “mother 
tongue” suggests, the language that an individual learns at school really has nothing to do with her 
mother's ethno-linguistic identities. Rather, the patrilineal logic of the CMIO model means that her 
father's racial identity determines what she learns as her “mother tongue.” (Might “father tongues” 
not have been a more appropriate label in this case?) Furthermore, an individual's “mother tongue” 
may differ from her home language, as shown by the the non-Tamil-speaking Indians I discussed 
earlier. This inconsistency would have presented less of an issue were it not for the PAP leaders 
wanting to transmit cultural values via the “mother tongues.” Since the majority of one's early 
socialization and acculturation occurs within the home, a mismatch between one's “mother tongue” 
and home language may contradict the leaders' intentions. Consider the example of a Sikh student 
who took Bahasa Melayu in the 1980s because schools then had yet to include Punjabi as part of 
their curriculum. The cultural values he absorbed through his “mother tongue” lessons would not 
align with his ethno-linguistic identities at all. Consider also the case of a monolingual Cantonese 
grandmother who cannot speak to her grandson because her daughter never taught him how to. 
Nowadays, many Chinese parents deliberately commit linguistic suicide this way so as not to 
distract their children from the mastery of Mandarin. However, without Cantonese, how can the 
grandson access the cultural knowledge and values that his grandmother offers? 
 The rigidity of the CMIO model has many nation-building implications beyond language 
and cultural policies. For the sake of brevity, however, I shall only discuss two other domains here. 
The first lies in compulsory military conscription. As I shall discuss further in Chapter 5, every 
able-bodied male citizen must serve at least two years of National Service upon turning 16½ years 
of age. In theory, the military unit a conscript is assigned to depends wholly on his physical fitness 
and the results of an aptitude test he takes before his enlistment. In reality, it is as an open secret that 
Malays will never be deployed in the commandos, armor, and other strategically sensitive units. 
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Even after conscription started in 1967, the Malays were deliberately and completely excluded from 
military service until at least the mid-1970s. They are enlisted now, but they are generally not given 
high levels of security clearance. As such, they are posted more than proportionately to non-combat 
roles such as truck drivers and store clerks, or outside of the military in the police or civil defence 
force. The air force too did not have its first qualified Malay pilot until 1992, 24 years after its 
establishment in 1968. Undoubtedly, this bias alienates the Malays and reflects leftover bad blood 
from the turbulent ethnic politics immediately before and after Singapore's independence. Yet, the 
Chinese-majority PAP leadership openly justifies this discrimination on the grounds that the Malays 
share racial and cultural affinities with their co-ethnics in Malaysia and Indonesia. Who will they 
side with should Singapore go to war with its neighbors? In fact, the current Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong has historically been a vocal defender of this policy. In 1987, he said: 
 
... we live in Southeast Asia. If there's a conflict, if the [Singapore Armed Forces] is called to 
defend the homeland, we don't want to put any of our soldier in a difficult position where his 
emotions for his nation may be in conflict with his emotions for his religion because these 
are two very strong fundamentals and if they are not compatible, then they will be two very 
strong destructive forces (pulling) in opposite directions ... And we don't want to put 
anybody in that position where he feels he is not fighting a just cause or perhaps, worse, 
maybe, his side is not the right side. That would be an intolerable position for the person and 
an unworkable position for the armed forces (The Straits Times 23 Feb 1987). 
 
 Using culture to predict future Malay disloyalty smacks of the de-historicizing “culture talk” 
that Abu-Lughod (2002) discusses. She argues that US discourses that link the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
to Islamic cultural traditions mistakenly locate the cause of the attacks in the idea of the jihad, 
instead of interrogating the CIA's historical complicity in resurrecting that idea in the agency's Cold 
War tussle with communist Russia. Constructing Islamic cultural traditions everywhere as 
monolithic and unfailingly warmongering, such discourses also ignore the more pressing economic 
developmental agendas that most Muslims have. Similarly, “culture talk” allows PAP leaders to 
justify their discrimination while avoiding a critical examination of Lee Kuan Yew's own role in the 
events that led to Singapore's secession from Malaysia in 1965. “Culture talk” also enables them to 
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dismiss the possibility that after four decades of their economically enriching governance, the 
Malays may have developed emotional ties to Singapore that transcend their regional affinities. 
Finally, while undermining their own nation-building goal to unify all citizens with their bias, the 
leaders may end up with a self-fulfilling prophecy. They marginalize the Malays now to contain 
possible betrayals during future wars, but otherwise-patriotic Malays may just turn their backs on 
Singapore precisely because of their poor treatment. Likening her life experiences to “being the 
least favorite child in the family,” a Malay journalist admitted that she would have emigrated were 
it not for her family ties. She continued: 
 
Someone then remarked that this is why Malays like myself are not trusted. But I explained 
that this lack of patriotism ... comes from not being trusted, and for being treated like a 
potential traitor” (The Straits Times 2008b). 
 
 Public housing forms the second domain where we can see the rigidity of the CMIO model. 
Established in 1960, the Housing Development Board (HDB) implements all phases of housing 
development, including clearing the land, resettling the former tenants, planning the housing estates, 
designing the multi-storey public flats and, until the late 1980s, managing the housing estates 
(Wong and Yeh 1985). Until 2006 when private developers began designing some high-end flats, 
only the actual construction of the flats is contracted out to private companies. I shall discuss the 
public housing program in further detail in the next section. Here, I highlight that the program 
houses 85 – 90 percent of all Singaporeans, the majority of whom own the flats they live in. In 
theory, public housing is allocated fairly via balloting. In reality, however, a citizen's ethnicity can 
influence where she lives. Through the HDB, state leaders aim to reproduce the nation's ethnic mix, 
as closely as possible, within each block of flats, housing estate, and new town. Supposedly, this 
prevents ethnic segregation and the re-occurences of communal riots. Although the balloting system 
of flat allocation effectively disperses ethnic groups all over the island, PAP leaders alleged that 
housing transfers taking place via the secondary housing market enabled ethnic regrouping since the 
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late 1980s (see Figure 4 below). In the ensuing panic, HDB officials imposed a system of ethnic 
quota with effect from 1 March 1989. 
  
Figure 4: Map of New and Old Ethnic Enclaves 
  
 Applied to the sale of new and resale flats, the quota policy sets a maximum limit on the 
percentages each of the four official ethnic groups living in each public housing block, estate, and 
new town. In cases where a particular group reaches or exceeds its limit, any further housing 
transanctions must not worsen the “ethnic imbalance.” For example, Malays in a Malay “enclave” 
can sell their flats to anybody, but a seller from another group in the same affected block or estate 
cannot sell to a Malay buyer. The policy aims to contain the perceived problem, not artificially force 
the proportions of affected groups down (Lai 1995). HDB planners compute the actual quota by 
taking into account the national population's ethnic mix and the projected demand for housing by 
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each ethnic group. These planners derive this demand from the rate at which new households are 
being formed. To allow for some flexibility in the configuration of ethnic composition at the micro-
level, they then fix the proportions for each block at three percentage points higher than that fixed at 
the neighborhood level (Sin 2003). 
 PAP leaders tout the quota policy as “necessary for the long-term stability of the nation” and 
“a small price to pay in order to ensure we do build a cohesive, better integrated society in 
Singapore (The Straits Times 31 Jan 1989). However, this official explanation focuses more on the 
end-results of mobility trends among public housing residents rather than the reasons and 
motivations behind ethnic regrouping (Ooi 1993). Likewise, the consequences of the policy remain 
unclear. Sin (2002) reports that although he made several requests to HDB for data, HDB officials 
kept turning him down because of the data's “politically sensitive” nature. Even so, Sin argues in his 
subsequent analysis that regrouping may occur because established religious infrastructure and 
social networks attracting new members of an ethnic group while detering existing members from 
moving away. For instance, the presence of mosques and halal food stalls in a neighborhood may 
pull in more Malays into a new neighborhood while dissuading already resident Malays from 
relocating. The analysis also reveals the difficulties the quota system impose on the sale of flats by 
minority sellers. For example, non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to the Chinese in a Chinese 
“enclave,” even though the Chinese form the largest group of potential buyers. This either delays 
the sale of the property, or forces sellers to lower their selling price to hasten the sale. Minority 
sellers can also sell back to the HDB at a government-fixed rate, but they make a loss in the process 
as the government rate can be 30 percent lower than the prevailing market price (Balakrishnan 
1989). 
 More importantly, Sin (2003) asserts that PAP leaders use the quota policy to dilute existing 
pockets of electoral resistance. The leaders invoke the spectre of ethnic riots to justify the policy, 
but it is extremely simplistic to blame such unrest on the existence of ethnic enclaves. Enclaves may 
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worsen ethnic tensions, they do not cause riots (Lai 1995). Furthermore, I observe, the blame of 
causing ethnic unrest fall on ethnic minorities, as if the Chinese do not form enclaves or they were 
not involved in the riots of the past. Lastly, present-day enclaves bear little resemblance to their 
counterparts of old. Ethnic minorities are now minorities everywhere, even in those areas that 
Singaporeans think of as minority enclaves. Even in Geylang Serai where tourists can find the state-
sanctioned “Malay Village,” the Malays witnessed a slip from their majority position in the 1950s to 
22.4 percent by 1980. If riots were to break out again between the Malays and the Chinese, the 
Malays would be greatly disadvantaged by their numerical inferiority. Most likely, PAP leaders use 
the quota policy to limit the Malays' electoral resistance. Malay disenchantment with the PAP is 
well-known (Balakrishnan 1989), and the leaders certainly blamed the Malay vote for their narrow 
victories in certain Malay-dominated constituencies (Clammer 1998). In 1988, for instance, they 
secured only 50.9 percent of the popular vote in Eunos and 54.9 percent in Bedok. This contrasted 
with the 63.2 percent that they garnered nation-wide (Rodan 1992). In this light, the quota system 
appears to both undermine the perceived growth and consideration of anti-PAP votes in existing 
Malay “enclaves,” and to prevent the emergence of new centers of resistance. Certainly, this move 
aligns with other unsavory PAP electoral tactics such as the redrawing of constituency boundaries to 
break up pockets of resistance among the surrounding PAP-supporting wards (Sin 2003).  
 Barr and Skrbiš (2008), Chua (2003b) and Rahim (1998) convincingly argue that the PAP's 
governance affected the Malays most adversely. They adjust the least well to the highly competitive 
economy of post-independence Singapore, being at odds especially with Singapore's promotional 
stance in the “Asian values” debate of the 1990s (Chong 2002). Throughout the 1980s, the primary 
education curriculum also persistently portrayed a pro-Chinese bias and deprived minorities of role 
models (Barr 2006). In particular, the loss of land that underpins Malay identity to the Chinese-
majority PAP denies the Malays the discursive space for socialization, identification, culturalization 
and politicization in their nationhood discourses (Chong 2002). This, however, does not mean that 
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the PAP politically disenfranchised the Malays. Upon independence, PAP leaders incorporated them 
into the emerging nation and exhorted them to participate in the nation-building project. The leaders 
also recognize the Malay's historical presence in the region and accorded these autochthons certain 
privileges to address their economic disadvatanges. These rights include free education in all levels 
of schooling, the enshrining of Bahasa Melayu as the national language, state assistance in mosque-
construction, and a cabinet minister specifically dedicated to Muslim affairs. No other ethnic or 
religious groups receive such privileges. 
 The various multi-cultural policies I discussed above reveal the PAP leaders' use of multi-
culturalism as a disciplinary tool. Chua (2003b) argues that the logic of harmony underwrites the 
complexity of the policies. While few can deny that harmony is a public good, the substance and 
means of attaining this lofty goal can be problematic. Unlike the more liberal Euro-America, 
Singapore does not have a fully democratic government where ethnic groups can negotiate their 
differences in free, undistorted public debates. Having reduced the opposition into an impotent 
political force, PAP leaders can impose unilateral decisions with relative impunity and justify their 
illiberality as their “knowing” what is best for Singaporeans. This forces the citizens to petition the 
leaders directly or through the media to address their grievances, which, in turn, tends to pre-
emptively foreclose public discussions in the PAP's mode of paternalistic/authoritarian governance. 
 In terms of inter-ethnic relations, the leaders constantly warn citizens of the precariousness 
of the current state of racial harmony to justify their constant policing of ethnic boundaries. These 
policing measures range from the Internal Security Department, which can detain without trial those 
deemed to work against “public interest,” to the criminalization of promoting religious and ethnic 
strife under Section 298A of the Penal Code, to the Presidential Council on Racial Harmony. Since 
discussions of ethnic relations always present a certain risk of disrupting ethnic harmony and no one 
can guarantee that unrest will not occur, the entire discursive domain of “ethnicity” becomes taboo. 
Those who raise the issue publicly risk being branded and disciplined as “racial chauvinists” (Chua 
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2003b). During the 1997 elections, for example, Tang Liang Hong from the Workers' Party 
expressed sentiments from monolingual Mandarin speakers about their socio-economic 
immobilization from Singapore's increasing use of English. When the PAP leaders called him a 
“Chinese chauvinist,” Tang challenged their “lie.” The leaders retaliated by filing defamation suits 
against him and forced him to flee. Tang remains, till this day, a fugitive from the law. 
 In this light, whatever ethnic stability that the PAP leaders discursively claim they achieved 
cannot be anything but shallow. Chua (2003: 75) writes: 
 
The result is a “racial harmony” that is minimalist, never going beyond visual familiarity and 
overtly recognisable differences, one maintained by tolerance of difference without any 
substantive cultural exchange, deep understanding and even less cultural crossing of 
boundaries. 
 
For instance, Singaporeans cannot be sure whether the social stability they have been enjoying since 
the last episode of ethnic violence in 1969 resulted from the state suppression of “ethnic talk,” and 
not from the progressive enlightenment of an increasingly educated nation. If it were the former, it 
makes suppression not only necessary, but also that the PAP leaders should continue it. Since the 
leaders never lifted their ban to test if discussions about ethnicity will indeed resurrect ethnic strife, 
they must continue to enforce it as the only sure way to maintain the present social stability. On the 
ground, however, Singaporeans still encounter ethnicity-related issues such as unfriendly inter-
ethnic sentiments, workplace discrimination, and structural inequalities inherited from the colonial 
past. A significant part of these problems undoubtedly stem from the gradual sinicization and 
Confucianization of public spaces since 1965 that I already discussed in Chapter 2. The inability to 
negotiate these difficulties means that not only does multi-culturalism remain weakly realized 
(Chua 2003b), but also, as I shall discuss further in Chapter 4, deters Singaporeans from developing 
a real sense of cultural belonging to the country. 
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Citizen as Economic Producer 
 The second group of citizen-making policies aim to maximize and realize the economic 
capabilities of individual citizens. As Tremewan (1994) argues, the forced relocation of farmers and 
urban squatters into state-built public housing in the 1960s produced a working class dependent on 
the state for shelter and on wage labor to pay for it. Although the public housing program initially 
encountered resistance, it has since become a major source of political legitimacy for the PAP by 
expanding home ownership to 85 – 90 percent of all citizens (the remaining 10 – 15 percent either 
live in private housing, or can only afford to rent their HDB flats). Undoubtedly, it also contributes 
towards Singapore's post-independence economic miracle. As Lim (1987: 185) summarizes: 
 
public housing, by lowering the price of a major wage-good, has lowered the wage. It may 
be credited with stimulating faster economic growth and employment creation. It may also 
have released private-sector resources of other forms of productive investment, thereby 
increasing productivity and growth. By ensuring a higher standard of living for the working 
population at a given wage, it may have contributed to better worker productivity and 
certainly to political and social stability and labour peace, which are necessary underpinning 
for private investment and economic growth. 
 
 For the residents, the program also brought radical improvements in living standards. Fully 
integrated into the road and mass rapid train systems, public housing estates are also planned to 
provide self-sufficiency in terms of the residents' needs. Residents can walk to neighbourhood 
centers to access low-level goods and services, or take in-town bus services to nearby town centers 
to obtain higher-order goods. The island-wide mass rapid train system can also take residents 
further away if need be. In the past two decades, some town centers have been upgraded into 
regional ones to expand their functions and catchment areas, and to make their range of offered 
goods and services more upscale. Furthermore, each housing estate has primary and secondary 
schools, religious institutions and public recreational facilities within easy reach. The presence of 
commercial activities and clean industries in the estates also provide residents with employment.  
 The program's massive material successes pay immense political dividends to the PAP by 
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making the party synonymous with economic development. In turn, party leaders mobilize this 
success to their own advantage by claiming that only they can deliver the goods. Citizens who vote 
for the opposition can only blame themselves if the current social stability and economic prosperity 
deteriorate. Although it is not possible to accurately gauge just how much citizens accept the PAP's 
carrot-and-stick discourse, the successful public housing program undoubtedly accounts for the 
party's political success. Since 1959, the PAP invariably garners the overwhelming majority of the 
votes. Critics may trace these victories to the gerrymandering discussed above and other unsavory 
electoral practices, or to the fear of PAP reprisals for supporting opposition parties, or even to the 
citizens' desire to protect the investment of a large part of their savings in their public housing 
properties. Whatever the reasons, no one can deny the basis of the party's political legitimacy in the 
public housing program (Chua 1997, 2000). Certainly, state legitimacy requires constant ideological 
affirmation and justification too (Chua 1995). Nevertheless, the housing success begins to explain 
how the PAP can achieve both economic success and political legitimacy despite its authoritarian 
governance: Singaporeans tolerate a certain level of illiberality as long as it translates into improved 
living standards. Here, material pragmatism trumps the idealism of human rights. 
 Of course, the public housing program cannot create and sustain Singapore's prosperity by 
itself. Lacking natural resources to develop, PAP leaders must also expand both the available labor 
pool as well as improve its quality. To this end, they granted suffrage to women through the 1961 
Women's Charter. Among other rights, the Charter guaranteed women the right to act in their own 
legal capacity and allowed them to engage independently in any trade or profession. Consequently, 
female labor participation rates shot up from 17.5 percent in 1957 to 25.8 percent in 1970, 45.6 
percent in 1986, and 51 percent in 1992 (Goldberg 1987; The Straits Times 6 Mar 1993). Together 
with the concurrent universalization of education, women's literacy rate also increased from 34 
percent in 1957 to 65 percent in 1965, and 80 percent in 1980 (Hill and Lian 1995). 
 Lazar (2001), however, argues that the PAP leaders granted women suffrage as a “strategic 
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egalitarian” act. By “strategic egalitarianism,” she means that the fulfilment of specific political and 
economic goals predicates the granting of equality to women. Although the PAP leaders instituted 
changes to encourage gender equality, these changes are highly selective, motivated solely by 
pragmatism, and stop short of enabling full emancipation for women in all spheres of life. Lazar 
also implies in her concept that only the political elite can decide whether, and to what extent, 
institutional equality may be granted. Indeed, PuruShotam (1992) wryly describes the granting of 
rights and opportunities to Singaporean women as “gifts” from the government. These gifts oblige 
women to suffer the will of the male gift-givers, and ultimately benefit the PAP leaders more. 
 Using the Women's Charter as an example, Lazar points out that the PAP leaders used it to 
incorporate feminist concerns into their broader political agenda, and to enhance their own political 
image in progressive, humanitarian, and revolutionary terms (cf. Molyneaux 1998). This move won 
the support from women's groups, especially the Singapore Council of Women, as well as the PAP's 
own Women's League. However, the Charter pertains mostly to women's rights within marriage and 
the family. The Charter does not cover laws pertaining to family maintenance, inheritance, taxation, 
immigration, and citizenship. These other laws fall outside the Charter's purview and they continue 
to discriminate against women by enshrining men as the rightful heads of households, and men's 
responsibility to maintain their wives and children (AWARE 1988).  
 Worse, PAP leaders can withhold or even retract their gifts in the light of other national 
considerations. For instance, in the aftermath of the Great Marriage Debate of 1983 that I discussed 
in Chapter 2, the National University of Singapore (the country's only university at that time) took 
in more male students than female ones to “address” the gender “imbalance” in its student 
population. Girls in the Gifted Children's Program that started in 1984 also consistently comprised 
only one third of the total enrollment. Koh and Wee (1987) read this as the result of an undeclared 
quota to over-represent boys in the program. Also in 1984, PAP leaders forbade girls in the lower 
secondary classes from taking technical studies, while making home economics a mandatory 
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subject for them but not for the boys. These decisions blatantly reified traditional gender roles by 
suggesting that while girls needed schooling for their future roles as “wives” and “mothers,” boys 
required training only as “workers,” but not “husbands” and “fathers” (Koh 1987). Not surprisingly, 
the PAP politicians paid dearly for their arrogance. Although the party still won 77 out of the 79 
available parliamentary seats in the 1984 elections, its share of the popular vote slipped an alarming 
13 percent to 62.9 percent. This loss revealed limits to the citizens' tolerance for illiberality. 
 In the end, however, the Women's Charter benefits PAP leaders more than the women it was 
named after. By providing the legal justification for women to leave their homes and enter the paid 
workforce, it expanded the available workforce. This fueled the national industrialization program 
and enabled the leaders to deliver their election promise to enrich the country. In this light, the 
leaders granted women suffrage more out of pragmatic reasons than a genuine concern for their 
welfare. Chan Heng Chee writes: 
 
The mobilisation of women into the economy is a conscious government policy ... to relieve 
the labour shortage to reduce the dependence on immigrant labor. It is by no means clear that 
the participation of women in labour is a commitment (to the) principle of belief in 
emancipation, that women are entitled to the equal right as men to work. As a woman 
journalist in the Republic wryly commented, “Women get the chance to play a role in the 
economy only when economic necessity forces the male to call upon her services.” Thus, 
when recession made its impact on Singapore, women were the first to be retrenched (quoted 
in PuruShotam 1992: 326). 
 
 The concept of “strategic egalitarianism” can also be applied outside of the Women's Charter 
to other socially egalitarian decisions that the PAP leaders make. Take, for example, the statement 
that former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong made in 2003 about employing openly gay citizens as 
civil servants. As I discussed elsewhere (Tan 2009), many gay men and lesbians hailed this move as 
a watershed event as no government officials, much less the Prime Minister himself, ever talked of 
them in anything but a negative light. Yet, the state's recognition of its homosexual citizens can be 
easily withheld or withdrawn. Four years later in 2007, politicians voted to retain the criminality of 
non-virginal sex between men, while legalizing the same acts for straight couples. This decision 
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effectively made all gay men and, by extension, all lesbians into second-class citizens. Like the 
Women's Charter too, Goh's statement serves the PAP's interests more than it does gay and lesbian 
Singaporeans'. The PAP leaders aspire to transform Singapore into a global city like Tokyo, London, 
and New York, so Goh recruited gay people to advertise the country's cultural diversity to global 
capital and professional labor. Yet, the gay people themselves benefited little from the publicity 
campaign. Goh did not liberalize the civil service, because the service already does not screen 
applicants on the basis of their sexuality to begin with. Furthermore, state agencies cannot recruit 
gay civil servants solely because of their sexuality, as this means they must knowingly employ 
criminals to do so. Indeed, my civil servant informants reported no significant changes in attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbians in their respective agencies after Goh's announcement.  
 Other Singaporeans do not always benefit from the state's cosmopolitanization project either. 
State officials implement their economizing decisions in such a rapid succession that coming out 
ahead in this constantly changing environment requires a highly flexible and, since the 1980s, neo-
liberal work ethic. Whether for personal or structural reasons, some cannot and/or will not make the 
necessary lifestyle changes that this ethic demands. Soon after independence, these class tensions 
became apparent when English-medium instruction was made compulsory in schools. While many 
parents realized that English afforded much potential for upward social mobility, others saw the  
language and the “foreign” values of individualism and conspicuous consumption it transmits as 
threats to their own cultural traditions. This latter group tended to be over 40, having either received 
no formal education, or studied in their respective local languages in community schools before the 
1970s when mass education became nationally available. The state's closure of Nanyang University 
(the only Mandarin-medium institution of higher learning in Southeast Asia at the time) in 1980 
ostensibly to improve its graduates' employability, struck a particularly heavy emotional blow to the 
Mandarin-educated Chinese (Wong 2002). This siege mentality made for a false consciousness, as 
Chinese history lacks no examples of individualism and conspicuous consumption (Clunas 1991; de 
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Bary 1981; see Fong 2004 for a more contemporary ethnography). However, under the state multi-
cultural policies, the resulting heightened ethnic awareness only further intensified the mentality. 
  Always bubbling just below the surface, the linguistic/class tensions between those who 
mastered English and those who did not boiled over in 1999. That year, former Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong noted in his National Day Rally speech that two broad categories of people would 
emerge as the country became even more internationalized. One group, the “heartlanders,” consists 
of taxi drivers, hawker stall-holders, production workers, and other members of the working classes. 
Being less socially mobile and more bounded to Singapore, they have very local orientations and 
interests. In contrast, the other group (the “cosmopolitans”) consists of highly educated, skilled, and 
mobile Singaporeans with an international outlook. The challenge, Goh argued, lies in “[getting] the 
heartlanders to understand what the cosmopolitans contribute to Singapore's and their well-being, 
and to get the cosmpolitans to feel an obligation and sense of duty to the heartlanders.” Without the 
heartlanders to form the stable core of Singaporean society, educated elites cannot engage the global 
with a crucial sense of locality. “If cosmopolitans and heartlanders cease to identify with each other, 
our society will fall apart” (The Straits Times 1999b). 
 Goh did not mention exactly where the heartlander and the cosmopolitan live and work. In 
the decade since his speech, Singaporeans came to identify the heartlander as someone who resides 
in Ang Mo Kio, Toa Payoh, Queenstown, and other older HDB housing estates where one can find 
“real” Singaporean culture in the nation's heart. In fact, many businesses in these estates incorporate 
the term in their names to attract said clientele (e.g. Heartland Mall in Kovan). In contrast, the 
cosmopolitan disappeared from popular discourses. Presumably, she resides in a private 
condominium and works in a comfortable, air-conditioned office somewhere, but the details were 
never further elaborated upon. Indeed, why would the average Singaporean have much to say about 
her? When Goh placed the heartlander and the cosmopolitan in a symbiotic relationship, he also 
implicitly made the former the morally superior partner. To the average citizen, the heartlander 
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embodies “authentic” Singaporean culture, while her globally oriented counterpart falls under moral 
suspicions. The cosmopolitan's outlook and ability to leave the country in the event of disasters and 
war make her national allegiance questionable. 
  Contextualizing Goh's speech makes the political shrewdness of his discourse apparent. In 
1999, Singapore was still reeling from the massive retrenchment of the Asian financial crisis two 
years earlier. Worried that the jobless would translate their discontent into reduced support in the 
next national election, Goh did what politicians elsewhere in Bulgaria and the United States did to 
the poorer segments of the electorate (Creed 1998; Hill 2000) – he centered the working classes in 
the nation's moral universe to assure them that they had not been forgotten in the dizzying, almost 
incomprehensible race for capitalistic development. In reality, however, does the heartlander really 
differ that much from the cosmopolitan? Here, I argue that Goh presented a false dichotomy. The 
word “cosmopolitan” comes from the Greek words for “world” (kosmos) and “city” (polis), so 
cosmopolitans are philsophically imagined as transcendent of the particularistic. Rather than leading 
an existence of nomadic non-belonging, these “citizens of the universe” embrace all of humanity in 
their circle of belonging (Cheah 2006). Discursively, it also appears as if the heartlander has little to 
do with the global. If that were true, how did the Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand result 
in massive retrenchment in Singapore? HDB flats also do not just house the working classes. With 
the combined household monthly income limit for public housing residence set at S$8,000 (about 
US$5,700) (HDB InfoWeb), the middle classes, many of whom hold jobs in air-conditioned offices 
in the central business district, live in HDB flats too. Lastly, given the small size of Singapore 
Island – a journey by car from the eastern end to the western one via a connecting highway takes 
about two hours – and an Internet penetration rate of 58.6 percent (International Telecommunication 
Union 2008), any heartlander can access the global simply by taking a subway train bound for the 
central business district, or going online at home or in an Internet cafe. As Werbner (1999: 18) 
argues, “even the working class labour migrants may become cosmopolitans, willing to 'engage 
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with the Other.'” Goh valorized the poor in his speech, but he also further widened the fundamental 
class divide between English-speakers and Mandarin-speakers with his dichotomy. 
 
Year Total Population 
('000) 
Resident ('000) Non-Resident 
('000) 
Total Population 
Growth (%) 
Resident Growth 
(%) 
Non-Resident 
Growth (%) 
2000 4,027.9 3,273.4 754.5 - - - 
2001 4,138.0 3,325.9 812.1 2.7 1.6 7.63 
2002 4,176.0 3,382.9 793.1 0.9 1.7 -2.34 
2003 4,114.8 3,366.9 747.9 0.2 1.6 -5.7 
2004 4,166.7 3,413.3 753.4 1.3 1.4 0.74 
2005 4,265.8 3,467.8 798 2.4 1.6 5.92 
2006 4,401.4 3,525.9 875.5 3.2 1.7 9.71 
2007 4,588.6 3,583.1 1005.5 4.3 1.6 14.28 
2008 4,839.4 3,642.7 1196.7 5.5 1.7 19.61 
 
Table 1: Population Growth Rates 
(Derived from Singapore Department of Statistics 2009: Section 3.1) 
 
 Singaporeans perhaps express their discomfort with the global and the modern most acutely 
through their public discourses about unskilled guest workers. After reaching replacement level in 
1976, the average number of children a woman that gives birth to in her lifetime (i.e. the total 
fertility rate) continued to drop until it reached 1.28 in 2008. As such, immigration must account 
entirely for the rapid population growth from 2 million in 1970 to 4.8 million in 2008 (Singapore 
Department of Statistics 2009). With reference to Table 1 above, a small number of these migrants 
become permanent residents and citizens who make up the resident population. In the past decade, 
they caused this population to grow at about 1.6 percent every year. The vast majority of the overall 
migrant population lacks the necessary education and/or technical skills to qualify for permanent 
residence or citizenship. With the exception of the Thais, the nationalities and ethnicities of these 
unskilled guest workers match those of Singaporean citizens: ethnic Chinese from the PRC, Malays 
and Indonesians (generalized as “Malays”), and South Asians (generalized as “Indians”). As such, 
they can be absorbed with relative ease, whether ethnically or culturally, into the local ethnic 
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communities without aggravating the existing inter-ethnic tensions (Chua 2003b). Yet, they remain 
temporary and marginal. Not only do they face more restrictions than their skilled counterparts (see 
Chapter 2), they are also more liable for dismissal during bad economic times. For example, their 
numbers dropped during 2002 and 2003 when Singapore struggled to recover from the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the dot-com bubble burst of 2001. 
 The accelerated growth of the guest worker population after 2005 strained the existing 
housing facilities and transport infrastructure, resulting in a more pronounced outpouring in the 
local media of frustrations by the citizens. Even before 2005, some Singaporeans already found the 
close presence of so many guest workers irksome. For example, some 5,000 – 10,000 South Asian 
migrant construction workers would gather in the South Asian enclave at Little India every Sunday 
afternoon to socialize with friends and visit the temples there. Many of the neighborhood's Chinese 
residents openly disliked the workers' presence. In a local geographical study (Chang 2000), these 
residents blamed the workers for blocking public access paths, and making carparks and buses 
congested. They also feared for their personality safety, despite the lack of documented evidence of 
burglary. One even complained that she “can't stand the smell of too many Indians,” and that the 
workers were making themselves “too much at home” (ibid. 357).  
 The racist grouses against guest workers apexed in 2007 and 2008, not surprisingly, when 
demographers also recorded the biggest jumps in guest worker numbers. The bulk of the complaints 
seemed to focus on workers from mainland China. Both the English- and Mandarin-language media 
carried news of PRC women getting involved in illicit affairs with local men, or secretly taking on 
sex work behind their legitimate jobs as bar hostesses, waitresses in restaurants and coffee shops, 
masseurs, and pei du ma ma . The Mandarin term pei du ma ma refers to those mothers 
(ma ma) who accompany their children studying in Singapore (pei du). They are legally forbidden 
to work. Non-Mandarin-speakers also complained about PRC wait staff who could not converse in 
English. I could not find any official numerical breakdown of the overall guest worker population 
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according to its national origins. However, I suspect that PRC migrants make up the majority, as 
PAP leaders decided that ethnic Chinese should constitute approximately three quarters of the total 
population (Chua 2003b). I also conjecture that they do so to bolster an otherwise shrinking local-
born Chinese population out of a fear that Singaporeans will ultimately vote along ethnic lines, and 
that ailing Chinese support would mean a stronger Malay opposition. 
 The growing intolerance also made a local journalist ponder why Singaporeans forgot their 
humble origins as migrants and became so atas, or “arrogant” in Bahasa Melayu (literally, it means 
“above”)(The Straits Times 2007). Guest workers take up essential manual labor jobs that sustain 
and grow the economy, jobs that citizens no longer want to do themselves. Yet, Singaporeans treat 
these workers with distaste. Chua (2003b) sees in this class-based racism a nascent sense of national 
belonging. Here, both state officials and ordinary citizens privilege their citizenship and economic 
status over any ethnic connections, affinities and identities with the workers, because of the latter's 
cultural “inferiority” that presumably stems from their economic backwardness. 
 
Citizen as Biological Reproducer 
 The final group of state citizen-making policies focus on biological reproductivity. Noticing 
the downward trend in total fertility rate, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew accused the nation's 
womenfolk in 1983 of jeopardizing Singapore's future with their recalcitrant infertility. Few can 
argue against the need for babies to support economic growth and reproduce the nation, but the 
Great Marriage Debate Lee triggered invoked remains extra-ordinary to this day for two other 
reasons. Firstly, Lee blamed women entirely for the national infertility, as if men had no role to play 
producing babies. Two non-feminist women's organizations consequently proposed, in a disturbing 
collusion with state patriarchy, that childbirth be made mandatory for women. Just as men bear 
arms during their years of military conscription, so patriotic women should also bear children (The 
Straits Times 1983b). A newspaper columnist responded tartly that “if childbirth is [sic] indeed 
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national service, the women in the S[ingapore] C[ouncil of] W[omen's] O[rganizations] should be 
the first to volunteer – before they seek to draft other women” (The Sunday Times 1983a). Secondly, 
the debate was the first time that Lee openly conflated the uneducated with the brown-skinned 
ethnic minorities, and expressed his discriminatory views against them. While the Chinese (who 
consisted 76 percent of the population at that time) shrank at seven percent per generation, the 
Malays (15 percent) wildly proliferated by four percent per generation and the Indians (6 percent) 
by one percent (Heng and Devan 1992). These changes made Lee lament: 
 
If we continue to reproduce ourselves in this lopsided way, we will be unable to maintain our 
present standards. Levels of competence will decline. Our economy will falter, the 
administration will suffer, and the society will decline. For how can we avoid lowering 
performance when for every two graduates ... in 25 years' time there will be one graduate, 
and for every two uneducated workers, there will be three (The Straits Times 1983a)? 
 
 Consequently, state officials introduced a bevy of measures to contain and reverse the failing 
fertility trend. In 1984, they set up the Social Development Unit under the aegis of what is now the 
Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports to encourage graduates to marry and have 
children early. In reaction to complaints about the SDU's implicit elitism, the Social Development 
Service was set up a year later by the People's Association, a separate statutory board, to provide 
similar services for non-graduates. In January 2009, the two units merged to enlarge their catchment 
areas and provide more opportunities for members to socialize. As I shall discuss further in Chapter 
5, both the SDU and the SDS organize events that generally aim to enable busy Singaporeans to 
socialize with members of the opposite sex in the hope that they will start dating or, better yet, get 
married. 
 More overtly, state officials also have an arsenal of monetary tools that rewards childbirth, 
and eases the structural and financial burdens of raising children. With reference to Appendix A, 
state officials sought to regulate childbirth immediately after independence in 1965. In the period of 
the old population policies (1966 – 1983), they strove to rein in population growth because of the 
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endemic problems of massive unemployment and under-employment. Urging Singaporeans to “stop 
at two,” state officials legalized abortion in 1970 and allowed income tax child relief only for a 
couple's first three children from August 1973 onward. Immediately after the Great Marriage 
Debate (1984 – 1986), lower-educated and lower-income couples were encouraged to sterilize with 
cash grants of S$10,000, while graduate mothers could claim up to the same amount in income tax 
child relief for each of their children. The electoral backlash the PAP suffered from their blatantly 
eugenic and elitist policies made the politicians retract some of their more objectionable policies, 
but their pro-natalism remained. Urging Singaporeans to “have three or more [children], if you can 
afford it” from 1987 – 1999, state officials reversed previous third-child penalties in primary school 
registration, such that children from families with three or more children now received priorities in 
getting into their desired schools. Realizing that working couples might not have children because 
of the time demanding by child-rearing, state officials also began offering working mothers S$100 
monthly subsidies to send their young children to approved child-care centers.  
 In 2000, after two decades of pro-natalist efforts that saw little results, state officials took 
more drastic measures. In response to criticism that Singapore's fast-paced society does not make an 
environment conducive to reproduction – Singaporeans complain that they often return home from 
work so tired that all they wanted was to shower and sleep – the pro-natal rhetoric shifted to stress 
the importance of maintaining a proper work-life balance. For instance, companies were asked to 
implement more family-friendly practices, such as dismissing workers on time instead of making 
them stay as long as their bosses do to “prove” their productivity. More significantly, state officials 
started rewarding mothers for their labors with so-called “Baby Bonuses” of S$1,500 for the second 
child and S$3,000 for the third. Parents who set up Child Development Accounts in banks would 
have their deposits matched dollar-for-dollar up to a certain limit. Working mothers could also claim 
eight weeks of paid maternity leave. Over the following decade, state officials extended the Baby 
Bonus program, rewarding the first two children with S$3000 each in 2004, and S$4000 each in 
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2008. For the third and fourth child, the award went up to S$6,000 each in 2004. Paid maternity 
leave was also extended to 12 weeks in 2004, and 16 in 2008. Simultaneously, infant-care subsidies 
also went up to S$400 in 2004, and S$600 in 2008. Lastly, for households with young children, the 
state levy they must pay for each foreign domestic helper they hire also went down from S$345 per 
month to S$250. 
 State officials do not limit their obsession with babies simply to monetary assistance and 
rewards. Harnessing the discursive and material might of such state agencies as the Ministry of 
Manpower; Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports; Housing and Development 
Board; Social Development Unit; Social Development Service; Internal Revenue Authority of 
Singapore; Registry of Marriages; and Registry of Muslim Marriages, officials expose the average 
citizen to fecundity-related issues at some point of her life. She may become part of an unwitting 
audience for the “Romancing Singapore” campaign – a state-initiated but privately run campaign 
that aims to cultivate a mood for love among dating or married couples – when she switches the 
television or radio, or go to the movies, or just simply browsing through a magazine. She may even 
take up the campaign's offers by, for instance, going to a “Singles Nite” at a sushi bar or spending a 
weekend at the Ritz Carlton with her date. Even marriage does not offer respite from the state's 
baby messages. Upon the official registration of her marriage, the new bride may receive receive 
pamphlets with such titles as Truly, Madly, Deeply: A Booklist on Marriage. This handbook lists 
books that cover topics such as planning a wedding; the secrets of a successful marriage; sexual 
intimacy; the differences between men and women and how to reconcile them; home décor; and 
financial planning (Teo 2007).  
 Strangely, these tremendous efforts fail to reverse the downward fertility trend. In 2008, the 
total fertility rate still hit a dismal 1.28 (The Straits Times 2009b). How can this persistent infertility 
be accounted for? I want to stress here that while state officials could have easily blamed gay men 
and lesbians, they have never done so. Rather, Singapore follows the global trend among developed 
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nation-states. In the period from 2000 to 2005, the total fertility rate for Germany, Japan, Australia, 
and the United States were 1.32, 1.33, 1.75, and 2.04 respectively (UN Population Division 2005). 
The classic demographic transition theorist Kingsley Davis (1937, 1997) explains the poor rates as a 
result of economic development. Arguing that industrialization undermines childbearing incentives, 
he posits that the newfound social mobility in developing economies essentially contradicts the 
social organization of the kin-based, familistic society. The new fertility regime, in contrast, focuses 
on small families. Grand in its scope, this theory predicts low fertility as a looming crisis for all 
economically advanced countries as global fertility declines with continued economic globalization. 
 Studies that focus on the value of children affirm Davis's theory by suggesting that the first 
two children satisfy such key childbearing rationales as becoming a parent, having a child to love, 
and carrying on the family name. Indeed, industrialization quickly undermines the rationale for 
higher parity births, such as helping with household chores and looking after younger children, by 
raising the cost of education and other childcare expenses (Bulatao 1981; Caldwell 1982). The cost 
of sending one child to school from the primary through to the pre-university levels in Singapore 
ranges from S$2,000 (US$1,400) to S$73,500 (US$52,000), while four years of college education 
cost S$25,500 (US$18,000). In comparison, pre-university education in Japan can set parents back 
S$100,000 (US$71,000) to S$166,500 (US$118,500), while university tuition costs S$62,500 
(US$44,500) to S$377,000 (US$248,500) (The Straits Times 2008c). The same industrialization that 
raises these direct costs of childcare also increases the indirect ones, such as investments in time 
and energy. Having more children means higher opportunity costs to the parents in terms of job 
advancement, a better material lifestyle, and a head start for each child. The same newspaper article 
cites a Japanese man who thinks having a second child as a rash decision even though he adores his 
son: “I need to put aside money for my own retirement.” In this light, Mason and Kuhlthau (1992) 
rightfully insist that these various cost increases be treated as an important anti-natalist factor. 
 Other demographic theorists locate the infertility trend in terms of ideological change. As 
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Mason (1997: 450) argues, “theories of fertility change must recognize that changing perceptions 
ultimately drive fertility change, and that perceptions may change more slowly or more quickly than 
the reality with which they are concerned.” Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa provide illustrative insights 
here. Arguing that low fertility hinges on a cultural shift in the dominant mental/cultural schema 
(Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986; Van de Kaa 1987), they further assert the existence of two 
successive motivations for declining fertility. The first, associated with the (first) demographic 
transition and especially with declining family size, assumes that all who could have children would 
bear them, and that parents aim to provide substantial resources to their children as their dominant 
orienting goal. In contrast, the low fertility of the second demographic transition is motivated by 
new ideas that place the individual and individual choice at the core of the unfolding life course, as 
can be seen in the increased rates for divorce and co-habitation. In the absence of a clear normative 
life course, individuals face the challenge of constructing a meaningful life that does not necessarily 
include parenthood. This schema agrees strongly with Gidden's (1991) observation that in the de-
institutionalized modern life course, having and caring for children still remain important, but only 
in situations where couples feel that parenthood will enable them to self-actualize better. 
 Another group of demographers use gender equity to explain failing fertility. McDonalds 
(2000) explains how gender equity can paradoxically become anti-natalist in high fertility contexts 
but pro-natalist in low fertility settings. As societies become more economically developed, gender 
equity also increases as more women enter the work force. Increasing female employment causes 
fertility to drop by opening up new avenues to feminine satisfaction, status, and prestige outside of 
childbirth and child-rearing. At lower levels of fertility, gender equity may rise further in politics, 
education, and other individual-oriented institutions, but remains relatively low in family-oriented 
ones. Consequently, fertility can fall to very low levels in Italy, Japan and other more patriarchal 
societies, while remaining closer to replacement levels in the United States, Scandinavia and other 
more egalitarian contexts. With pervasive gender equity, fertility closer to replacement level occurs 
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as women bear fewer of the financial, time and energy costs of rearing children. Greater equity 
spreads these costs more broadly among men and the state than in settings with stronger familial 
patriarchy. Indeed, Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) point out that as the state de-familializes society 
by shouldering more of the responsibilities traditionally relegated to the family, the more working 
women find it conducive to have children. 
 This last point on the relationship between gender equity, de-familialization, and fecundity 
resonates strongly with Singapore's case of recalcitrant infertility. A year after the implementation of 
the latest changes to the pro-natalist policies in 2008 (the most significant being a greater coverage 
and a higher monetary payment for childbirth), The Straits Times (2009) declares the failure of the 
“baby bonus payments.” The article reports that although the government gave out a record S$230 
million in payments in 2008, the total fertility rate still fell from 1.29 in 2007 to 1.28 in 2008. It 
attributes the higher payout to the restrospective nature of the policy changes, as parents who gave 
birth prior to 2008 could still claim the rewards. The report also traces the payment scheme's failure 
to its appealing only to those who already want to have children to begin with, not the more 
important group of couples who desire to remain child-less.  
 Furthermore, by publicly framing the incentives to ease the financial burden of childbirth 
and childcare as “payments” and “rewards,” state officials undermine their own goals by treating 
children as if they were common commodities in the market place to be sold by parents to the state. 
This mercenary attitude cheapens parenthood as a life course ideal, resulting in policy failure. When 
sociologist Youyenn Teo (2005: 123) questioned her informants about their attitudes towards the 
pro-natalist policies, the resulting comments centered on the common belief about the 
incompatibility between money and good values: 
 
... first, material incentives are ineffective because the behavior that is encouraged requires 
genuine beliefs that transcend money. Second, in fact, money is seen in opposition to good 
values so that equating money with them cheapens the values. More generally, insofar as it is 
using money to encourage certain behaviors, the state contributes to a materialistic culture 
that undermines the cultivation of genuinely good values (emphasis in original). 
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 Teo's consultants did not deny the usefulness of the tax rebates and cash bonuses. However, 
they also insisted that these incentives are merely “extras” that do not actually sway their decisions  
one way or another. Responding to Teo's queries about the whether tax credits affect people's child-
bearing plans, one married Chinese woman laughed and exclaimed: “I hope not! That shouldn't be 
the reason why you have kids. Then next time you tell the kid, 'Oh, I had you because of the twenty 
thousand dollars!'” (Teo 2005:126) Another informant, a single woman, points out that the use of 
monetary incentives encourages abuse of the system. Those who take the money may behave in 
ways that violate policy's spirit by, for example, having a baby just for the money. Lastly, a married 
Malay man describes the state as too “money minded” (Teo 2005: ibid.), because it maintains a 
materialist approach for social and cultural matters that characterizes its economic strategies in 
general. Overly focused on economics, state officials lack sensitivity towards the psychological and 
social needs of society. Consequently, the state promotes bad rather than good behavior, and opens 
the way for abuse and devaluing the values they allegedly support. 
 The national attention given to the fertility of married Singaporeans unintendedly alienates 
their unmarried counterparts. Being part of a couple has become such an unquestioned badge of 
normality (as part of the larger social entrenchment of heteronormativity) that those participating in 
other forms of intimate sociality, including being single, must justify their abnormality (Budgeon 
2008). Reflecting this observation, newspaper editor Sumiko Tan alleges that state pro-natalism 
reeks of “singlism,” i.e. the negative steretypes and discrimination direct against the unmarried. In a 
poll of 1,000 US undergraduates she cites, singles are seen negatively as immature, insecure, ugly 
and prone to jealousy, while married people are seen as honest, caring and kind. Singlism in 
Singapore can also manifest at the level of the individual as micro-aggressive acts in the work 
place. These acts include making singles cover, with no extra pay, the work of colleagues who go on 
maternity leave; giving parents priorities to take leave during the school holidays in June and 
December; and assigning night and weekend duties to singles. After all, they have no families to 
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care for, so they must have flexible schedules, right? Singlism ignores how singles contribute to the 
national economy just as much as married people do, or that singles have parents and siblings to go 
home to. This unequal attention, Tan admits, makes her feel less wanted (The Sunday Times 2008). 
 During my own fieldwork, some of my consultants made comments that resonated strongly 
with Tan's sentiments. Over dinner one night in a café, I chatted with Thomas about his feelings 
towards Singapore as a gay man. Relating how he would soon be eligible to purchase his own HDB 
flat the following year when he became 35 years old, he emphatically revealed that shocked he was 
at the many privileges and grants the state denies him because he is not married: 
 
There are so many privileges and grants that are given to married couples that I'm not 
allowed to have. Wow! I didn't know that. I was really an idiot when it comes to money and 
stuff like that. So only when I started doing [research on HDB flats], I started to find out. I 
was so surprised. And there're so many limitations and stuff like that. I almost wished that, 
you know, it made me feel that ... you're just a troublesome family member. That they have 
no choice but to give you a room. Given a choice, they wouldn't. So they would like, you 
know, don't give you the best and stuff like that. It hit me personally for this lah, as a single. 
And I think that being gay is one or two levels even below single. 
 
Not surprisingly, given his feelings of alienation, Thomas admitted later in the interview that given 
the opportunity, he would migrate out of Singapore to greener pastures where his worth as a human 
being and as a citizen is not measured in terms of how many babies he can produce for the state. 
 Echoing the earlier assertion by Yanagisako and Collier (1987) that scholars ought to study 
gender roles and kinship categories as part of a larger integrated system, Teo (2009) contends that 
state officials impose such impossible demands on citizens' (especially women's) (re)productivity 
that women cope by focusing on their careers and holding back on their fertility. She points out how 
state pro-natalist policies characteristically locate the question of childbearing and child-rearing 
firmly in the realm of women’s “choices” through the shaping of structural possibilities and 
constraints. For instance, nursing mothers can claim tax relief for the female (and only female) 
foreign domestic helpers they hire, and up to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave (the cost of which is 
shared between the state and the employer). State officials appear to de-familialize childbearing and 
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childcare through these policies, but this shifting of responsibilities is entirely financial in nature. 
Women are still expected to prioritize their roles as mothers over those as employees, and invest the 
bulk of their time and energy in childcare. For example, only working mothers can claim the tax 
relief for hiring foreign domestic helpers. This restriction suggests that not only are working 
mothers still expected to work while parenting their children, but the task of mothering children 
ultimately still falls on women (albeit in surrogacy in the form of the domestic helper).  
 Maternity leave further reifies women's roles as mothers. In sharp contrast to the 16 weeks 
of maternity leave that a working mother can claim, her husband can only claim up to four. Even 
then, the discretion of granting paternity leave (or not) falls entirely on the employer. Indeed, state 
leaders justify this difference by framing men's primary role not as fathers, but as workers. Longer 
periods of paternity leave, they claim, will endanger the economy (The Straits Times 2008d). In this 
respect, Singapore's gendered state policies resonate with the ideology of “gender equality” Shapiro 
(1991: 276 – 7 n40) observes in the Israeli kibbutz movement: 
 
The attempt to achieve [sexual] equality is generally a matter of trying to turn women into 
the social equivalents of men ... Women had to be given the opportunity to work in 
agricultural production, in developing industries, and in the army. There was, however, no 
comparable effort to get men into the kitchens and the laundries. 
 
Indeed, Singapore's gender ideologies not only ossify traditional gender roles that locate men in the 
public sphere and women in the private one, but also ironically discourage working mothers from 
taking the full 16 weeks of maternity leave. The norms that emphasize the primacy of work and the 
undesirability of long periods of time-off still persist. As a result, working mothers feel guilty and 
insecure. They must weigh the time they devote on their newborns against the debts of obligations 
they “owe” their colleagues who cover their duties, as well as the chances of becoming obsolete 
through their extended absences (Teo 2009). One of my straight male consultants even speculated 
that maternity leave may hurt the employability of potential mothers: 
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You know, the whole maternity leave scheme may backfire. If this woman comes along looking 
for a job, and the employer knows she's getting married soon, why should he choose her and 
pay for the 16 weeks when she goes on maternity leave? 
 
Under these conflicting demands, it is no wonder that working women fail to attain the “work-life 
balance” that state officials continuously emphasize, and end up choosing their careers over family 
formation. 
 
Conclusion 
 As I reach the conclusion of this chapter, I find it apt to go back to the beginning and remind 
ourselves, as Teo (2009: 533) does, that “being an ideal Singaporean is hard.” State officials 
envision their perfect Singaporean as the culmination of three ideals, i.e. the embodiment of race-
culture, the productive economic worker, and the fecund biological reproducer. After a survey of 
basic theories of the state and the nation, I proceeded to a discussion of the myriad state policies 
that officials have in place to socially engineer citizens into the perfect Singaporean of their vision. 
These discourses and practices include those that reflect the state's restrictive language ideologies, 
racist military recruitment policies, the ethnic quota system that governs one's residence depending 
on one's ethnic background, the liberal policies towards both skilled and unskilled migrant workers, 
and the arsenal of pro-natalist incentives I just discussed. These incentives aim to lower obstacles to 
women having more children, but they ultimately reflect state gender ideologies that burden women 
with conflicting and near-impossible demands on their economic and biological (re)productivity. 
 Given their circumstances, Singaporeans may be expected to revolt against the state's gender 
injustice and generally heavy interferences in their private lives. Yet, women do not treat the state as 
the source of their work-life struggles, but rather blame themselves for their failure to harmonize the 
demands between career and motherhood (Teo 2009). Even more paradoxically, they see the state as 
a benign agent whose only fault lies in its inability to fully realize its good intentions: 
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Counterintuitively, even though people saw the state as heavily involved in precisely the 
main source of their conflicts – an increasingly competitive and stressful work environment 
– they capped their criticisms with the claim that the economic has a certain logic that the 
state is merely responding to. They described the state as dealing with an inexorable force 
that is “the economy” and depicted it as doing the best it can for the larger good of the 
nation. They used phrases like “understand the government’s point of view,” “see the bigger 
picture,” and “the government wants to do the right thing” to account for why, despite their 
disagreement with specifics, the state still had an important role to play in shaping families 
(Teo 2009: 550). 
 
While it provided the driving force for the radical politics of second-wave feminism earlier in the 
1970s, gender in this case has somehow been disarmed. 
 Women's compliance with the state's gender order should not be taken as an indicator of real 
satisfaction with the socio-political status quo. After all, citizens cannot possibly enjoy the frequent 
incursions that the state makes into their lives. Such discontent, in fact, has consequences in the 
cultivation of national belonging that I shall discuss in greater depth in Chapter 4. There, I begin 
with an introductory discussion of the differences between (neo)liberal conceptions of citizenship 
and the communitarian ones that state officials employ. Next, I shall examine the ideological efforts 
that these officials make to convince Singaporeans of their political legitimacy. Ironically, these 
efforts result in the citizens' alienation from the government and, through the government's intimate 
associations with the nation-state, from Singapore the country itself. In the last section of the 
chapter, I shall discuss ethnographic examples of how local LGBT rights activists attempt to bridge 
this affective gap through their activist efforts. 
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An Interlude 
 Every year on August 9, Singapore celebrates its National Day. It marks the first day of 
island's existence as an independent nation-state in 1965, a day after it was (as popular discourses 
go) unceremoniously “expelled” from Malaysia. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) would have called  
this piece of traumatic historical “truth” an “invented tradition.” The historically inclined know that 
Singaporean politicians wanted to leave the union as well, albeit with far more reluctance than their 
Malaysian counterparts did. Nevertheless, no one seemed to mind the exaggeration of what acutally 
happened. After all, almost everybody loves a good story of the underdog surviving against all odds 
to triumph over his oppressors (except, of course, the oppressors). And Singapore did just that, at 
least in economic terms. 
 
 
Figure 5: 2007 National Day billboard showing some Members of Parliament  
at the junction of Kampong Bahru Road and Outram Road (Source: Author) 
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Figure 6: Public housing block with national flags in 2007 (Source: Author)  
 
 Preparations to celebrate this national victory occur every year months ahead of National 
Day itself. Starting in May, town councils install billboards by major road junctions (Figure 5) and 
hang pennants from the ubiquitous public housing blocks (Figure 6). Television and radio stations 
will also start playing the National Day theme song of the year. These tunes used to be of the chest-
thumping variety, such as Stand Up for Singapore (1984) and Count on Me, Singapore (1986) that I 
learned as a young child. Realizing that these early efforts likely repelled their audience because 
they sounded too inorganic and propagandistic, state officials took to a softer approach that tugged 
at one's heartstrings in the late 1990s. This policy change resulted in the penning of Home (1998), 
Where I Belong (2001), and Song for Singapore (2010), songs that all focus on one's emotional ties 
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to Singapore as the place where one grew up and, ultimately, the place to return to no matter where 
one goes in life. 
 The celebrations climax during the National Day Parade (NDP) on National Day itself. The 
parade used to be held alternatively between the National Stadium and the h open field in front of 
City Hall aptly named the Padang (Malay for “field”). The Stadium closed for good in 2007 for re-
development, so the venue shifted to the Floating Platform at Marina Bay. Tickets to the NDP are 
free, but demand always far outstrips supply (despite three chances to catch it live in a full-dressed 
rehearsal, a preview parade, and the actual parade on August 9 itself), so tickets are alloted via 
balloting. Each balloter can apply for up to four tickets every time, but balloters do not always have 
seeing the parade in mind. As National Day draws nearer, advertisements offering NDP tickets for 
sale Singaporeans will start appearing on local auction web sites. Depending on how desperate a 
buyer becomes, these tickets can sell for as much as S$200 apiece. Detractors decry such 
capitalization of nationalistic sentiments as morally reprehensible behavior, and call (unsuccessful 
so far) for the state to intervene in this gray market. 
 In 2008, I finally went to see my first NDP. To be honest, I took this long to go not because I 
had been unsuccessfully balloting for tickets all this time. Rather, I treated the parade as I did the 
Merlion (that hideous water-spouting statue with the head of a lion and the body of a fish that stands 
in Merlion Park), or the zoo, or the Singapore Flyer (the country's answer to the London Eye giant 
Ferris wheel), or the many other attractions the state built to unburden tourists of their euros, yen, 
and dollars. Like the tourist spots, the parade will always be there. There is one every year. I can 
catch it on TV during either its live or encore telecast. If I miss the parade this year and I really 
want to watch it, I just simply wait for next year. Besides, the Pink Picnic also occurs on the 
afternoon of National Day at the Botanic Gardens. I would much rather attend the picnic and help 
my gay friends assert their place in Singapore than to go to the NDP and support a state that has not 
always been gay-friendly. Still, what kind of an anthropologist of the state who studies Singaporean 
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cultural citizenship would I be if I missed the NDP during fieldwork? So, I went online to apply for 
tickets. As my beginner's luck would have it (or maybe I had priority because I never applied 
before), I got a pair of them. 
 On National Day itself, I donned my favorite red shirt (so as to better match the red on the 
national flag) and headed out to the Floating Platform. The parade began at 5 pm, but members of 
the audience could enter the platform two hours earlier. Those who wanted to go even earlier would 
have to first wait in line at checkpoints set up some distance away from the venue. The tickets were 
color-coded and I had to sit in my designated color zone. It was otherwise free-seating within the 
zone itself. Since I was already assured a seat, I would normally arrive only at about 4.30 pm. Yet, 
in cases like the NDP where the timing of one's arrival could determine one's view of the stage, 
Singaporeans are known to act in a kiasu manner. Kiasu, a term that comes from the Hokkien kia 
(“fear”) and su (“lose”), literally means “the fear of losing out.” Together with its close cousin 
kiasee, literally “the fear of death” but more properly translated as “the fear of punishment” (see = 
death in Hokkien), kiasu has been ascribed by Singaporeans upon themselves as part of their way of 
thinking. Nobody likes to lose or to get punished, so it is natural to take measures to avoid such 
outcomes. One, however, becomes kiasu or kiasee when the preventive measures turn extreme. 
 Take, for example, the so-called “Hello Kitty Craze” that swept through Singapore in early 
2000. That year, McDonald's sold pairs of Hello Kitty and her boyfriend Dear Daniel dressed in 
different ethnic costumes as toys that accompanied its set meals. There were six pairs in total. The 
quality of the dolls was inferior to those of other Sanrio products. Nevertheless, the dolls became so 
popular that at the height of the McKitty Craze, some 300,000 Singaporeans of all ages (or eight 
percent of the total population) crammed into all 114 McDonald's outlets on the island to get their 
hands on the toys. The long lines of impatient customers sweating under the hot, tropical sun led to 
ugly disorderly behavior, such as catfights, line-jumping, and wasteful dumping of uneaten burgers 
that became the focus of mass media scrutiny. Under tremendous public pressure to control the 
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Kitty-crazed crowd, McDonald's decided to release the last pair of dolls not in Febuary as originally 
planned. Rather, those who ordered the set meal would receive a coupon that they could then use to 
redeem the dolls much later in July that year. The craze finally died (Ng 2001). 
 As yet, no one could fully explain why Singaporeans went crazy over Hello Kitty. Ng (2001) 
attributed it to the general popularity of Hello Kitty among the Chinese-Singaporeans who formed 
most of the long lines outside McDonald's, the marketing savviness of McDonald's itself, and 
simple unmitigated greed. Each doll in the pair cost only S$4.50, about four times cheaper than a 
regular Hello Kitty doll of the same size. The dolls' costumes were also unique. Since McDonald's 
launched the McKitties in Singapore first, many thought that the toys had a high collection and 
resale value. News of a Singaporean man who sold a pair of McKitties to a Hong Kong collector for 
US$50 (or about ten times the original price) further fueled the fever. Indeed, most bought extra 
pairs with resale in mind. Popular discourses also blamed Singaporean kiasuism for the craze. In 
what North Americans would identify as “keeping up with the Joneses,” one must have the dolls 
because the neighbors also bought them. Not having them would mean a tremendous loss of face. 
The final joke, however, was on the McDonald's costumers. Unbeknownst to them at the time, the 
restaurant chain would later release similar dolls in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Japan. This 
move rendered the ones in Singapore worthless as investments. 
 Certainly, Singaporeans do not monopolize kiasuism. Anyone who has seen the long lines 
outside of retail outlets for the post-Thanksgiving or Christmas sales, or days before the official 
release of a particular product (Apple's iPhone and iPad come to mind here) know that kiasuism 
afflicts people worldwide. Since resources are ultimately finite, kiasu behavior seems inevitable in 
some situations. The only difference, perhaps, lies in how Singaporeans treat it as a national trait 
that some deride and attempt to excise. A field informant, for instance, regards kiasuism as vestigial 
behavioral from the recent colonial past when most residents had been poor and life was hard. It 
will, however, remain socially entrenched even after the generation that came of age in that era of 
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poverty passes on. Singapore has become materially wealthy, but there will always be some things 
that are in short supply – well-paying jobs, affordable housing, government scholarships, places in 
reputable schools – so Singaporeans will always be kiasu at some level.  For others, kiasuism is 
something they embrace, sometimes in self-deprecatory humor as a reminder to not take themselves 
too seriously. It was in this humorous spirit that a local cartoonist created the comic character Mr 
Kiasu as the protagonist of a series that makes fun of the stereotypically kiasu Singaporean. The 
series lasted from 1990 to 2000, and it enjoyed such popularity that a local Mandarin-medium 
television station even turned it into a sitcom. 
 In the comic series, Mr Kiasu often ends up embarassing or frustrating himself through his 
actions. Unknown to me at the time, I would also realize that my own kiasu behavior at the NDP 
would amount to nothing. Fearing that long lines would form at the gantry points outside of the 
floating platform and stop me from getting a good seat, I made my way to one just outside of the 
entrance of a metro station at 1.30 pm. There was no one there at the gates. It was too early. I 
wanted to get out of the hot sun, but I did not want to lose my first-place position. It took about 
another 40 minutes before others came to join my line. Shortly before the gates opened, a woman 
walked up to me and introduced herself as a reporter with one of the local newspapers. She wanted 
to interview me, and she gave me her number for me to call later. On the way to the platform, I 
bumped into two friends from The Bear Project. Their seats were in the same color zone as mine, so 
we decided to sit together. When we reached the platform, we collected goodie bags and went to our 
allocated zone. That was when I realized thay my kiasuism was for nothing. The platform was huge, 
with a seating capacity for 27,000! Yes, the seats could have been bigger with more leg room, but I 
really needed not have gone so early and sweated that much at all. Giant television panels had been 
installed on the stage, so that even those sitting at the back could see the performances appearing on 
stage later. 
 Sitting near the middle of the zone and enjoying the cooling sea breezes blowing in from 
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Marina Bay, we opened our goodie bags to see its contents (Figure 7). Some of it was expected: 
tissue paper, packet drinks and snacks, a cap, a sling bag, a raincoat, and a mini national flag. There 
were also two balloons and an odd contraption consisting of several see-through rectangular plastic 
blades linked together at one end. The color red dominated the entire ensemble (except the blue 
goodie bag), and everything had the NDP logo of five children in a star formation shooting forth 
stars from their upward-reaching hands. One of my friends blew up his balloons. They turned out to 
be a rod and a hand. We could beat the rod against the plastic hand instead of clapping with our own 
hands. The odd contraption unfolded to become a propeller of some sort. We reckoned that it must 
be for a mass display later. 
 
 
Figure 7: Contents of the NDP goodie bag in 2008 (Source: Author) 
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 The parade began shortly after a brief shower at about 5.30 pm. The NDP's theme varies 
year by year – the one for 2008 was “Celebrating the Singaporean Spirit” – as do the parade floats 
and items that match that theme. Yet, as a national ritual (Kong and Yeoh 1997), the parade has 
certain fixed structural elements that get re-enacted every year. The appearance of hosts, usually 
local TV celebrities, signals the imminent commencement of the parade. They give instructions in 
the use of any unfamiliar apparatuses in the goodie bag – the propeller was indeed meant for a mass 
display – and rev up the audience's spirit. Several pre-parade entertainment segments follow. These 
items include the perennial crowd favorite of parachuting commandos precision-jumping into the 
parade grounds (and, in this case, not into Marina Bay!), and precision drills by the military police. 
Parade contingent of military, police, and civilian representatives march in. The parade commander 
salutes the Prime Minister and other senior parliamentarians as they arrive, but the parade does not 
formally begin until the President arrives in his armored sedan and his entourage of traffic police 
escorts. The singing of the National Anthem follows, as helicopters bearing a giant national flag fly 
past overhead. The President then inspects the parade contingents, and is honored by a feu de joie 
by the Guards of Honor. After he gives permission to march the parade off, the parade commences 
as the contingents march past the dais on which he sits, and the audience behind him. With timed 
precision, fighter jets from the air force now fly in to perform awe-inspiring aerial acrobatics as 
they roared past the gathered audience below. After the formal parade finishes, the audience takes 
the national pledge during the lighter-hearted celebrations that follow. 
 As a ritual, the NDP has several distinct characteristics and functions. Firstly, the parade  
occurs in a time and space specifically set aside for it. The specially decorated streets and designed 
costumes, together with the anticipating audience, transform the parade into a particularly emotive 
event (Goheen 1993). Secondly, it enables its participants to reflect upon the values that make up 
Singaporean society (Turner 1974), because the ritual foregrounds these shared values to celebrate 
them (Goheen 1993). Thirdly, it comments on existing social relationships. It concurrently shapes 
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and is shaped by the field of social networks it is enmeshed in. By emphasizing the shared attribute 
of citizenship (Goheen 1993), highlighting common values (Bocock 1974), displaying communal 
power and solidarity (Marston 1989), and generates what Turner (1974: 156) calls “liminality” to 
suspend the rules that govern everyday social interactions (Turner 1974), the NDP creates a sense of 
community by reinforcing national cohesion. Fourthly, the parade suspends a sense of place by 
building up collective memory that supports the formation of a sense of home, and, when written 
large, a sense of nationhood (Connerton 1989). Lastly, as a spectacle, the NDP inscribes its nation-
building message onto the population through pageantry and fanfare. It does so either punitatively 
through excessive violence (e.g. public torture and executions), or celebratorily through wonder and 
awe that deliberately constructed pomp creates (Ley and Olds 1988; Yeoh and Lau 1995). Foucault 
(1979) argues that spectacles amplify the threat of punishment to enable it to penetrate the realm of 
consciousness that lies beyond the immediate experience of witnessing the ritual. The same effect 
applies to rituals-as-celebrations as well. As such, public spectacles become a means for elites to 
exert hegemonic control (Ley and Olds 1988). 
 Hegemony, as Gramsci (1973) points out, can never be fully achieved. Elites seeking to gain 
and/or maintain power will always encounter resistance from groups that disagree with the version 
of reality that the elites propose. This dissent can be as overt and material as demonstrations and 
riots, or it can be implicit and symbolic. Kong and Yeoh (1997), for instance, register resistance 
among participants in the NDP contingents and entertainment segments. For the NDP to succeed, 
they must spend many tiring weekends rehearsing. They are fed (at a level of quantity and/or 
quality that may not commensurate with the labor put in), but they are otherwise not compensated. 
After all, they are supposed to participate out of a sense of nationalistic pride. Naturally, many 
consider the NDP a chore and resent having to “burn” their weekends this way. Resistance also 
occurs in other forms, such as the re-selling of NDP tickets and my own non-chalance towards the 
nation's birthday. In particular, the former draws public ire because it subverts the nobler project of 
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nation-building into selfish, personal gain. 
 The low level of widespread resistance begs the question: why are Singaporeans not any 
more patriotic? After more than 40 years of strong nation-building efforts by the state, should not 
national fervor be higher? In the following chapter, I explore one possible reason why Singaporeans 
remain reluctant to express their belonging to the country. 
 
 
 
  
117 
Chapter 4: The “Great Affective Divide” and Gay Activist Constructions of Citizenship 
 
While the PAP Government has inspired in the people much respect for its efficiency 
and much gratitude for the good life as a result of this efficiency, there is very little 
in the way of affectionate regard (Catherine Lim 1994a). 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed three citizenship archetypes, and the discursive and real-
life reactions Singaporeans have against the impossible demands that these models place on their 
cultural, economic, and reproductive lives. Continuing with the ethnography, I make two assertions 
in this chapter. Firstly, I maintain that gay men suffer from both a nation-wide apathy towards the 
country called the “Great Affective Divide,” and from the criminalization and subsequent social 
stigmatization of their sexuality. Secondly, by examining local gay activist efforts that center gay 
men and lesbians nationally to overcome this double alienation, I argue that community-based 
projects fare better in heavily Confucianized Singapore than gay pride parades and other assertions 
of individualism. To make both assertions, I begin by first comparing the liberal idea of citizenship 
with its Confucian counterpart and the “Asian Values” offshoot. In particular, PAP leaders use the 
communitarian “Asian Values” discourse to justify their authoritarian style of supply-side socialism. 
Next, I discuss the origins of the Great Affective Divide both as a term and as a social phenomenon 
rooted in this form of socialism. Lastly, I compare two instances of gay rights activism that occurred 
in 2010: a gay pride parade of two marchers that failed miserably, and a carnivalesque event called 
“Pink Dot” that attracted 4,000 straight, gay, and lesbian participants to an afternoon of cultural 
performances. Gay pride parades work well in the United States because individualism predicate the 
society there, but they fare less well in communitarian Singapore. 
 
Liberal and Confucian Citizenship as Ideas 
 The history of the idea of liberal citizenship in the West can be traced from the practices of 
governance in the Greek polis in Aristotle's Politics through the French Revolution that marked the 
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transition of the individual from the subject of a sovereign to the citizen of a state. Subsequently, the 
American Revolution further delineated the state's limits as a legal entity empowered with political 
authority (vis-à-vis the more cultural concept of the nation). The merger of these two identities into 
the notion of the nation-state not only produced the identity of the citizen upon whom the nation-
state wields authority, but also the responsibilities that this citizen owes the nation-state (Nuyen 
2002). However, thinkers vary tremendously in their conceptions of this citizenship. While Miller 
(1995) locate it on the cultural-historical end of the spectrum, Oommen (1997) stresses on the legal-
political end through such non-cultural criteria as residency. 
 Rather than going into further details of this history, I focus instead on the core ideas in this 
chapter. Hobbes regarded the citizen as the primary political unit, subjected only to the state's 
authority but otherwise equal in status to other citizens. Despite the state's potential abuses, Hobbes' 
citizen rationally chooses to live under its rule because this is still preferable to life in a natural state 
with no government. Locke further enhanced the Hobbesian idea of exchanging individual security 
for political association by constructing the citizen as an individual with inalienable rights to life, 
liberty, and property. Given the metaphysical view of a person as her own thinking, rational, and 
autonomous animal distinct from the state, this citizen only takes on obligations and responsibilities 
insofar as they further her personal interests. Furthermore, citizenship can only express the public 
dimensions of her identity and not her private ones, so it does not define her entire being. Mill went 
even further to insist that the nation-state, particularly as state, should not impinge on the private 
domain. As a set of rights that free an individual from the interference from the state and others to 
enable her to develop fully her individuality, liberal citizenship becomes the means to guarantee 
individual autonomy despite one's membership in a political community. 
 Confucian philosophers theorize about citizenship in a radically different fashion. Critics 
point out that classical Confucian writings do not contain any words for “citizen,” “citizenship,” or 
“citizenry.” In modern Mandarin, “citizenship” can be translated as shimin ,  guomin , or 
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gongmin . As “people of the city,” shimin is too literal and not a common translation. Guomin 
(i.e. “people of the state”) emphasizes membership in a state and other legal and political dimension 
of citizenship, while gongmin (i.e. “public people”) stresses on the cultural and communal aspects. 
These terms all refer to the modern, Western notion of citizenship, so critics may that Confucianists 
do not discuss, let alone value, these terms (Nuyen 2002). Indeed, the term “Confucian democracy” 
sounds oxymoronic to Huntington (1991). The Confucian emphasis on the individual's duties to her 
group over her own personal rights makes the philosophy appear incompatible with the notion of 
liberal citizenship and, by extension, democracy. 
 Following Ames (n.d.), I concede here that Confucian ontology only attributes meaning to 
the self when the individual exists as part of a larger web of social relationships (see Chapter 5 for a 
further discussion on the ontological justifications). Yet, can Confucianism really not commensurate 
with liberal citizenship? The lack of signifying terms for citizenship in classical Confucian texts 
does not mean that the signified concepts do not exist in or are alien to the philosophy. For instance, 
during the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), the judicial upholding of Confucian family values led 
to such individual rights as the one to “conceal the crimes of close relatives” and the one to not 
“testify in court against family members” (Bell 1999). Later, Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1912 CE) laws 
also protected parents' rights to respect from their children (Li 1999). The Confucian ideal of li  
(“ritual” or “propriety”), i.e. acting and speaking in a manner that befits the given situation, also 
arguably implies the observation of rights. As such, it is more correct to say that Confucianism does 
not recognize free-floating, socially dislodged rights rather than it denying all individual rights. 
 With regards to the notion of equality, critics often accuse Confucianism with promoting 
elitism through meritocracy at the expense of equality. They charge Confucianism of allocating far 
too many rights and privileges to the superior gentlemen junzi who occupy the higher rungs of 
the strictly hierarchical Confucian society, instead of focusing on the masses min . Young (1998), 
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for instance, argues that Confucian li diminishes human worth, as it suppresses the idiosyncrasies of 
individual expression while creating hierarchy by defining social roles and their appropriate stylized 
behavior. Contrary to its detractors, Confucianism does in fact emphatically endorse the equality of 
human worth. The concept of “sameness” can be found in classical Confucian texts. In Mencius 4B: 
32, Mencius asks while referring to two mythical kings often depicted as morally perfect, “How 
should I be different from others? Yao and Shun were the same as other men.” Later, in Mencius 
6A:7, he comments: “The sage and I are the same in kind.” Elsewhere, Confucius notes that human 
beings are “by nature close together [or alike],” but “through practice set apart” (Analects 17:2). In 
fact, Tan (2004) argues that Confucius conceived of li as inherently flexible, as he did not reject all 
changes in ritual. While linen caps were prescribed for rituals, he followed the more common 
practice of wearing silk ones (Analects 9:3). He also acknowledged that the rituals of the Zhou 
Dynasty (1045 – 256 BCE) kings that he practised were themselves adopted and improved upon 
from those of the previous dynasties. Tan (2004) agrees that rituals, like any other semiotic 
structures, can oppress when their forms and contents are frozen. At their worst, rituals can even be 
abused to persuade people into accepting their oppression. Yet, she also reminds us that Confucius 
advocated against such ritualistic uses. He considered a good teacher as one creates as well as 
transmits knowledge (Analects 2:11). Transmission without innovation ossifies the past and renders 
it irrelevant to the problems of the present. 
 Other critics contend that equality should also be extended to the higher level of rights and 
social rewards. Kwok (1998: 90), for example, claims that the Chinese recognized only the “right of 
the prince, right of the patriarch, right of the ruler (jun quan, fu quan, zhu quan) – and such rights as 
those of the people, son and self-rule (min quan, zi quan, zizhi quan) are not encountered in past 
historical pages.” Insofar as equality means the same treatment of all citizens, Confucianism and 
liberal citizenship appear incompatible with each other. Responding to Kwok, Nuyen (2002) asserts 
that while quan  can be translated as “right,” it literally means power. Power inequality exists as 
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long as society recognizes different social functions. This observation holds true even in a country 
like the United States where liberal citizenship is nominally advocated. Its president wields a lot of 
political power, but even he will not be able to function properly as his country's leader if the power 
differential does not exist. Instead of focusing on power inequality, it makes more sense to ask if 
Confucianism provides equality in the processes of acquiring power. Here, I pointed out that both 
Mencius and Confucius believed that all human beings are the same in their potential to become 
gentlemen and, ultimately, sages shengren  through self-cultivation and learning. Confucius 
himself said that “there should be no class distinction” in education (Analects 7:7). Indeed, he never 
refused to teach anyone, no matter how poor. 
 Elsewhere, Nuyen (2001) further argues that while the hierarchical Confucian society does 
assign unequal powers and rewards, equality in this case should be read along Aristotelian lines. In 
other words, he contends that equality ought to be understood as having two axes, i.e. a horizontal 
one where those of equal status should be treated equally, and a vertical one where those with status 
should treat those with less unequally. Since the equal treatment of “unequals” violates the vertical 
aspect of equality and hinders the proper functioning of one's social role, the unequal treatment of 
different people in the Confucian hierarchy merely reflects the fact that they are unequals. Elitism 
and meritocracy can then arguably be interpreted as a commitment to equality. 
 
Confucianism and the “Asian Values” Discourse in Singapore 
 In Singapore, Confucian values permeate the whole of society. These values do not spread 
via such “Great Traditions” as schools and other formal institutions (Redfield 1956). In Chapter 2 
earlier, I discussed how state attempts to formally imbue citizens with Confucian values produced 
ambiguous results at best. The Religious Knowledge program in secondary schools was abandoned 
in the early 1990s because it heightened inter-religious tensions. The 1991 White Paper on Shared 
Values was also deliberately worded in race-neutral language to get Singaporeans to at least tolerate 
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it. Instead, an ethnic Chinese person typically gets exposed to Confucianism through the “Little 
Traditions” (ibid.), as families and other informal social structures transmit their values generation 
after generation. She may not enact Confucian rites – a devout Christian will not offer incense to 
her ancestors typically enshrined on the family alter – but she will know of loyalty (zhong ), filial 
piety (xiao ), humaneness (ren ), righteousness (yi ), and other Confucian values. Indeed, she 
practices filial piety, to some degree, by taking care of the physical, financial, and emotional needs 
of her aged parents. 
 In the early 1990s, Confucianism and its ideological opposition to the liberal individualism 
of the West again became the center of public attention as part of the “Asian Values” debate. At the 
global level at that time, intellectuals from Asia, Europe, and the United States tried to explain the 
rapid rise of East and Southeast Asian capitalism in the 1980s. The Asian proponents attributed their 
successes to hard work, emphasis on education, familial orientation, collectivism, and other values 
supposedly unique to Asia (albeit in different strands of arguments modified to suit local cultural 
conditions). Their Western counterparts (e.g. Berger 1987) read these values (except collectivism) 
as copies of Western virtues that are either already present, or lost but recoverable. They interpreted, 
for instance, thrift and self-reliance as Victorian values. Rather than acknowledging the possibility 
of alternate modernities (Ong 1999), they insisted that any non-Western economy still required 
components of Western bourgeois culture to succeed. As such, the Asian successes became mere 
reproductions of the Western original (Chua 1999). Others accuse the Asian proponents – especially 
the premiers of Indonesia (Suharto), Malaysia (Mahathir Mohamad), and Singapore (Lee Kuan 
Yew) – of justifying their own authoritarian governance in the name of collective interests. Each 
premier nurtured and attempted to further project onto his country's body politic the idea of 
communitarianism already present in that country's national ideology (i.e. Panca Sila in Indonesia, 
Ruku Negara in Malaysia [Ramage 1995], and Shared Values in Singapore). Ostensibly, they used 
the de-ethnicized macro-identity that communitarianism provides to unify the diversity of ethnic 
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groups living in their countries (Chong 2002). The masquerading of self-interests as national 
concerns, however, just as easily enables political and economic abuses that benefit the individual at 
the expense of the masses. As proof, detractors need only to point to Indonesia where a massive 
outpouring of public anger ended Suharto's 32 years of one-man rule in 1998. 
 At its core, the Asian Values debate re-staged the ideological struggle between liberalism 
and communitarianism. The escalation of the debate, Chua (1999) opines insightfully, did not occur 
immediately after the demise of Soviet-style socialism by coincidence. The death of communism 
crippled left-leaning intellectuals in Europe and the United States by depriving them of an effective 
counter-discourse against the moral rapaciousness of rampaging globalizing capitalism. The Asian 
Values discourse filled the socialism-shaped hole by resurrecting the social and re-energizing the 
interrogation of Western-style capitalism. Not surprisingly, some regarded it as a substitute for 
communism and attacked it, often vehemently, in the defense of liberal democratic capitalism (Chua 
1999). Fukuyama (1992: 238) writes: 
 
The most significant challenge being posed to the liberal univeralism of the American and 
French revolutions today is not coming from the communist world, whose failures are for 
everyone to see, but from those societies in Asia which combine liberal economies with a 
kind of paternalistic authoritarianism ... Asia's tremendous economic success has led to a 
growing recognition that the process was due not simply to the successful borrowing of 
Western practices, but to the fact that  Asian societies retain certain features of their own 
traditional cultures – like a strong work ethic – and integrated them into a modern business 
environment. 
 
 In Singapore, state officials identified Asian Values with those that Confucianism espouses. 
As the Other of this Asian Values-as-Confucianism discourse, they chose that version of American-
style liberal individualism where one's self and, at best, one's immediate family form her primary 
concerns. This extreme strain of individualism prioritizes individual rights, and reduces the state to 
a regulatory framework for orderly inter-personal transactions. Individuals in conflict settle their 
differences in court, making litigation the primary basis for social order. In this system, the concept 
of the social can only be thought of negatively as the injunction against the trangression of another's 
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rights and interests (Chua 1999). Rejecting this unsocial Other, Singaporean state officials put in 
place a system of “supply-side socialism” where they divert state resources to maximize citizens' 
productive potential (The Straits Times 1994a). As I outlined in Chapter 3, such efforts include the 
construction of an island-wide system of roads and metro stations (to facilitate the transportation of 
people and goods), and the provision of  heavily subsidized education (to improve upon human 
capital) and public housing (to stabilize the household). Admittedly, the provision of such public 
goods would not have been at all possible, much less successful, were it not for draconic legislation 
that, for instance, enables the officials to acquire private land at prices below market rates for their 
construction projects (Chua 1997). These laws transgress private property rights, but are justified in 
the name of providing welfare benefits for the entire nation. 
 Yet, the equation of Asian Values with Confucianism commits two critical mistakes. Firstly, 
on the conceptual level, such an equation treats “Asia” as if it were a meaningful category even 
when PAP elites know that it is not. The vast Asian continent has such a diversity of ethnic groups 
and cultural practices that not only does “Asia” mean nothing beyond the geographic or 
cartographic sense, any attempt to definitively specify a set of common values automatically 
becomes a self-Orientalizing exercise (Hill 2000). Indeed, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (1977: xx), a 
pioneer in the PAP leadership, proclaimed as the Minister of Culture: 
 
I have very serious doubts as to whether such a thing as “Asian values” really exists – or for 
that matter Asian anything – Asian unity, Asian socialism, Asian way of life and so on. It 
may exist as an image but it has no reality. If it has any meaning at all it is merely a 
convenient way of describing the heterogeneous, conflicting network of beliefs, prejudices 
and values developed in the countries which for geographical purposes have been grouped as 
being in Asia. Only as a geographical expression does the term “Asia” have any reality.  
 
Yet, like any other invented tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), the Asian Values discourse can 
only be effective insofar that it resonates with the people upon whom it is inscribed. Despite its 
essentialism, it works precisely because the citizens themselves fail to approach it with a critical eye 
(Chua 1999). The excuses “We are Asians” and “We are an Asian society,” often used to justify the 
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rejection of anything socially progressive, attest to their unthinking readiness to accept the 
implementation of rigid identities and behaviors. Even Lee Kuan Yew could not resist this kind of 
convenient just-so reasoning. During a live interview on CNN in 1998, a gay man called in and 
asked him about the place of gay men and lesbians in Singapore in the future. Caught unprepared, 
Lee answered: 
 
Well, it's not a matter which I can decide or any government can decide. It's a question of 
what the society considers acceptable. And as you know, Singaporeans are by and large a 
very conservative, orthodox society, a very, I would say completely different from, say the 
United States and I don't think an aggresive gay rights movement would help. But what we 
are doing as a government is to leave people to live their own lives as long as they don't 
impinge on other people. I mean, we don't harass anybody (Birch 2003: 7, my emphasis).  
 
His successor, Goh Chok Tong, resorted to the same reasoning during a National Day Rally Speech 
(Goh 2003) when he attempted to placate Singaporeans angry at his hiring of openly gay civil 
servants: “Let me stress that I do not encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a 
traditional and conservative Asian society (my emphasis).” 
 Secondly, on the level of the social, Asian Values-as-Confucianism blatantly disregards the 
presence of non-Chinese ethnic minorities that make up almost a quarter of the total population. In 
particular, the discourse places Malays in a cultural quandary that threatens to depreciate their sense 
of self-worth. British colonial policies recognized the Malays' indigeneity by granting them special 
land rights, while restricting land ownership among non-Malay migrants. Access to land and its 
spaces of socialization, identification, culturalization, and politicization now predicates a Malay 
person's ethnic identity (Horowitz 1985). In Singapore where they cannot make historic claims to 
territory, Malays are denied this crucial component of their identity. Asian Values threaten to further 
disorient them culturally by marking Confucianism as the only path to economic success. Accepting 
this model means culturally identifying with the Chinese, a move that will surely cast a Malay 
person's ethnic identity into doubt. The Chinese predicate individual self-worth upon material 
success (Redding 1990), but religious piety and social relationships matter more to the Malays 
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(Chong 2002). Not adhering to the model, however, leaves the Malays with little other recourse. 
Members of the middle-class Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) attempted in 2000 to 
provide such an alternative. Calling for collective action by Malay leaders and more political clout 
to influence national policies, they undermined the de-ethnicized “Asian” macro-identity that Asian 
Values promote. State officials denied their request on the grounds that it would have made race a 
political issue. Ironically, this denial exposed the inadequacies of Asian Values by not addressing 
the possibility of a heterogenous collectivity where differences and bargaining strengthen instead of 
challenging institional structures (Chong 2002). 
 
“The Great Affective Divide” 
 Asian Values-as-Confucianism also support, through the paternalism inherent in both 
discourses, a conceptual binary that posits the state as the father and the citizens as his children. 
While masculinizing the state and endowing it with such “male” qualities as logic, discipline, 
authority, and universal vision, this dichotomy simultaneously cast the citizens as selfish, infantile, 
demanding, ignorant, dangerous, and feminine (Yen and Goh 2007). Such a parent-child 
relationship echoes the theory by radical feminist theorist Luce Irigaray (1985a, 1985b, 1993) that 
defines phallagocentrism as a “monosexual imaginary” (Whitford 1991: 92) centred on masculinity 
as the singular model that determines all other subjectivities. This model constructs the feminine as 
masculinity's negative Other to better highlight masculinity's positive values (Butler 1990; Hansen 
2000). Given the limits of this chapter, I will not attempt a full investigation of how Singaporeans 
come to accept their subordinated position in their relationships with the father-state. The process 
likely involves an informal compact where, according to some of my more politically astute field 
informants, the citizens exchange their political acquiescence for material comfort. This compact 
came about in the aftermath of the PAP's crackdown on the massive leftist political protests in the 
1960s. Those who survived the suppression came to see politics as dangerous territory to be treaded 
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upon only either by PAP cadres or the terminally foolish, and they taught this life lesson to their 
children. Certainly, the ample demonstrations that the PAP gave of its ability to create national 
wealth and to deal with detractors in the subsequent years convinced many Singaporeans to not 
question the arrangement.  
 Yet, in 1994, challenge emerged from a most unlikely quarter. That year, a local novelist 
called Catherine Lim (1994a) highlighted the existence of “a great affective divide” that estranged 
citizens from the PAP. She claimed that “while the PAP Government has inspired in the people 
much respect for its efficiency and much gratitude for the good life as a result of this efficiency, 
there is very little in the way of affectionate regard.” She further attributed the lack of national 
affect to the impersonal and bureaucratic style of PAP governance, as well as the heavy-handed 
manner in the party handles alternative political discourses. Insofar as PAP dominance results in 
citizens equating the party with the country itself (even though they ought to distinguish the party 
from Singapore the country and Singapore the nation), the great affective divide effectively inhibits 
any real expression of patriotism. The near-impossible demands that the state makes on citizens that 
I described earlier in Chapter 3 only exacerbate Singaporeans' lack of affect towards the PAP and, 
indirectly, Singapore itself. 
 As evidence, Lim pointed to the hanging of national flags outside one's flat in the months 
before National Day on August 9. The state encourages the practice as a sign of one's nationalistic 
pride, but few Singaporeans do it on their own accord. As Lim explained, the lack of identification 
with the PAP/Singapore means that most Singaporeans feel embarassed to appear patriotic. When 
flats appear fully decked with national flags (see Figure 8), it is usually because the neighborhood 
residential committee installed the flags. The committees only have limited manpower, so only 
those flats that face a main road are decorated. The inauthenticity of the “patriotic” flag display 
becomes immediately apparent when one moves away from the main road (Figure 9), or to the 
private apartments where the residential committee members cannot access (Figure 10). 
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Figure 8: Block of Public Flats Fully Decorated with National Flags in July 2007 (Source: Author) 
 
 
Figure 9: Flagless Block of Public Flats in July 2007 (Source: Author) 
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Figure 10: Flagless Private Apartment Block in July 2007 (Source: Author) 
  
 PAP leaders did not react to Lim's critique initially. Kenneth Tan (2009) credits this tolerance 
to Lim's deft positioning of herself as a meek and obedient daughter vis-à-vis the overbearingly 
strict father-state. Lim (1994b) penned a second political commentary later that year. This time, she 
argued that former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong could not leave the domineering shadow of Lee 
Kuan Yew, his predecessor. As such, Goh failed to execute the gentler, more consultative style of 
governance that he promised earlier. This second article attracted Goh's ire. In a reply by his press 
secretary (The Straits Times 1994b), Goh stated that “he [could not] allow journalists, novelists, 
short-story writers or theatre groups to set the political agenda from outside the political arena.” He 
claimed that he “welcome[d] alternative viewpoints, but he [would] refute mistaken views, sharply 
if necessary.” He also challenged Lim to “enter the political arena so that she could take 
responsibility for her views.” Castigated, Lim not only apologized to Goh privately (The Straits 
Times 1994c), but also stated publicly that she merely wanted to share her views on what she 
perceived as a grave problem. She neither wanted to enter politics nor “belittle or upset anyone” 
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(Lim 1994c).  
 In 1999, a state proposal to phase out the madrasah system of Islamic schools set off another 
round of questioning. During the National Day Rally that year, Goh announced that the madrasahs, 
attended mainly by Muslim-Malays, failed to prepare their students adequately for the new 
knowledge-based economy. Not only did 65% of madrasah students drop out of school, those who 
stayed on to take the Cambridge “O” level examinations also fared far worse than their counterparts 
in mainstream schools. An average of 9% of madrasah students achieved a minimum of 5 “O” level 
passes from 1996 – 1998, compared to 28% of Malay students in mainstream schools in the same 
time period (The Straits Times 1999c). Arguing that madrasahs produced religious scholars who 
make no direct economic contributions, and at a number greater than what the Muslim community 
required, Goh proposed to close down all primary-level madrasahs and divert their students to 
mainstream schools instead (The Straits Times 1999d). Given the centrality of Islam in their ethnic 
identity, the Malays read Goh's proposal as the latest of many state attempts at ethnic suppression.  
 Frustrations over the madrasahs led activist Zulfikar Shariff to establish the now-defunct 
website Fateha.com to address perceived injustice the state committed against Malays. Fateha shot 
into national prominence when its commentators openly criticized the arrest and detention without 
trial of Jemaah Islamiah terrorists in Singapore in December 2001. A month later, when the Ministry 
of Education banned the use of Islamic headscarves in mainstream schools, Fateha also openly 
sided with the affected schoolgirls. These two incidents, Zulfikar Shariff (2004) claims, prompted a 
state campaign of intimidation that graduated from telephone and email taps to police raiding his 
apartment to threats of possible arrest and detention. Fearing for his life, he fled to Australia to 
escape political persecution. 
 In the two instances above, Lim and Zulfikar Shariff attracted the state's displeasure because 
they crossed discursive boundaries known locally as “OB markers.” First used by a parliamentary 
minister as an adoption from the golf term “out-of-bounds markers,” OB markers demarcate state 
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limits of topics deemed safe for public discussions. Unlike actual golf markers, the discursive ones 
are purposely left undefined. Social climates change constantly, the minister said, so state officials 
cannot determine the permissibility of a given topic in advance (The Straits Times 1999a). The two 
instances above, however, demonstrate that critical discussions of politics and race remain taboo. 
While Lim transgressed by critiquing the Prime Minister himself, Zulkifar Shariff violated the 
state's longstanding approach of de-politicizing inter-ethnic relations by not talking about them. OB 
markers clearly stifle the growth of a Singaporean national identity, and Gomez (2000) decries their 
use as state censorship. Not knowing where exactly the markers lie, citizens would rather err on the 
side of caution and self-censor than to risk getting into trouble with the state. 
 Despite their taboo nature, race and politics provide important inspirations for nationalistic 
discourses. By policing alternative (but not necessarily dissenting) political talk with heavy-handed 
methods, the state limits the basis for national identity-formation to only economic progress. The 
adoption of economic developmentalism in the early years of independence provided much-needed 
economic stability. It even gave the new state its raison d'être (Chua 1996). Anthropologists of the 
state recognize that the “universalization of a shared civilization or ethnic tradition in the minds of 
equal and autonomous individuals as a condition for its continual survival” form the basis of the 
bonds of solidarity among citizens of modern nation-states (Chun 1994: 50; Gellner 1983). In this 
respect, however, Singapore faced an endemic problem. Of its three major ethnic groups, the 
Chinese dominate numerically. With their many clan and trade associations that culminate in such 
umbrella organizations as the Hokkien Association and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, they 
also formed the best organized group. Yet, their origins as migrants deny them propriety rights. 
Contemporary geopolitical tensions arising from the rise of communist China further meant strong 
discomfort in Singapore's neighbors in Malaysia and Indonesia over the possible rise of a third 
China in their midst. The Malays, while indigenous to the region, constituted only a numerical 
minority that could not politically dominate the new state. Lastly, the Indians suffered the twin 
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disadvantages of migrant origins and numerical inferiority. As such, the PAP could not base the new 
nation on a shared cultural heritage (Chua 1996). It could not create a “regime of authenticity” 
(Duara 2003: 33) by injecting timeless values into the idea of the nation to make it appear “real” 
and eternal. 
 Denied myths of shared traditions, the PAP sought other grounds for national existence in 
“universal” concepts that concurrently transcend and suppress ethnic differences (Chua 1996). 
These concepts include anti-colonialism, class politics and socialism/communism, and capitalistic 
economic modernization. Anti-colonialism can serve as a galvanizing force in the quest for 
independence (The Straits Times 1992). Indonesians read their anti-colonial struggles, for instance, 
as the presence and expression of the population's collective will, and elevated these endeavors to 
the level of a founding myth for their country (Yong 1992). Yet, PAP leaders could not utilize this 
option because Singapore achieved its independence without any revolutions. The British colonizers 
gave the island its political autonomy voluntarily. As for class politics, the PAP already decimated 
and tamed the contentious left by 1965 through a series of complicated strategies. These maneuvers 
included co-opting the trade unions into its own ranks and turned them into staunch anti-
communists, and the closing of Nanyang University, the region's only Mandarin-medium institute 
of higher learning. In particular, this last move deprived left-leaning sympathizers of critical support 
from radical segments of Chinese university and secondary school students (Barr 2000). 
 By default, capitalist development became Singapore's sole candidate for its national raison 
d'être. Singapore's forced departure from Malaysia deprived the country of the anticipated larger 
Malaysian market, and threatened it with economic collapse. The PAP astutely capitalized on this 
fear of extinction, and turned it into a galvanizing issue of national survival. Framing the reason for 
Singapore's existence in economic rather than symbolic terms right from the beginning, Lee Kuan 
Yew (1962: 83) said, “Political problems ultimately mean the problem of how we make our living, 
how we can give everyone a fair and equal chance to study and work and have a full life.” The 
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country's economic survival became embodied in the challenges that individual citizens face to earn 
their livelihood. In turn, progress in material well-being became the criterion by which citizens 
assessed, defined, and legitimated the PAP regime (Chua 1996). 
 Conceptually, Singapore turned Gellner (1983) on his head because its nationalism produced 
industrialization, not the other way round as it is normally conceived of. “In Singapore,” Willmott 
(1989: 591) observes, “the state preceded the development of nationalism rather than emerging as 
its political consequences, and the state itself became the first major symbol of national identity.” 
Curiously, this nationalism does not hark to the past as nationalism usually does, because Singapore 
has no primordial past to speak of. Rather, it looks towards the future, specifically one where the 
country secures its economic prosperity. Instability will always trouble this sort of vision. While 
Singapore achieved modernity, it still retains its geographical vulnerabilities. Years of economic 
development neither made it significantly bigger in land area nor granted it any more natural 
resources to develop. Unable to exorcise the specter of national extinction, it remains a nation in 
perpetual crisis. Consequently, Singaporeans consciously know, perhaps more than anyone else, that 
modernity is always work-in-progress (Osborne 1995), and that they must continuously strive to 
maintain their status. Otherwise, they risk slipping into non-modernity or, worse, that liminal, 
undead-like state between modernity and tradition that Brenner (1998: 14) calls the “unmodern.”  
 In turn, this fear of national decline justifies the continued use of the crisis discourse, and 
ultimately reinforces the PAP's political dominance. Heng and Devan (1992: 343) write: 
 
It is a post-Foucaldian truism that they who successfully define and superintend a crisis, 
furnish its lexicon and discursive parameters, successfully confirm themselves the owners of 
power, the administration of crisis operating to revitalize ownership of the instruments of 
power even as it vindicates the necessity of their use. 
 
Ironically, this same discourse of survival can aid progressive politics, provided that citizens can  be 
persuaded to accept the suggested new element as economically beneficial. When Goh Chok Tong 
suggested hiring openly gay civil servants, for instance, he reasoned that this move would attract 
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foreign investments and create more jobs for everyone else (The Straits Times 2003b). Using the 
same logic, other PAP leaders justified the opening of two casinos despite objections from all levels 
of society, including a number of Members of Parliament.  
 However, economic accomplishments cannot form a national identity by themselves for the 
simple and obvious reason that nationhood encompasses far more than mere national wealth. To be 
fair, economic progress can provide some basis for such an identity. Singapore overcame severe 
physical limitations to become a developed country, and this achievement imbues citizens with a 
sense of nationalistic pride that emerges during international disputes. When former Indonesian 
president B. J. Habibie dismissed Singapore disparagingly as a “little red dot” on the map in 1998, 
for example, Singaporeans rallied against this national insult. However, as Furnivall (1944 [1939]) 
pointed out, market interests can only provide fickle guarantees of civil peace in Singapore and 
other plural societies organized for economic production rather than social life. He predicted that 
because economics ignores the cultural embeddedness of market operations, such societies would 
eventually crumble under the pressure of inter-ethnic competition. In fact, as a symptom of Lim's 
great affective divide, citizens already see themselves more as members of their own respective 
ethnic group rather than as Singaporeans (Chua 1996).  
 
Doubly Alienated Gay Men 
 The great affective divide afflicts all Singaporeans, but gay men suffer a double alienation 
from the state's criminalization of their sexuality. Before the major legal overhaul in 2007, homosex 
was an offense chargeable under Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code. The two Sections read: 
 
Section 377 (Unnatural Offences): Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature with any man, woman or animals, shall be punished with imprisonment for 
life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the 
offence described in this section. 
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Section 377A (Outrages on Decency): Any male person who, in public or private, commits, 
or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male 
person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years (Singapore Statutes Online). 
 
 
Prosecutors seldom invoked either Sections, but the acts that they could construe as unnatural 
offences ranged very broadly. Court decisions in the 1990s implied that only vaginal sex was 
considered natural. Every other sex act, from rape to mutual masturbation, was punishable under 
377. Consensual fellatio is legal, but only if it leads to vaginal sex (Leong 1997). 
 While 377 targeted both straight and gay couples, 377A applied specifically to men. Court 
cases resulting from police sting operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave it precedent to 
include oral sex between men, mutual masturbation, and touching another man’s genitals. During 
the worst of these operations carried out in March 1992, the police made eight arrests at the popular 
cruising grounds at the Tanjong Rhu beach. Reporters from the local tabloid The New Paper, 
curiously present at the scene at that time, photographed the entire operation. The consequences of 
the raid went far beyond the S$1,000 fine that each of the eight arrested men received. Of the four 
men whose incriminating pictures The New Paper published, one committed suicide to expunge his 
shame (Leong 1995). 
 377A also enabled the state to harass gay men in other ways. In the moral panic that 
followed the first official case of HIV/AIDS-related death in 1989, the state attempted to suppress 
homosexuality on the misguided belief that this would somehow halt the spread of this so-called 
“gay cancer.” It was believed that state officials forced the closure of a number of gay nightclubs, 
including the very popular Niche, by refusing to renew their liquor licenses. The nightclub owners 
could not protest the state’s move, lest the real reason for the clubs’ closure be made publicly known 
(Heng 2001). 
 The legal discrimination of homosexuality extends to traditional media. To this day, positive 
gay and lesbian representations remain strictly suppressed in such media. The Media Development 
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Authority administers a series of guidelines for both traditional media such as television, and new 
media such as the Internet. One set of guidelines, the Free-to-Air and Cable TV Program Codes, 
stipulates that any television programming must be congruent with such national objectives as the 
observation of societal and moral standards, and the promotion of positive family values. The MDA 
misleads by using “guidelines” to describe its codes. By definition, “guidelines” are suggestive but 
not legally binding. Yet, depending on the severity of the violation, any breach of these codes can 
attract fines ranging from S$1,000 to S$50,000. In October 2006, for example, the MDA charged 
cable TV provider Starhub Cable Vision for airing an episode of the American reality TV program 
Cheaters that featured footage of women engaging in ménage à trois and bondage sex. Although 
SCV aired the heavily pixilated footage at midnight when most children would have gone to sleep, 
the MDA still found it guilty of promoting lesbianism and fined it S$10,000 (The Straits Times 
2006). Consequently, gay men and lesbians only appear in traditional media if they end up dead 
(through murder, suicide, accidental death, or some other acts of violence), catching HIV, living the 
rest of their lives sad and alone, or meet some other dire and unpleasant fate. 
 The media suppresses lesbianism, but the courts never actually convicted lesbians. 377A 
applies only to men, and the courts only punished men for same-sex acts. This does not, however, 
legalize lesbianism. In principal, certain lesbian acts are prosecutable under Section 20 of the 
Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act that punishes, with fines not exceeding 
S$1000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, “riotous, disorderly or indecent behavior” in a 
public setting (Leong 1997). In reality, the impact of the legal omission of lesbianism goes beyond 
court cases. Leong (1995:14) writes: 
 
The legal omission of lesbianism amounts to the symbolic annihilation of lesbians: officially, 
lesbians do not exist in Singapore. Silence, or the absence of discourse on lesbianism, is no 
better than the legal oppression of male homosexuality: it is representative in itself by way 
of denying the existence of another form of human sexuality, thought and behavior. 
 
Overall, the anti-sodomy laws render gay Singaporeans into what Richardson (1998) calls “partial 
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citizens.” State officials oblige all gay citizens to perform duties such as paying taxes, conscription 
into the military (for the men), and general observation of laws that they also impose on straight 
Singaporeans. However, gay citizens do not enjoy all the rights and benefits of citizenship that their 
heterosexual counterparts do.  
 In 2007, the Ministry of Law updated the legal codes. As part of a set of long-overdue 
housekeeping changes, it introduced several new laws that curtail marital rape, commercial sex with 
minors, and paedophiliac predation among other new crimes. Most significantly, it also announced 
that it would strike down 377 but not 377A (The Straits Times 2007b). This lopsided amendment 
legalized non-vaginal sex for straight couples but kept it criminalized for gay ones. Perhaps 
recognizing that the illiberality of this decision severely contradicted their previous promise to open 
up society to attract foreign professionals (Chris Tan 2009), several key ministers claimed that the 
government retained 377A only as a symbolic reminder that the PAP still supported the heterosexual 
orthodoxy, especially the hetero-patriarchal family unit. The ministers promised that they will not 
actually persecuate anyone with the law. 
 Knowing that the lack of legal backing left the promise vulnerable to reneging in the future, 
gay rights activists tried to repeal it once and for all. This attempt included two signature-gathering 
campaigns (one online and one offline), and pro-repeal apologias from both a university law don 
and the Law Society of Singapore itself. Conservatives, consisting of clamorous Christians and less 
agitated Muslims, responded by launching their own anti-repeal campaign. Ultimately, politicians 
denied the repeal on the grounds that homosexuality remained too socially divisive an issue for 
them to legalize. The vociferous exchange between the pro-repeal and anti-repeal camps threatened 
to boil over and polarize society along religious lines. Fortunately, some good news did emerge 
from the debate. The Prime Minister himself reassured gay men that he would let them be, as they 
“are our kith and kin” and “we shouldn't make it any harder than it already is for them to grow up 
and live” in Singapore (The Straits Times 2007c). 
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 Conceptually, the repeal campaign presents a case that contradicts previous observations 
made on the political passiveness of Singaporeans. Political participants are typically classified as 
either “active” or “passive.” As the former, they keep themselves politically informed (usually via 
the media), but their participation is usually limited to voting in elections. A small number also join 
civic and/or political groups and voice their grievances directly to the authorities (Painter 1992). 
Although only vocal citizens appear to participate actively, political participation involves both the 
vociferous and the muted. As Lee (2002) reminds us, even when one does not vocalize her thoughts, 
she still participates actively by acquiescing in a less confrontational manner. A citizen participates 
either in the role and method of decision-making, or complicitly abides by a decision already made 
(Pateman 1970). Real passive political participation does not exist. 
 Pateman (1970) further theorizes three levels of political participation: “pseduo,” “partial,” 
and “full.” She restricts pseudo participation to such processes as informing about and endorsing a 
pre-determined decision. No participation in the decision-making process actually occurs, but a 
feeling of participation is nevertheless created through such “technique[s] of persuasion” as public 
relations practices (Pateman 1970: 69). In partial participation, the individual exercises influence by 
voicing her opinions, but the political elites still reserve the final power and authority to make the 
decisions. In the last model of full participation, each member in a decision-making body is invested 
with equal power to determine the outcome of decisions.  
 The model of full participation does not work in Singapore, because it smacks too much of 
the idea of Western liberalism and the associated push for democratic and human rights. With their 
ambivalent attitude towards political participation and active citizenship, PAP leaders will not allow 
full participation to occur. Rather, the pseudo and partial participatory models appear to hold more 
meaning in the current discussion of civil society. The informal compact between citizen and state, 
where the citizen cedes her rights to question political decisions for material well-being, and the 
campaign to repeal 377A illustrate each of the two models respectively. In the case of the campaign, 
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advocates from both sides of the debate could only petition politicians and appeal to their sense of 
what is right. The privilege of making the final decision remained with the Prime Minister. 
 The apologias that the law don makes deserve some attention. The don, Michael Hor (2007, 
2010), asserts that homosex ought to be legalized as it harms nobody. Furthermore, 377A's retention 
does not even benefit those seeking its preservation. As long as the law remains unenforced, gay 
men will persist in having homosex and offend these advocates. These advocates' arguments that the 
repeal imposes an unwelcomed pro-gay sentiment onto them and restricts their freedom of religion 
also do not hold. Rather, by insisting that Christianity and Islam must be anti-gay, they infringe 
upon the same freedom of their more numerous moderate brethren who think otherwise. In fact, 
377A's retention likely violates the constitutional norm against unjustified discrimination. The two 
aspects of equality, conveniently called “fit” and “weight,” determines the constitutionality of any 
piece of legislature. To “fit,” a law must make sense (albeit not necessarily perfectly) in the way it 
classifies people or activities for attention. As for “weight,” the issue at hand must be serious 
enough to deserve that focus. 377A's retention fares badly on both measures. The law does not “fit,” 
as it targets only male homosex. If the law reflects an antipathy towards homosex in general, why 
does it not include women? After all, women make up fully half of the population and, presumably, 
half of all homosex as well. Neither does the retention carry sufficient “weight.” The appeasement 
of the sectarian sensibilities of any one social segment cannot justify the criminalization of private, 
consensual sex between two adults. If it did, it would throw into disrepute the constitutionally 
enshrined right to equal protection before the law. 
 The fact that the state preserved 377A in spite of its constitutional problems raises intriguing 
questions about the PAP's collective feelings towards homosexuality. As a party famous both locally 
and globally for running an efficient government, why does it willingly tolerate the legal untidiness 
of retaining a law it promised not to enforce? Why does it risk derailing its own plans to tranform 
Singapore into a global city? Second-tier cities that aspire to become first-tier ones must at least put 
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up a gay-friendly and liberal façade to attract professional labor. By rejecting this “me-too-ism” of 
this global jostling for economic supremacy (Bell and Binnie 2004: 1814), Singapore risks falling 
behind in the race. Lastly, all three of the country's Prime Ministers indicated their willingness to 
legalize homosexuality at one point or another. Lee Kuan Yew (1959 – 1990) said in 2007 that the 
state has no interest acting as morality police even as it pays heed to society's concerns (The Straits 
Times 2007a). Goh Chok Tong (1990 – 2004) declared in 2003 that he welcomed openly gay men 
and lesbians in the civil service (The Straits Times 2003a). The current Prime Minister, Lee Hsien 
Loong (2004 – ), has yet to make a public statement similar to his two predecessors'. Yet, judging 
from his appeal to adopt a live-and-let-live attitude towards gay men and lesbians, he clearly also 
favors the decriminalization of homosexuality. 
 Assuming that the younger Lee does speak for the entire government, his reluctance begs the 
question: what stopped him from repealing 377A? According to my field informant Alex, a veteran 
gay rights activist and long-time political observer, internal divisions based on (il)liberal beliefs 
fracture the PAP despite its seemingly united public front. Lee must first purge the party of its 
conservative, and likely fundamentalist, Christian elements before he can truly exercise his will: 
 
Lee Hsien Loong likely knows that homosexuality must be legalized sooner or later, but the 
short time between the repeal campaign and his appointment as Prime Minister did not give 
him enough time to consolidate his influence. He still did not have the power to remove the  
old dinosaurs from the PAP. 
 
Unlike Alex, Sanders (2009) speculates Lee's denial as a stop-gap measure. Lee must know that if 
377A were repealed, activists would exploit it immediately to campaign for equal employment 
opportunities for gay men and lesbians, gay marriage, gay adoption, and other even more socially 
contentious issues. By keeping 377A, he kept the floodgates closed and prevented these subsequent 
issues from surfacing. 
 Empirically, my fieldwork informants responded to the repeal attempt differently. When I 
asked them whether they thought the attempt justified the effort spent on it, the vast majority replied 
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positively despite its failure. Many of them knew right from the start that it had little real chance of 
actually succeeding. Rather, its efficacy laid elsewhere. Prior to 2007, most Singaporeans hardly 
even knew 377A existed as it afflicted only gay men. In Alex's words, it belonged to the “graveyard 
section of the Penal Code.” By crystalizing its inequality and injustice for all to see, the attempt 
enabled all citizens to engage in the nation-building process. As one gay consultant put it, 377A's 
existence means “that your own people are against you, so it makes you question. After all my 
patriotism, what is it for? What I'm doing for these people, is it worth it?” Alex echoed this 
sentiment: “The campaign forced those gay men who had been sitting on the fence to declare their 
position.” Another consultant, Yangfa, also ruminated: 
 
[The attempt] was a course that we had to go through. It was a necessary evil. We had to go 
through that ... as a country, as a legislative process. We had to go through that process of 
questioning our laws. It would have been a miracle if it was repealed with minimal 
discussion ... What impressed me, what I really appreciated was the fact that it drew so much 
attention. There was a lot of media coverage. There was a lot of opportunities for people to 
air their views on both sides, and that itself was a milestone. A different way things might 
have turned out was that it was discussed all behind closed doors, and the media didn't report 
on it, and it happened within a matter of days. But it didn't happen within a matter of days. It 
was a matter of weeks, months if I was not wrong. The fact that it was talked about, I mean 
that in itself was wonderful! 
 
 Paradoxically, three of my consultants objected even though it would have legalized their 
sexuality had it succeeded. One of them saw no point in supporting it: 
 
I don't think [the attempt] was necessary. To me, I just find it that ... I don't know why people 
are kicking such a big fuss. We know that [the repeal is] not going to happen ... I don't see 
the purpose of the [petitions]. Like I said, [the repeal] won't happen, so why sign it? I don't 
need to say I'm gay and I'm pro-whatever. Just let me run my own life. That's it. 
 
Another one opposed because he saw the attempt as too socially disruptive: 
 
I'm a very practical person. I think all these movements, it will come as society evolves. 
Don't push it too hard, because if you push it, you may get a negative effect ... you may get 
the reverse effect. So just let it be. I think the best movement is to do it subtly, through 
education, through the arts, through soft-sell. Ten years later, you can be sure that the attitude 
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will change. Rather than all these waving pink banners and marching down the street. It just 
irritates people and has a negative effect. 
 
These three informants form only a minority in my consultant pool, but they appear to represent a 
larger population of silent but politically conservative or even apathetic gay men. As the debate over 
the possible legalization of homosexuality raged, The Straits Times (2007d) published the following 
letter from such a gay man: 
 
I live my life discreetly and I am happy to have been able to do so without any legal 
interference pertaining to my homosexuality for the past 30 years. Singapore is a good place 
for a gay man to live in, as long as one understands the social contract involved and respects 
the mainstream's wish to have the traditional family unit as the social norm (my emphasis). 
 
“Discreet” usually means “closeted” in the local lingo, and those who desire discreetness often 
justify their political conformity in terms of communitarian values. They object to such behavior, in 
the words of the above consultant who abhors social disruptions, as “waving pink banners and 
marching down the street” that draws attention to themselves and threatens social cohesion. Other, 
more astute consultants, see discreetness as homonormativity at work. They assert that gay men 
trade in their intangible human rights for material well-being. Yangfa told me: 
 
When I went to the gay bars to get people to sign the off-line petition, I kept meeting these 
people who refused because they are civil servants, and that signing would identify them as 
gay and jeopardize their jobs. They made me so angry! I really wanted to give them a tight 
slap and tell them to wake the fuck up! 
 
The fear of state retaliation was unfounded, because the pro-repeal campaigners were not punished. 
Writing as an academic, one informant (Heng 2004: 73 – 4) traces gay political conformity to a fear 
of state reprisals against unruly activism: 
 
Criticism against Singapore's gay activists does not only come from conservative forces 
outside the gay community. There are gay Singaporeans who are also against political 
activism ... Those rejecting activism argue that being confrontational (read Western) rather 
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than consensual (read Asian) will only bring down the wrath of the state on the gay 
community and lead to the reimposition of restrictions on gay social and commercial 
activities. For these people, it is enough that the Singaporean gay community can enjoy a 
vibrant gay scene where many forms of recreation, which used to be available only in the 
West, are allowed, e.g. gay saunas, films and plays with gay themes, etc. They hold the view 
that these facilities are what count rather than abstract Western notions of gay rights. They 
are concerned that gay activists risk jepoardizing all these precious new gains by being 
political.  
 
Another consultant observed that homonormativity commonly afflicts working adults in their 30s or 
older, but not younger gay men: 
 
My own view with the whole decriminalization and the whole issue of gay rights in 
Singapore is this: that you cannot divorce what a gay Singaporean feels from his 
Singaporean identity or his Singaporean psyche. And his Singaporean psyche has always 
been, you know, I'm here and I put a lot of value to stability, economic success and blah, 
blah, blah, and less to the political and the more intangible things. Which is why you see 
Singaporeans, especially my generation. I'm not talking about the younger generation. The 
younger generation is very different, but up to now, we're talking about gay people who are 
in their 30s and above. I think they have always been very, very pragmatic. They've always 
said, “As long as I have a great job here, great standard of living. I can still have parties, I 
can still have sex, I can still travel overseas for sex. There's shopping, there are friends, 
there's family. I don't really care about gay rights, because I have all these material 
trappings.” And Singaporeans have always been like that. You don't have to talk about gay 
rights. You can talk to them about freedom of expression and they'll say the same thing: “I 
don't want to die for freedom of expression. I don't want to have a volatile society, and I 
don't want to have a disjointed parliament that can't pass its laws and run society efficiently, 
just for freeedom of expression.” You'll find that a lot of people will gladly trade away 
intangibles like freedom of expression, human rights, gay rights, equality, for things like 
these. And that has been the psyche of Singaporeans all the way. 
 
 The majority of my informants are in their 30s and older, so I cannot verify whether political 
apathy really affects younger gay men less as this last consultant observes. However, one of my 
informants, Nick, was in his early 20s when I interviewed him. Nick expressed a positive hope for 
the future when I asked him to articulate his feelings towards Singapore. He advocated for gay men 
and lesbians to come out of the closet, despite the potential of a conservative backlash, because they 
would set off what he calls a “ripple effect.” “Out” gay men and lesbians change the views of the 
people around them. These surrounding people would, in turn, change how their own colleagues, 
friends, and relatives perceive homosexuality. This would eventually normalize homosexuality by 
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deconstructing the social stigma that afflicts it: 
 
That's why I always say that change in Singapore is all about the grassroots ... It's all about 
the grassroots. Change in Singapore will only happen when we, as gay Singaporeans, are 
able to affect a critical mass of people. That's the only way we can hope for change ... The 
government in Singapore is hierarchical. There are people in power ... who have a 
fundamentalist Christian background, and it's people like these who are stopping change ... 
Instead of using this battering ram and try to ram things in, we ought to adopt a more 
outreach mode .. to wear down resistance like water does stone. I believe we shouldn't start 
at the top. We should start the bottom, you know, where the majority of Singaporeans are ... 
Singaporeans will say, “Ah, I'm just one person. What difference do I make?” But like I said, 
you as an individual, being openly out as a gay person, project a normalized image of what 
gay people should be and in that sense, break stereotypes because that shifts the image [of 
homosexuality] from that [portrayed in the] media. 
 
In effect, Nick called for more socially engaged gay citizens to actively change societal perceptions 
of homosexuality rather than let state officials and the media dictate their behavior through murky 
OB markers and bad stereotyping. He knows that a direct confrontation with the state will only 
result in the state unleashing the police and other state apparatuses of coercion to enforce its order. 
Protesters will be hauled to the police station as criminals nobody should publicly associate with. 
By coming out and showing that gay men and lesbians behave just like everyone else does, Nick 
challenges common stereotypes of gay people as immoral perverts. Subsequently, when enough 
Singaporeans agree that gay people are just like everyone else, they can repeal 377A and bring 
about equality through popular consensus. Nick's social activism helps counteract the apathy of the 
great affective divide.  
 
Grassroots Citizenship Processes 
  Nick's non-confrontational call for social activism echoes the goals of other gay rights 
activists. These activists realize that they can best affect political change by invoking the idea of the 
communal in their work. Before I conclude this chapter, I shall ethnographically examine two 
recent attempts to highlight the presence of gay citizens by these activists. One focused on the 
liberal idea of gay rights as individual rights, while the other enmeshed gay men and lesbians as part 
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of the larger social network of the extended family. Their success (or lack thereof) illustrates what 
works in Singapore and what does not. 
 The first attempt took place in 2010 during the annual Chingay parade in February. First 
organized in Singapore in 1973 to enliven a Chinese New Year festive mood dampened by the state 
ban on firecrackers the year before, Chingay has unclear historical origins. The official Chingay 
web site explains the etymology of its name: 
 
There is no historical record of how the word “Chingay” originated. But records show that as 
early as the 19th century, Chingay appeared in South East Asia, beginning in Penang . The 
word was coined from its phonetic Hokkien equivalent, which means “the art of costume 
and masquerade”. It alluded to a Chinese styled decorated miniature stage or float borne on 
the shoulders of performers. This miniature stage depicts an important historical scene. It 
was probably the beginning of the manual float. During New Year processions in old China , 
such floats were carried through the streets on men's shoulders while dancers, jugglers and 
magicians entertained the crowds. Huge animals, both real and mythical took part in the 
processions, which were essentially religious in nature and aimed at honouring deities at the 
beginning of each new year.  
 
In Singapore, what started out initially as a procession of decorated floats, acrobats, lion and dragon 
dancers, and other Chinese cultural performers became an extravagent multi-cultural event that 
included local Malay and Indian performance groups, as well as foreign ones hailing as far away as 
Brazil. Indeed, Chingay now attracts so many spectators that there are two parades each year, i.e. a 
preview that is not telecast live to viewers at home, and the actual parade that is. In 2010, organizers 
departed from the practices of previous parades and allowed impromptu participation in the samba 
contingent. Would-be participants needed only to register just a few hours before the parade. The 
organizers sold and rented out costumes to those who did not come suitably dressed, and they also 
provided basic instructions in samba. Taking advantage of this invitation, a local Chinese gay rights 
activist suggested organizing a gay and lesbian contingent to, in his own words, “put the 'gay' back 
into Chingay.” He tried to garner support by promoting his American-style pride parade as a fun but 
non-political event, despite my warning that other Singaporeans would never see it as such. As long 
as the state remains vested in policing sexuality, nothing sexual can ever be apolitical (cf. Hubbard 
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and Sanders 2003). 
 The activist opted to go to the preview parade, but only he and his Australian-Chinese friend 
showed up. They chose the preview, as the friend had to fly back home the next day when the actual 
parade occurred. Both the preview and the actual parade were held at the Pit Building of the 
Formula One Grand Prix race tracks at Marina Bay. In a video recording that he later uploaded onto 
the popular social media site Youtube (Tan 2010), the activist can be seen wearing a completely pink 
outfit and a brightly sequinned vest. In contrast, his friend donned a tight pair of shorts (but no 
shirts) to better show off his sculpted torso, wrapped a pink boa around his waist and another one 
around his head like a feathery tiara, and hung a pair of pink angel wings from his neck. As the clip 
starts, the friend comments he feels out of place, possibly because he knows that his loud, campy 
outfit does not quite match the costumes the other samba dancers are wearing. The sartorial 
mismatch does not deter him. Throughout the first half of the seven minute-long recording, he adds 
to the parade's already-carnivalesque atmosphere by vigorously waving a rainbow flag on a ten-foot 
pole. Near the middle, he grows tired of the flag-waving and the Singaporean took over. In the last 
minute, the Singaporean is still seen dancing joyously with the rest of the samba dancers. Here, 
however, the parade announcer spots the two men and can be heard declaring: “And now ladies and 
gentlemen, members of the public and tourists who had just registered on the spot this evening to 
join the parade. Looking at them dancing away! Chingay is indeed a parade for everyone! (emphasis 
in original)” 
 The two activists should be commended for their courage and tenacity in the face of no 
support. Nevertheless, their Chingay foray still failed completely, mainly because they ignored the 
Singaporean aversion to assertive politics. By insisting on an avenue that many associate with the 
vociferous demands for individual rights more commonly found in Euro-America, they undermined 
themselves right from the start. As for the pride parade itself, it could not subvert as it happened 
only with the state's sanction. Furthermore, the activists barely stood out from the riot of colors that 
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surrounded them. As Yasser, a field informant, reminded me after he watched the clip: 
 
Their outfits looked drab in comparison and their rainbow flag means little to Singaporeans. 
Had I not known any better, I'd have thought of them as regular marchers who marked the 
end of the samba contingent. 
 
To me, the parade itself also failed as a gesture of inclusiveness and solidarity, as the two activists 
could not possibly represent the size nor the ethnic, class, gender, sexual, and somatic diversity of 
the local LGBT population. The fact that they went to the non-televised preview parade further 
limited public knowledge of what their deed. The Australian activist discredited the parade even 
more. Born and raised in Singapore, he revealed earlier that he migrated to escape the country's lack 
of political freedoms. If he were truly interested in advancing gay equality in Singapore, should he 
not have stayed? It seems, after all, far easier to criticize authoritarian Singapore from Australia, 
where others already cleared the way for the socio-political inclusion of gay men and lesbians. The 
Chingay announcer made the last critique. How else could he explain the rainbow flag except by 
casting its bearers as tourists? Surely, no sane Singaporean would wave such a flag in such a public 
event when everybody knows of the illegality of homosexuality. As far as the announcer caught the 
audience's attention, he achieved more solidarity than the activists could by discursively stripping 
the Singaporean of his nationality and declaring that “Chingay is indeed a parade for everyone,” 
even bothersome trouble-making tourists. 
 Despite the parade's failure, I do not equate it witn non-productivity. Altman (1996a, 1996b) 
controversially posits that non-Western gay and lesbian identities came into existence as copies of 
Euro-American originals through the globalization of Western consumer culture. The two activists 
unwittingly replicated this “global gay” thesis through their uncritical attempt to unmoor the pride 
parade from its cultural coordinates and transplant it in Singapore. Ironically, the parade's failure 
productively substantiates the critiques that Boellstoff (2005), Sinnott (2004), and others launched 
against Altman and his Eurocentric telos. Western theories of sexuality inspire men and women with 
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same-sex desires in the non-West, but any accurate account of same-sex identities outside Euro-
America must factor in local cultural conditions. 
 The second attempt, called Pink Dot, produced far better results. First organized in 2009 at 
Hong Lim Park, Pink Dot invites Singaporeans to gather and form (as its name suggests) a giant 
human pink dot to celebrate the idea that love transcends all limits. Accordingly, the theme in 2009 
was “Freedom to Love.” To his credit, the activist who put together the failed Chingay pride parade 
also came up with the Pink Dot idea. Thankfully, the other activists involved in the event's 
organization quickly adapted the message to suit the local communitarian ideals. They cast gay men 
and lesbians not as loathsome, fearful sex predators but as living, breathing members of one's own 
family. They also deliberately framed Pink Dot not as a protest or a demonstration, but as a multi-
cultural event open to Singaporeans of all races and sexual orientations. For instance, they held Pink 
Dot 2010 on the International Day of Families on 15 May to match the theme of “Focusing on Our 
Families.” This strategy of inclusivity worked. In 2009, Pink Dot attracted 2,500 participants. A 
year later, that number jumped to an estimated 4,000. 
 The second Pink Dot coincided with the end of the school year for me in 2010, so I signed 
up when the organizers called for volunteers. However, I nearly did not go, as I did not have a 
pleasant flight home. Technical difficulties delayed the flight from Chicago for six hours, and I had 
to rush through customs to get to my connecting flight in Hong Kong. When I finally arrived in 
Singapore at 3 am the day of Pink Dot itself, I was quickly reminded that I was no longer in more 
polite Illinois by an off-duty air stewardess who cut my queue at the ATM. Fortunately, I was not at 
all sleepy and grouchy despite my 24-hour flight home. I learned from previous trans-Pacific flights 
that I must sleep in the plane, with sleep-inducing medicine if necessary. I got a sore bum as a result 
from all that sitting, but I knew I would stay awake until 10 pm or so that night. Still, I would much 
rather hang out later with friends whom I had not seen for almost nine months, than go to Hong Lim 
Park in the afternoon. Later that day, I called up Gary to inform him of my decision, as I signed up 
  
149 
through The Bear Project's Facebook page that he administered. 
  
 
Figure 11: Some volunteers for Pink Dot 2010 from The Bear Project. I am right in the middle. 
(Source: Yang Liem Sang) 
  
 Gary would not have it, so I found myself in a pink t-shirt at Hong Lim Park at the stipulated 
time of 3 pm. The weather that day was typical of May – overcast, but hot and humid. The cooling 
rainy season would only start a month later when monsoons began drenching the island. For now, 
whatever wind there was did not dissipate the heat so much as spread it around more evenly. As 
expected, Gary had not arrived. He was almost never punctual for any social event. He had to wait 
for his long-time boyfriend Kenneth to get ready, and Kenneth's sense of timing was rubber band-
like at best. However, the Pink Dot organizers were already there, and preparatory work had begun. 
Tents were set up, while the volunteers busied themselves with either propping up static displays in 
the ground, or going to the nearby hawker center to buy ice and cold drinks. An hour later, 
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volunteers had arrived in sufficient numbers – including Gary and Kenneth at 3.45 pm – that one of 
the organizers gathered all of us for a briefing. He divided us into three groups. He tasked the first 
group to set up balloons and other decorations, and the second and third group to delineate the dot 
and to do crowd control respectively. Gary and Kenneth joined the second group, and I the second. 
 Some more ice and cold drinks later, another organizer came to brief the second and third 
group. A stage director by profession, he told us that we would form two shapes that day, a heart 
and the dot itself. He instructed those in the second group to hold up banners to mark out the 
required shape according to positions already designated on the ground, and those in the third group 
to usher event-attendees into the shape to fill it up. After each shape was formed, aerial pictures 
would be taken from a hotel room nearby. This room was on the top floor and it faced the park from 
across the road. We conducted a brief rehearsal before he dismissed us. We would not be needed 
again later when it was time to form the two shapes. Wanting to escape from the miserable 
afternoon heat, those of us from The Bear Project adjourned to a nearby air-conditioned cafetaria 
for yet more ice and cold drinks. 
 When we got back to the park at about 5 pm, I was tasked to distribute buttons and hand-
held fans printed with pictures of Pink Dot's furry anti-mascots “Fear” and “Ignorance,” and the 
message “Love 4 All” (Figure 12). Moving among the crowd, I noticed that the park's normally 
green field was awash in a sea of pink – pink t-shirts, pink shorts, pink socks and shoes, pink 
balloons, pink groundsheets, pink paper plates, cupcakes with pink icing, pink radios, two dogs with 
pink-dyed fur, and even two famous local theatre directors who came as pinkly attired drag queens. 
The turn-out reflected, in part, Pink Dot's intended target audience. Critics later pointed out that the 
participants were overwhelming Chinese and English-speaking. Organizers would do well in the 
future, these critics remarked, to bridge the ethnic and class gaps by reaching out to the ethnic 
minorities, Chinese gay men and lesbians who speak mainly Mandarin, and the trangendered people 
who feel that Pink Dot was more about gay rights than sexual diversity. Of the gay men who did go 
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to Pink Dot, they represented the somatic spectrum very well. In the sea of pink, gym-trained jocks 
jostled for space with skinny twinks and fat chubs. Lesbians also showed up in large numbers, even 
though my untrained gay male gaze could only differentiate the butch ones from the femme and the 
androgynous. 
 
Figure 12: The five types of buttons handed out at Pink Dot 2010 (Source: Author) 
  
 A circular clearing opened up in the park's center. There, two men and a woman identified 
themselves as the event's ambassadors. These three, two straight threatre and television actors and a 
gay DJ, kicked off Pink Dot proper by introducing the invited performance groups. The impressive 
line-up included a Malay dikir barat singing group, classical Indian bharatanatyam dancers clad in 
eye-catching pink and purple saris, and a more contemporary dance group. A video clip featuring 
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Eileena Lee, a well-known lesbian activist, and her mother was also screened in between the 
performances. In the clip, Eileena talked about her coming out experience with her mother to 
encourage others to do the same. Not only did Mrs Lee embrace Eileena's sexuality, she did so 
depite her being Christian and Eileena being Buddhist. In a country where gay men and lesbians 
regard Christians warily as the shrillest homophobic voices tend to come from the conservative 
Christian quarters, Mrs Lee's acceptance showed that close family ties could overcome religiously 
induced prejudice. 
  
Figure 13: The Pink Dot of Pink Dot 2010 (Source: Pinkdot.sg) 
 
 At 6 pm, the MCs asked the crowd to get ready to form the pink heart and dot. The director 
whom we met earlier climbed up a ladder placed firmly on several tables in the performance area, 
and calling out instructions on a loudhailer to fill up each shape more evenly. Although the heart 
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and dot looked simple enough, it took more time than expected to get the banner-bearing volunteers 
to demarcate each shape properly and the crowd to fill in the space within. There was a real danger 
that the sun would set before the official photographers could take pictures of the pink heart and dot 
after they had been formed. Working quickly, the usher-volunteers molded the crowd as directly, 
and we managed to form both shapes in time (Fig. 12). Overjoyed that Pink Dot had accomplished 
its goals, the crowd clapped and cheered. After cleaning up the area of any litter we could find, the 
volunteers joined the dispersing crowd and went to a nearby mall for a much-deserved dinner.  
 Strong symbolic meaning saturates Pink Dot. Historically, Hitler's purging of German queers 
already associated the color pink with homosexuality. More importantly in this case, the color also 
results from the combination of the red and the white of Singapore's national flag. As such, pink 
symbolically re-inserts gay men back into the center of the Singaporean nation when Section 377A 
banishes them to society's margins. The name “Pink Dot” further strengthens this nationalizing 
sentiment, because it reminds Singaporeans of how they transmuted the “little red dot” insult former 
Indonesian President B. J. Habibie hurled against them into a badge of national pride. The site of 
the event, Hong Lim Park, also poses some significance. Located in Chinatown, the park is one of 
Singapore's earliest gay cruising grounds. According to my field consultants, gay men began 
cruising there as late as the 1980s. Even after younger cruising gay men gradually moved southwest 
to an area of derelict shophouses nicknamed Jurassic Park (now demolished and occupied by China 
Square), to Ann Siang Hill further west, and eventually online onto the Internet, older gay men in 
their fifties and above still use the park as such. Politically, not only did the park used to host 
speeches and rallies in the 1950s and 1960s, the state-sanctioned Speakers' Corner is also located 
there. Modelled after the more famous Speakers' Corner in London's Hyde Park, the Hong Lim Park 
version opened in 2000. It provides a rare public space for free speech and demonstrations in a 
country where the government usually treats such behavior with great scrutiny and distrust. 
 Indeed, as an indication of the PAP's distrust of active citizenship, the state originally made 
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the Speakers' Corner highly unsuitable for its intended purpose. For instance, speakers must first 
register their intention (although not their topics) with officers at a nearby police post. They could 
also only make speeches, without the aid of sound-amplifiers, between 7 am and 7 pm. Trees only 
shade the park along its edges, so the timing deterred would-be speakers from using the unshaded 
Corner, or going there to listen to others. Even at 7 pm, the park would still be uncomfortably warm 
from the day's residual heat. Over the years, however, the rules that govern the Speakers' Corner 
were relaxed such that would-be speakers can now register online with the Commissioner of Parks 
and Recreation. They can also hold events at any hour of the day, and use loudhailers and other 
sound-amplification devices from 9 am to 10.30 pm. The list of permitted activities had also been 
expanded to include exhibitions, performances, and even demonstrations (provided that the 
demonstrators are all citizens and permanent residents). Clearly, were these rules not loosened, Pink 
Dot would not have been possible at all. Hence, the genius of Pink Dot does not lie in the discovery 
of some exploitable legal loophole, but rather in how the organizers achieved so much by working 
within the restrictions that they face. To date, Pink Dot 2010 holds the record for having the largest 
attendance in any event ever held at the Speakers' Corner. As one organizer put it, “The government 
opened the door just a little, and we kicked it open all the way!” 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I compared the idea of liberal citizenship with its Confucian counterpart. 
Although the two appear incompatible with each other at first glance, their difference lies largely in 
the social embeddedness of human rights. To liberal political thinkers, a person is automatically 
bestowed these rights by virtue of her being her own thinking, autonomous creature. Membership in 
a nation bestows more rights, but certain rights are guaranteed regardless of political association. In 
contrast, Confucianists only accord rights to citizens as members of larger communities. They do 
not recognize socially disengaged rights. Beyond this fundamental irreconcilable difference, other 
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philosophical contentions such as power, equality and creativity can be more or less resolved.. 
 In the 1990s, the philosophical opposition between liberalism and Confucianism surfaced 
again as the so-called “Asian Values” debate. In a bid to explain the spectacular rise of certain East 
and Southeast Asian economies a decade earlier, intellectuals from Asia, Europe and the United 
States attributed these successes to social values either supposedly unique to Asia, or translated 
from Western bourgeois culture. As an extension of the post-WWII ideological conflict between 
democracy and communism, the resulting debate witnessed Asian proponents accusing their liberal 
Western counterparts of arrogantly refusing to acknowledge modernities alternative to the Western 
ones. In turn, these Western intellectuals accused them of supporting authoritarian rule in the name 
of collective interests. 
 In Singapore, the accusations of illiberal governance hold some truth. Unwilling to have its 
policies questioned by its citizens, the state discursively constructs itself as the father in relation to 
the infantilized citizenry. This unequal relationship benefits the citizens materially, but the lack of 
full political participation alienates them from the PAP. Insofar as Singaporeans cannot differentiate 
the political party from Singapore as a country and a nation, this “great affective divide” inhibits the 
real expression of patriotism. Gay men are doubly alienated, firstly as Singaporeans and, secondly, 
by the criminalization of their sexuality. However, dissatisfaction and anger over their marginal 
social positions led some gay rights activists to challenge the status quo and, in the process, engage 
gay men and lesbians in the bigger nation-building project.  
 To date, those activists who achieved at least a modicum of success did so because they 
realized they must work according to Singapore's communitarian ideals that, among other things, 
grant a healthy dose of respect to the authorities. Those who propound individualism-based rights 
claims or openly challenge the state's authority will likely face failure or, worse, time in the police 
station and possibly even behind bars. The three examples of the public campaign to repeal Section 
377A, the gay pride parade during Chingay, and Pink Dot substantiates this argument very clearly. 
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More importantly, both the public campaign and Pink Dot demonstrate that gay rights can be 
advanced even in a country with an authoritarian government like Singapore. Confucianism and 
communitarianism do not always retard socially progressive politics as liberals think they do! 
 In the next and last main chapter of this dissertation, I shift my focus to examine how gay 
men cope with state demands on their sexuality in their everyday lives. Moving away from the level 
of the organization to that of the individual, I shall examine gay men's quotidian strategies in the 
two main spaces of nation-building in the home and in the military. 
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Chapter 5: Being Good at Being a Chinese-Singaporean Man 
 
In Glendiot idiom, there is less focus on “being a good man” than on “being good at 
being a man” – a stance that stresses performative excellence, the ability to fore-
ground manhood by means of deeds that strikingly “speak for themselves” (Herzfeld 
1985: 16, emphasis in original). 
 
The personal is political (Hanisch 1976 [1969]). 
 
 
Introduction – Some Basic Definitions 
 In this chapter, I turn to individual gay men to see how they understand their homosexuality 
and their relationships with the seemingly monolithic state in their everyday lives. What do these 
men understand by the identity label “gay”? What culturally meaningful strategies do these men use 
to negotiate their sexuality and their relationships with the state, and to evade familial and state 
surveillance of their sexuality? I begin by defining the basic categories “male” and “man,” after 
which I discuss the meta-concepts of “hegemonic masculinities” and “subordinated masculinities” 
that frame cross-cultural studies of manhood. Next, I briefly explore the notion of gender 
performance, before I apply the above theories to analyze the everyday lives of gay men. I assert 
that while these men enact global gay discourses by referring to themselves as “gay,” reading 
Singaporean gay culture as an offshoot of the Euro-American original only produces a superficial 
interpretation. Many gay men do not “come out,” despite the central importance of this ritual in the 
modern gay identity, ultimately to avoid straining familial ties. While this does not mean that gay 
men cannot come out, those who do so successfully must perform other aspects of their masculinity 
to such high degrees as to deflect the social stigma arising from their sexuality.  
 I begin by first defining what I mean by “male” and “man.” I define “male” and its “female” 
counterpart according to one's reproductive anatomical differences. This biological definition seems 
commonsensical (Geertz 1983), especially we compare it with other socially constructed categories 
of difference such as “gender” and “sexuality” (Foucault 1990; Ortner 1974). Like all systems of 
common sense, however, this definition too stems from a social constructivist perspective. When 
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transgendering people undergo sex re-assignment operations, they expose the artificiality that basic 
biological categories of “male” and “female” share with “gender” and “sexuality.” Nevertheless, I 
continue to use “male” in its commonsensical definition, because most people understand it this 
way. As a male, an individual learns to identify himself as not only a biological male, but also, 
depending on age, as either a “boy” or a “man” (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). In this light, the 
category “male” differs from that of “man.” Typically, biological males become men to claim the 
rights and privileges of membership in the dominant gender group. To do so successfully, a male 
individual must present a convincing masculinizing act that requires a set of conventional signifying 
practices that establishes and upholds the identity “man.” Butler (1990, 1993) calls this performance 
of the “man” identity the oft-unconsious repetition of acts that indexes one's manhood. Herzfeld 
(1985) also recognizes this performative aspect, as one can see from his oft-quoted statement that I 
reproduced above. 
 Having a male body aids in the performance of masculinity, since the possession of such a 
body normally qualifies the owner for membership in the category “man.” Yet, membership does 
not always require such a body, as women demonstrate when they bind their breasts and mask their 
secondary sex characteristics. Neither will simply having such a body satisfy all the membership 
requirements. Biological males can still fail to become full-fledged men if they cannot muster the 
other masculinizing signifiers (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). The fact that males can fail highlights 
the inherent contested nature of the masculinization process. As Hanisch (1976 [1969]) famously 
observes in the epigraph I reproduced at the start of this chapter, “the personal is political.” 
 This contestation prompts the following questions: What counts as a masculinizing signifier, 
and what do males do after they became men? The anthropological record of masculinity offers a 
diverse range of answers. Anthropologists define and use the concept of masculinity and the related 
notions of male identity, manhood, manliness and men's roles in at least four ways (Gutmann 1997). 
The first approach locates masculinity in what men think and do. The second incorporates the 
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element of performance by reading masculinity as the thoughts and acts that signify one's manhood. 
The third considers how and why some men emerge from this performance as more “manly” than 
others. The last approach emphasizes the social centrality of male-female relationships and defines 
masculinity in terms of non-femininity. Using these various frameworks, anthropologists document 
meanings of masculinity that differ in social domains as diverse as kinship and marriage (Lomnitz 
and Pérez-Lizaur 1987; Peletz 1996), fatherhood (Gutmann 1996; Taggart 1992), the body (Alter 
1992; Reddy 2005), male friendships (Brandes 1980; Tiger 1969), same-sex sexuality (Herdt 1981; 
Kulick 1998), heterosexual desire (Allison 1994; Frank 2002), male initiation rites (Godelier 1986), 
warfare (Chagnon 1968), diasporic life (Manalansan 2003), domestic violence (Bourgois 1995), and 
men's relationships with women (Delaney 1991; Sacks 1979). 
 The above studies all provide insights into the construction of masculinity across different 
cultural systems, but their cultural specificities presents an issue of commensurability. For example, 
do anthropological inquiries into the masculinity of the Indian sannyasi wrestler (Alter 1992) 
inform similar work on the masculinities of the “warlike” Yanomamö (Chagnon 1968), the US strip 
club patron (Frank 2002), the “macho” Mexican (Gutmann 1996), or the Brazilian transgendered 
travestí prostitute (Kulick 1998)? How does my own study of Singaporean gay masculinities fit into 
this complex constellation of male images and behavioral codes? Gilmore (1990) acknowledges the 
issue of cross-cultural commensurability in his influential study where he produces a seemingly 
universal set of core masculine attributes that includes discipline and self-direction. In the end, even 
he fails to formulate a definitive theory of universal masculinity, as too many variations exist along 
the cross-cultural continuum of male images and codes. Herdt and Stoller (1990: 352 – 3) encounter 
the same difficulty in their comparison of male-female erotics: “[f]or the study of erotics and gender 
identity, cross-cultural data are still too impoverished and decontextualized to truly compare 
masculinity and femininity, sexual excitement, and fantasy constructs of people from different 
cultures.” What meta-concepts can I then deploy to better frame my studies of masculinity? 
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Males, Men and Masculinizing Acts 
 Among sociologists, Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985) made “hegemonic masculinity” the 
organizing framework for the study of men and masculinity in their landmark paper “Toward a New 
Sociology of Masculinity.” Positing masculinity as a hierarchy, they argue that in any given society, 
certain forms of masculinity that they call “hegemonic” command more social prestige than others. 
Multiple forms of hegemonic masculinity can exist concurrently. For instance, the masculinities of 
the soldier, the sports star, and the country's president enjoy hegemonic status in present-day US 
discourses. These masculinities all center on one's capacity to assert control while resisting control 
by others (Johnson 2005). Yet, what counts as hegemonic changes over time. For example, the ideal 
of Chinese masculine beauty changes synchronically and relatively to fluctuations in the importance 
of physical activities. Men of the Tang Dynasty (618 – 907 CE) “cultivated a virile, even martial 
appearance. They liked thick beards, whiskers and long mustaches and admired bodily strength. 
Both civilian and military officials practised archery, riding, sword fighting and boxing, and 
proficiency in these arts was highly praised” (van Gulik 1974: 188). By the Qing Dynasty (1644 – 
1912 CE), the masculinity of the effeminate and physically frail scholar became idealized. Then, the 
non-Chinese Manchus' conquest of China led the Chinese to reject physical strength and military 
prowess for their associations with these foreign “barbaric” invaders (Wu 2004).  
 What counts as effective means to attain the hegemonic ideals also varies according to the 
individual's biological sex, age, ethnicity, class, and other social backgrounds. When women vie for 
positions of power in politics, commodity-trading, and other traditionally men-dominated domains, 
they must often compensate for their lack of male bodies. They must “out-macho the boys,” so to 
speak, by exerting more effort in their masculinizing performances (Zaloom 2006). Even among 
men, the same means can produce different results when inflected by one's social backgrounds. For 
example, aggression is considered a conventional masculine trait. Consider now two men, one white 
and one black, of the same age who work at the same job in the urban United States. Collins (2009) 
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maintains that the white man's aggression would be rewarded, as he is simply being himself. Yet, 
the same aggression in the black man would brand him as dangerous due to the racialized history of 
the United States. 
 Many may strive to attain hegemonic masculinities, but only a rare handful actually succeed. 
The conceptualization of masculinity as a performance implies an audience that actively interacts 
with the performance and validates its degree of success (Serano 2007). In other words, a male does 
not become a man simply by constructing his masculinity. He must also be perceived as having that 
identity. Goffman (1961: 144) calls this the “dance of identification.” The masculinities of those 
who fail, or those who do not try, become “subordinated” (in Carrigan et al.'s [1985] terms) in the 
hierarchy of masculinities. In present-day US discourses, such lesser valued masculinities include 
those of gay men (Eng and Hom 1998), men of color (Doyle 1989; Eng 2001), and masculine 
women (Halberstam 1998). The inability to attain the hegemonic ideals may drive some to enact 
masculinizing acts that valorize their subordinated masculinities. For example, Cooper (2000) avers 
that Silicon Valley computer programmers practice “nerd masculinity” that involves enduring long 
work hours to meet production goals, and to establish a reputation for expertise. 
 Informed by the feminist critique of gender, Carrigan et al. (1985) revolutionized the study 
of men and masculinity with their theoretical contributions. They 
 
debunked sex-role theory for its blindness to power, showed how masculinity was about 
power relations among men not between women and men, illuminated the link between 
masculinity and heterosexuality by taking gay sexuality seriously, treated masculinity not as 
a trait but as a form of male practice that has its effect the subordination of women, and 
formulated the concepts of hegemonic and subordinated masculinities (Shrock and Schwalbe 
2009: 278). 
 
Nevertheless, “hegemonic masculinity” remains problematic as a meta-concept. Carrigan et al., for 
instance, do not clarify what it actually looks like (Wetherell and Edley 1999). They also charge that 
men subjugate women in the pursuit of hegemonic ideals. Ample anthropological evidence supports 
this claim (e.g. Gutmann 1996; Ogasawara 1998), but Carrigan et al. also treat “man” in their 
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original formulation as a static category bereft of meaningful social processes. Seen this way, any 
pursuit of masculine ideals becomes masculinity's equivalent of the biblical Original Sin. Lest he 
further the oppression of women, anyone born as a biological male must forever foreswear 
becoming a man! 
 To avoid this ethical dilemma, we should not see the pursuit of hegemonic masculinity as a 
moral critique. Schrock and Schwalbe (2009: 280) observe that 
 
[a]ll humans learn where they are supposed to fit in a set of preexisting cultural categories, 
some of which are hierarchically arranged. So just as North Americans of European descent 
learn to think of and present themselves as white, which is the dominant racial category in 
U.S. culture, males learn to think of and present themselves as men, which is the dominant 
gender category. 
 
The root of the problem, they argue, lies not in individuals but in the system that privileges those 
who successfully attain the ideals. Envisioning hegemonic masculinity as a set of social processes 
and practices contra Carrigan et al. opens up new opportunities to refine the idea. It becomes 
possible to see hegemonic masculinity not as a configuration of purely white or heterosexual praxis, 
but rather as a hybrid bloc that reproduces patriarchy by uniting diverse (even subordinated) 
masculinizing practices (Demetriou 2001). Re-conceptualizing hegemonic masculinity also enabled 
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) to expand the meta-concept to include a more complex model of 
gender hierarchy; to further highlight of the interactions between the local, the regional and the 
global; to give a more specific treatment of embodiment in the contexts of power and privilege; to 
emphasis more strongly on the internal dynamics and contradictions of hegemonic masculinity; and 
to recognize the potential for a greater movement towards gender democracy. Biological males may 
one day attain their hegemonic masculine ideals without perpetuating gender oppression. 
 In the spirit of refining masculinity theory, Coles (2008) proposes what he calls “mosaic 
masculinity” to explain how men recalibrate their conceptions of hegemonic masculinity vis-à-vis 
their own identities. By “mosaic masculinity,” he (ibid.: 238) refers to “the process by which men 
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negotiate masculinity, drawing upon fragments or pieces of hegemonic masculinity which they have 
the capacity to perform and piecing them together to reformulate what masculinity means to them.” 
Cole recognizes, as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) do, that men strategically adopt or reject 
diferent aspects of ideal masculinity to gain social acceptance in their changing life circumstances. 
This agency means that men who embody subordinated masculinities do not simply reject all of the 
tenets of masculinity, but rather “focus upon those elements that privilege them and reject the rest” 
(Coles 2008: 238). Subsequently, this reformulation enables these men to see their masculinities as 
dominant, especially if they operate in domains with other men of similar dispositions and actions. 
 
Wen and Wu Masculinities 
 Among Chinese-Singaporeans, they understand hegemonic masculinity in terms of ideas of 
manliness that date back at least to the time of Confucius during China's Zhou Dynasty (1045 – 256 
BCE). During my dissertation research, I did not specifically address how the construction of my 
consultants' masculine selves reflects these ideas. Yet, no discussions of Singaporean masculinities 
would be complete without an understanding of what these ideas entail. As such, I shall discuss 
them here as a theory and leave the research about their dynamics as lived experiences for the 
future. 
 Historically, the Chinese know masculinity as a heuristic dyad called wen-wu, a term that 
translates as “cultural accomplishments-military prowess.” Both the terms wen and wu have many  
meanings. For wen, the Great Chinese Dictionary (Luo 1990b: 1512 – 3) lists 26 definitions whose 
core meanings center on literary and other cultural attainment. Creel (1970: 67) captures the gist of 
its importance when he states that wen 
 
appears to have originally had the sense of “striped” or “adorned”, and it may be by 
extension from this that wen came to mean “accomplished”, “accomplishment” or even 
“civilization”: all of those adornments of life that distinguish the civilized man from the 
untutored barbarian. 
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In comparison, wu has over twenty definitions in the same dictionary. These definitions center on 
martial and military force and power (Luo 1990a: 338 – 9). These various meanings of wen and wu 
have deep historical origins. The Book of Rites, one of the Five Classics of the Confucian canon, 
describes how two legendary Zhou Dynasty (1050 – 256 BCE) kings received their posthumous 
titles. One, King Wen, used culture to rule while the other, King Wu, used military power. In the Ji 
Fa chapter, one finds the verse, “King Wen, who by his peaceful rule, and King Wu who by his 
martial achievements, delivered the people from their afflictions” (Legge 1885, Volume 28: 209). 
 From the surface, wen-wu appears indistinctive from masculinities found elsewhere. Even 
Louie (2002) observes that common elements exist in wen-wu and contemporary Western visions of 
the “real man.” For instance, one can easily compare displays of Chinese qigong and other martial 
arts to the exhibitions of military hardware in most independence day celebrations nowadays. Even 
so, two key differences exist between Chinese and Western masculinities. The first rests in the 
forms of male sexuality that the Chinese consider appropriate. Unlike much of the recent sexual 
ideologies in Anglophone countries, the Chinese do not require militant homophobia as proof of 
one's manhood (Louie 2003). Keeping in mind that studies of sexuality and the concomitant 
homophobia first arose only in late nineteenth-century Europe (Foucault 1990), Wu (2004) finds 
that elites commonly accepted male same-sex relationships over China's long history. Non-elites of 
the Ming (1368 – 1644 CE) and Qing Dynasties (1644 – 1912 CE) even deliberately cultivated 
homo-erotic sensitivities to display their awareness of aristocratic cultural vogues. 
 The Chinese accept homosexuality, but they reject uncontrolled sexuality. The control and 
containment of one's sexual passions characterize Confucian sexuality (McMahon 1988). Imitating 
the forms of the masters in calligraphy, extensive rote learning, and even taking one's examinations 
in enclosed examination halls, and other wen practices all aim to hone one's self-control. Wu 
adherents should also promote peace instead of encouraging war; the martial arts often include 
training in patience and restraint. The Chinese recognize that while sheer brute strength has its uses, 
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they view those who use it exclusively as nothing more than mere oafs. They even describe sexual 
intercourse in general as a battle, where the ultimate goal lies in making one's partner achieve 
orgasm while withholding one's own (Louie 2003). 
 This historical acceptance has subversive, even blasphemous, modern implications. Louie 
(1999) goes further than Wu (2004) to aver the social normality of bisexuality in pre-modern China. 
He re-interprets Guan Yu, a major character in the classic historical novel Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms whom the Chinese deified later as their God of War. Novel editors de-sexed Guan Yu so 
that he now appears as an ultra-powerful, but ultimately sexless and not-quite-human, super-hero. 
Louie recovers Guan Yu's humanity by examining his service to his sworn elder brother/superior 
commander Liu Bei as a general. The novel records that Liu Bei often shares his bed with Guan Yu 
to indicate their close intimacy as sworn brothers. When Liu Bei leaves him to sleep with his other 
advisers, Guan Yu often becomes strangely foul-tempered the morning after. These fits of jealousy 
lead Louie to argue that while Guan Yu was married with children, he had sex with Liu Bei on top 
of his military duties. Louie attributes the lack of further commentary about Guan Yu's anger to the 
novel editors' sexually conservative censorship, but he does not state what sex role Guan Yu takes. 
Yet, extra-sexual social conditions such as age, social class, and personal wealth structured sex roles 
in pre-modern China, unlike the present-day and more egalitarian West (Hinsch 1990). The older, 
more socially powerful partner usually took the active role. This means that Liu Bei inserts Guan Yu 
during sex. No wonder the novel editors censored such unbecoming details of Guan Yu's sex life! 
 The second key point of difference between Chinese and Western masculinities lies in wen's 
general historical dominance over wu. In contrast to the disparaged stereotype of the overly studious 
“geek” and “nerd” in the contemporary US, the Chinese considered wen superior to wu as early as 
the Spring and Autumn Period, even though each had its own place in the ordered Confucian state. 
This historical period spans roughly from the second half of the eighth century to the first half of the 
fifth century BCE. Confucius revealed his own preference for wen: “The master said of the shao 
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that it was both perfectly beautiful and perfectly good, and the wu that it was perfectly beautiful but 
not perfectly good” (The Analects III: 25, translated by Lau 1979: 71). Shao refers to the music of 
Shun, a member of the group of mythological kings called the Three Sovereigns and Five 
Emperors. King Yao, another member of the group, found Shun so virtuous that he abdicated in 
Shun's favor. In contrast, the King of Wu ascended to his throne through military might, and wu 
refers to his style of music. Confucius considered music essential to one's character development 
(Li 2008). By stating his preference for shao over wu, he showed his belief that physical violence 
could not help an individual achieve true perfection. This bias continues even today. Political 
candidates in contemporary Taiwan often list their highest education achievements in the briefings 
for televised electoral coverage. The high number of doctoral degree-holders contrasts sharply with 
their Western counterparts who would rather emphasize their military service record or “sporting” 
mass appeal than their elite education (if any)(Louie 2002). 
 Despite their wen preferences, the Chinese still think that the ideal man should also embody 
wu. Even in the modern Chinese languages, wen wu shuang quan  (Mandarin for 
“complete in every wen-wu aspect”), wen wu bing yong  (“employ wen and wu in 
concert”), and other idioms describe these perfect men. In order to win their Han Chinese subjects 
over, the Manchu emperors of the Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1912 CE) sinicized themselves and 
exhibited competence in both wen and wu. Spence (1966: 157) observes that 
 
the Kang-hsi Emperor thus inaugurated the first of those literary projects for which the 
Ch'ing dynasty is justly famous; this was a measure of his feelings of confidence and 
stability: having been “wu”, the military conqueror of Wu San-kuei and Galdan, he would 
now also assure his reputation as “wen”, the literary Emperor, proving his appreciation of the 
Chinese poetic tradition despite his non-Chinese ancestry. 
 
Just as few men ever achieve hegemonic masculinity, only a handful actually master both wen and 
wu. I present these two ideals here as distinct concepts only for heuristic purposes, and not to 
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essentialize men as either wen or wu beings. In real life, to the extent that all Chinese men attempt 
to harmonize wen-wu within themselves, most end up embodying both to some degree. The authors 
of The Analects recognized this long ago: “There is no man who does not have something of the 
way of Wen and Wu in him.” (The Analects XIX: 22, Lau 1979: 156). While either wen or wu can 
count as ideal masculinity, both must be present to a high degree if one were to achieve the heights 
of the hegemonic ideal. 
 Lastly, wen-wu historically applied only to Chinese men. Women accrued wen-wu prestige 
only when they masqueraded as men. Zhu Yingtai, the female Eastern Jin Dynasty (304 – 439 CE) 
scholar immortalized in the classic tragic love story The Butterfly Lovers, cross-dressed to take the 
imperial examinations to display her wen talents. Hua Mulan, a legendary warrior woman reputedly 
from the Northern Wei Dynasty (386 – 534 CE), also had to conceal her femininity to serve in the 
army in lieu of her aged and disabled father. Her life story formed the basis of the 1998 Disney 
animated feature, Mulan. Once these women took off their disguises, however, their wen-wu 
attributes evaporated immediately. Both cases demonstrate that no matter how well-trained women 
might be in wen-wu skills in private, their achievements would only be publicly acknowledged if 
they appeared as men. Louie (2002) traces this discrepancy to the imperial civil service or military 
service examinations in which one must typically excel to gain official recognition. Feudal customs 
explicitly forbade women from taking either test with varying degrees of rigidity over China's long 
history, so one simply could not discuss women in wen-wu terms. This non-applicability continues 
even today. Hence, unlike Westerners, the Chinese do not at all equate the lack of masculinity with 
femininity. Instead, a man becomes non-masculine when he loses his sexual potency – whether 
through impotence or castration – as the mastery of wen-wu requires sexual self-discipline. In this 
light, the Chinese traditionally never saw eunuchs as men. No matter how accomplished eunuchs 
might be in wen-wu talents, their lack of a complete male body meant they had even less chance of 
accumulating wen or wu prestige than women did (Louie 2003). 
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 The feudal customs that denied women access to wen-wu also denied foreign men the same. 
Rather than seeing foreigners as non-masculine, the Chinese hyper-sexualized them to reveal their 
animal barbarism. Stripped of their civilization, foreigners became discursive beings of only basic 
instincts and sexual drives. In early Chinese descriptions of Western men, foreigners had four 
testicles and an excess of body hair. Both characteristics index a highly sexualized masculine form 
(Dikötter 1992). Consequently, the Chinese considered foreigners too animalistic to understand the 
finer philosophical points of the Confucian Classics, much less attempt the imperial examinations to 
acquire social prestige and civilization: “Wen-wu was not perceived as applicable to men outside the 
Chinese cultural realm because it contains within its matrix a masculine sexuality of self-affirming, 
civilising difference” (Louie 2002: 13). 
 Now that the Chinese have contact with Western discourses of masculinity and feminism 
through cultural globalization, I doubt that they still think of wen and wu as strictly Chinese male 
attributes. Given the roots of Chinese masculinity in the male anatomy, I surmise that the Chinese 
bestow wen-wu qualities on foreign men more easily than they do their own women. An exposition 
on the impact of globalization on Chinese masculinities will go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
While elements of wen-wu will become readily obvious in the ethnographic discussion below, I will 
leave the more detailed inquiries to a future date. For now, I will turn my attention to the cultural 
dynamics of masculinities among male Chinese-Singaporeans. 
 
Being Good at Being a Chinese-Singaporean Man 
 Having discussed masculinity as theories, what do these ideas mean to Singaporean gay men 
as lived experiences? Among Chinese-Singaporeans in general, Williams (2006) asserts, hegemonic 
masculinity centers on financial, career, marital, and reproductive success. Clearly, gay men already 
can never achieve complete hegemonic masculinity. The Chinese ones may achieve recognition for 
their wen-ness if they do well in school, and use their academic credentials as the basis of their 
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careers. My consultants mostly claim a middle-class background, so they succeed somewhat in this 
respect. Even those who claim working-class backgrounds do not suffer from material deprivation. 
They live in at least three-roomed public housing apartments (i.e. two bedrooms and a living room), 
as their middle-class counterparts do, even though their parents may own the apartments. Nobody 
rents, to my knowledge. They have access to televisions, refrigerators, cell phones, computers with 
high-speed Internet access, and other urban amenities. Otherwise, however, their sexuality prevents 
them from getting legally married and having children biologically (unless through surrogacy). 
They cannot adopt children even if they want to. An informant told me: 
 
No, laws do not specifically forbid gay men from adopting, but the adoption agencies will 
first check the men's families. Once they realize that [the men] lack a “proper” family 
environment, they will not allow the men to adopt. 
 
 Of course, my informants' perpetual bachelorhood may not really bother them. After all, 
many straight Singaporeans also do not marry and have children. State discourses also never once 
blamed homosexuality for Singapore's low birth rates (even though they could easily have). Gay-
bashing is also unheard of, at least in the news, if not in reality. As such, personal capabilities 
mostly limit the extent of material comfort in gay men's lives. Even so, their bachelorhood leaves 
the men open to questions about their personal lives that they may feel too uncomfortable to answer. 
In the following sections, I examine how gay men negotiate their masculinity and sexuality in their 
everyday lives. Specifically, I ask how do gay men make sense of the identity label “gay,” and how 
these meanings affect their lived experiences in the two main domains of social life in their natal 
family homes as well as the military. I chose these two domains, because gay men spend a longer-
than-usual period at home before moving out (at least when compared to their Euro-American 
counterparts), and because the compulsory nature of military service makes the conscription 
experience a character-defining period in most Singaporean men's lives. 
 I begin by questioning the meanings of the identity label “gay.” Altman (1996a, 1996b) 
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asserts that non-Western gay and lesbian identities came into existence as copies of Euro-American 
originals through the globalization of Western consumer culture. My ethnographic data appears to 
support this “global gay” thesis. All of my informants self-identify as “gay” in the Euro-American 
sense of this identity label. They do not think of themselves as “queer” – it seems that this label is 
limited only within academic circles. Neither, despite their predominantly Chinese ethnicity, do they 
refer to themselves or to other gay men as tongzhi  (“comrade” in Mandarin), an identity label 
that rose in Hong Kong in the late 1980s before becoming popular in China and Taiwan as well 
(Chou 2000; Wong and Zhang 2000). The Singaporean Mandarin media uses it as a euphemism for 
“gay man” (nan tongzhi   “male comrade”) or lesbian (nü tongzhi ! “female 
comrade”), but the local ethnoscape does not otherwise avail itself to the spread of the label beyond 
Chinese ethnic boundaries. As Alex, an activist friend, once told me, no Malay or Indian gay man 
would ever refer to himself with such a blatantly Chinese label. 
 In lieu of tongzhi and “gay,” my informants sometimes refer to themselves with more local 
terms such the Malay pondan and bapok; the Mandarin bo li "# (“glass”) and jie mei 
$%(“sisters”); the Hokkien ah qua &' (also spelled ah kua); the Cantonese bo lei (“glass”), zi 
mui (“sisters”), gei (a transliteration of the English “gay”) and gei lou (“gay man/fellow”); or the 
local constructions sister, AJ, PLU, and 302. As local equivalents of the English “faggot,” these 
terms carry derogatory connotations. My consultants' use of these terms mirrors African-Americans' 
co-option of the racial ephithet “nigger” to empower themselves (Kennedy 2002). However, in all 
cases of alternate identity label use, my informants used these descriptors as synonymous 
substitutes for the Euro-American “gay”. It seems that Altman's thesis holds true in Singapore. 
 In contrast, I insist that reading Singaporean gay culture as a mere copy of the Euro-
American original only produces a superficial interpretation. Many of the alternate identity labels I 
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mentioned above have their own rich cultural histories that the “global gay” thesis threatens to 
obfuscate. Take, for example, the Malay terms pondan and bapok. Peletz (2009) argues that many 
Malay terms that now index homosexuality originally referred to transgendered and bisexual ritual 
specialists in early modern Southeast Asia. Embodying both male and female elements – the 
(fe)male-bodied ritualists wore the attire of the opposite sex – these specialists served as sacred 
mediators between humans, spirits, and nature. The male-bodied bissu of the Bugis of Sulawesi, for 
instance, put on female attire and accroutrements of femininity, safeguarded royal regalia, engaged 
in relations and marriages with same-sexed (but male-gendered) partners, and enjoyed noble status. 
Yet, the immense respect that these specialists commanded does not suggest a free-for-all sexuality. 
Severe sanctions that were based on biological sex, kinship status, age, and class governed the 
ritualists' behavior. Transgressors might be burned alive or killed in other ways. 
 The Chinese terms bo li and bo lei (Mandarin and Cantonese cognates for “glass”) refer not 
only to one's anal opening through analogy of the mouth of a glass bottle, but also to its fragility. In 
contrast, the Hokkien ah qua (pronounced /a: gwa/) was originally a disrespectful slur used against 
effeminate eunuchs of the imperial Chinese courts. Qua here is a cognate of the Mandarin guan ' 
(“officer”). Eunuchs (tai jian ()) were also called huan guan *', so adding the diminitive ah 
prefix to guan turns an otherwise prestigious title into a belittling insult.  
 In the case of the local constructions AJ, PLU, and 302, consultants told me that they believe 
that missionary schoolboys first invented AJ as a Pig Latin version of “gay.” PLU originally 
abbreviates the name of the local LGBT rights advocacy group People Like Us. PLU, however, 
neither indicates actual PLU membership nor even interests in rights activism. Rather, PLU's close 
associations with homosexuality expanded PLU's semantic domain, so that PLU now also means 
“gay.” In fact, Singaporeans incorporate PLU into the names of their gay-oriented businesses and 
organizations. These groups include the PLU Cafe in a sleepy part of the island called Yio Chu 
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Kang, a gay bathhouse called PLU Spa Sanctuary in Johor Bahru in neighboring Malaysia, and the 
Internet forum that specifically caters to gay and lesbian youth interests called PLUME (an acronym 
for People Like You and Me). Lastly, 302 originates as the number of a clause in the military's 
medical handbook that designates homosexuality as a psychological “abnormality”. Given the 
prominence of military service in male Singaporean lives, as I shall discuss below, Singaporeans 
incorporated 302 and other military terms into their everyday speech. Hence, reading Singaporean 
gay identities as offshoots of the Euro-American original obscures these socio-linguistic histories. 
 
Being Good at Being Gay at Home 
 Explaining Singaporean gay culture as a “global gay” offshoot also assumes that gay men 
there treat “coming out” with the same ontological importance as Euro-American ones do. In Euro-
America, a gay man comes out by openly declaring his homosexuality outward from the immediate 
family, to friends, and then to colleagues. A few of my consultants, including Eileena who brought 
me to the closeted lesbian bar in Chapter 1, came out completely. The vast majority came out only 
to their siblings, friends and/or colleagues, and many support gay activist events. Yet, they remain 
closeted to their parents, either refusing to come out, or claiming that they do not feel obliged to.  
 In this sense, Singaporean gay men share a “tacit subjectivity” with their counterparts from 
the Dominican Republic. Decena (2008) argues that the mainstreaming of the coming out process in 
the United States means that people come out now to become “normal” gay subjects (McRuer 1997, 
Vaid 1995). Still, many Dominican gay and bisexual men residing in New York City resist coming 
out fully to their families to protect their own privacy. More importantly, many also claim that their 
families already know implicitly anyway, so they do not see the need to openly state the obvious. In 
fact, disclosure may even backfire as public knowledge of the men's illicit sexuality exposes their 
families to public gossip and humiliation (cf. Murray's [1997] discussion of a similar Islamic “will 
not to know” about others' homosexuality). Drawing upon Spanish grammar that permits a speaker 
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to drop the subject from her utterances as long as she conjugates the verb correctly, Decena calls 
these implicitly gay and bisexual Dominican subjectivities “tacit.” By remaining tacit, these men 
maintain the integrity of their social networks against the corrosive effects of public shaming. As 
such, they allow scholars to transcend the explicit categorization of individuals in our critical 
examination of the complexities that structure social relationships. 
 The reasons why Singaporean gay men remain tacit about their sexuality, however, differ 
from those of the Dominican ones. Overwhelmingly, my informants claim that they do not want to 
hurt their parents. One said, “[Telling my parents] won't enrich their lives, so why risk all the 
negative outcomes?” Another one revealed:  
 
No, they don't know. I have to keep it as secret. I believe that saying all these things may 
hurt them, because they're very nice to me, and they've been taking care of me for the past 
23 years, so I do not wish to break this news to them and, you know, break their hope. 
 
Many of my informants' parents received little formal education. Born in the 1950s and 1960s when 
Singaporeans had neither universal education nor compulsory instruction in the English language, 
these parents learn what little they know about homosexuality from the tabloid Lianhe Wanbao and 
other Mandarin-medium newspapers. Wanbao usually does so in sensationalist reports where gay 
men or lesbians inevitably die from suicides or drug overdoses, seduce the husbands or wives of 
“happy” (read “heterosexual”) families as what I jokingly call “homo-wreckers,” suffer mental 
breakdowns in public, or otherwise meet some disgraceful or unpleasant end. These negative 
images color the parents' perceptions of homosexuality, so my informants feel that coming out 
strains familial relations, and shames and saddens their parents. Conservative parents also generally 
do not discuss sexual matters with their children. Even if they suspect their children's sexuality, but 
they rarely ask directly to confirm. This verbal reluctance gives my informants even less impetus to 
come out to their parents. 
 Many informants also live in their natal homes even though they are now in their 30s and 
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40s. Unlike Euro-America, children in Singapore are typically not expected to move out until they 
marry or earn enough to buy their own apartments. This usually happens from the late 20s onwards. 
The practice of renting rooms does not seem prevalent. Sylvia, a lesbian friend, suspects that 
because the country's land shortage drives up real estate prices, gay men and lesbians would rather 
stay home and save on the rent money until they can buy their own properties. With rents for an 
apartment room just outside of the city center costing S$1,000 (US$770 in current exchange rates) 
or more, the savings can be substantial when a fresh graduate's gross monthly salary starts usually 
around S$2300 (US$1700). Staying at home, however, presents a risk to gay men who do come out 
to their parents. Instead of accepting the son, the parents may evict him. On top of his emotional 
trauma, the son now also faces the immediate need of finding some place to live. “That's why,” a 
consultant advised me, “you should buy your flat before you come out. This way, you'll still have 
some place to go to even if things head south.” More than rents, emotional risks ultimately inhibit 
gay men from coming out to their parents. Brian, another informant, explains his reluctance in more 
succint terms: “I just don't want the drama.” 
 When my informants claim shielding their parents from emotional hurt as their rationale for 
their remaining in the closet, they prompt me to pose a dangerous question: is “coming out” that 
important or even necessary? Western gay ontologies posit that an individual's outer self should 
match his/her inner one. This mirroring predicates the commonly heard “coming out” rhetoric that 
positions those who come out as being truthful to themselves. When I asked Otto, an informant, 
why he came out to his mother, he said, “I don't want to lie to myself anymore.” Ontologically, this 
view frames the closeted gayness as an existential crisis that one can resolve by coming out. It also 
assumes substance dualism that constructs the human mind-self as a substance distinct from one's 
body and other phenomena of the material world. The development of this dualistic subjectivity can 
be traced from Platonic thought that saw humans as pre-existent and even disembodied, to the more 
recent Idealistic proponents who emphasize the subject's ability to guarantee her own unity through 
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time. As perhaps the most renowned of all the substance dualism philosophers, Descartes concluded 
that “I” as the subject of doubting assumes that the “I” exists and doubts. To him, the self exists by 
itself, before the body and the physical world outside come into existence. Descartes also linked the 
self to the mind and distinguished the resulting self-mind from the body. He further conceptualized 
the self-mind as something greater than the body, because it can exist independently from bodily 
movements (Yao 1996). In this view, whatever makes an individual homosexual must also reside in 
the pre-existent self-mind, since it obviously does not come from the body or the physical world 
outside. Consequently, not only do gay “coming out” rhetorics call for the matching of one's two 
selves, they also posit gayness as a pre-social human right. 
 Confucianism, in contrast, posits a different construction of the self. Confucian philosophers 
seldom conceive the self as something that essentially perceives and thinks as Descartes did. While 
many thinkers do hold the concept of mind/heart (xin +) in great importance, xin refers to the 
moral heart/mind rather than the cognitive mind. Xin comes into being when an individual 
cultivates her self to maturity, and it presupposes a unity between one's inner faculties and external 
performances. The larger self subsumes the smaller xin as both an extension and its faculty of 
thinking. In contrast to the disembodied Cartesian self-mind, the Confucian self-xin always relates 
to one's embodied actions (Yao 1996). We should not equate this lesser emphasis on an individual's 
inner complex with lesser complexity in the Confucian self, or even a lack of distinction between 
the private and the public. Rather, Confucian thinkers regard a person holistically instead of treating 
one's inner and outer selves as distinct categories (Eno 1991). In a completely opposite view from 
Christianity and its idea of the Original Sin, this means that an individual can develop her xin and 
true self by excising her baser instincts, and preserving and nurturing her innate benevolence, 
righteousness, propriety, trustfulness and other moral qualities. 
 To cultivate her self, an individual should expose herself to education (jiao ,) and moral 
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training (li ). The key to this process of self-development lies in respecting one's self, which an 
individual achieves by harmonizing her dispositions and conforming to the proprieties in every 
situation and on every occasion. One should have the freedom to develop oneself, Yao (1996) points 
out, but one should not equate this freedom with freedom from self-control. An individual's 
immediate family becomes her first teachers of morality, so much so that Confucian thinkers 
conceive of the family as the roots of the self, and the self as a extending branch of the family. The 
family's importance frames the respect for one's self as essentially a responsibility, not only for 
manifesting one's own nature and the family's virtues, but also setting an example of integrity for 
others to follow (Yao 1996). This concern for familial relationships enmeshes the Confucian self 
within webs of social meanings, so Confucian thinkers do not posit the human right to be gay as 
pre-social as Descartes did. This concern clarifies the rationale behind my informants' reluctance to 
come out to their parents, and commit unfilial acts that hurt and shame their families. 
 In his study of tongzhi politics in Hong Kong, Chou Wah-Shan (2000) concurs by stating his 
reservations about the imposition of Anglo-American experiences onto other cultural traditions. He 
regards the discourses of “coming out” and “being out and proud” in gay pride parades as integral 
to a larger cultural project that affirms confrontational Western individualism. This model works in 
societies where individuality and self-affirmation predicate one's personal and cultural identities, 
but it jars discordantly in Chinese societies outside the West. Chou (ibid.) cites the example of an 
attempt to organize a gay pride parade in Hong Kong in 1992 that only managed to attract ten 
foreigners and two overseas Chinese. The organizers canceled the parade, fearing that the 
overwhelmingly foreign participation would reify the stereotype of homosexuality as a Western 
cultural import. This move drew harsh criticisms from gay Caucasians living in Hong Kong against 
the organizers' apparent lack of courage and sexual liberation.  
 If my informants neither want to come out to their parents, nor can they achieve the 
hegemonic masculine ideal, do they negotiate their sexuality within the spaces of their natal homes? 
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My field research yields differing data. Having lived with my father during fieldwork, I found that 
my own negotiation tactics resemble those of my consultants'. We all hide our gay-related and 
XXX-rated videos, comics, and magazines (sometimes in locked cupboards) to prevent parents 
from stumbling across these materials by accident. Accidental discovery can lead to family crises 
when the parents suddenly realize they have a gay son. We also talk about gay matters in English, 
because our parents often cannot understand this language. When friends come to visit, we also 
oblige them not to pecah our lobang (= “break a hole” in Malay) and blow our covers by “outing” 
us in our conversations. When my mother passed away from cancer shortly after I started my 
dissertational fieldwork, my friends from TheBearProject came to the wake to pay her their final 
respects. While we chit-chatted as I waited for the next round of funeral rites to begin, one of my 
friends commented very loudly about a cute guy he spotted sitting at the next table. The others 
echoed his assessment, so I turned to see the center of everyone's attention. My cheeks burned as I 
saw my straight and married elder brother. He must have heard the comments, even though later, he 
only asked me who my friends were. After the wake, I warned my friends in no uncertain terms not 
to risk “outing” me again in the same manner. They agreed, even though they still bring up the faux 
pas occasionally during conversations to joke about it. 
 Gay children may refrain from discussing their sexuality with their parents, but the parents 
still try “help” their stubbornly single sons. Like their co-ethnics in mainland China (Rofel 1999), 
Chinese-Singaporeans also consider marriage necessary for a child to become a full-fledged social 
adult. As such, parents often ask my informants whether they have girlfriends, or whether they will 
hold their wedding dinners soon. When my informants meet their friends and relatives during 
wedding dinners, Chinese New Year home visits and other occasions for social gathering, they are 
subjected to yet another round of questioning. Parents pester their children not to echo the state's 
call for early marriage that I discussed in Chapter 3. I never heard anyone justify their urging their 
children to marry because state officials told them to. Rather, parents do so more out of their 
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heteronormative assumptions that one should naturally want to marry and have babies. If one's child 
refuses to bear offspring of his own, who will take care of that child when the parents pass on? Even 
my Malay-Muslim consultants receive the same marriage queries. For example, Yasser insisted that 
his parents and relatives pressure him to marry not out of a sense of filial piety – a Confucian value 
that does not apply to him to begin with – but more as an insurance against old age. Seen this way, 
parental matrimonial concerns stem more from practical worries for the children's future welfare 
than from the state's pro-fecundity campaign, or even the Confucian imperative to bear children to 
continue the family line. 
 Some parents continue to make their inquiries even after their children came out to them. 
These “out” informants reckon that their parents see their homosexuality as a phase that they will 
grow out of. The parents hope that they will one day xuan ya le ma -./0 (“to rein in one's 
horse at the edge of a sheer cliff” in Mandarin), realize their “mistake,” and get married. By asking 
about girlfriends and marriage dates, the parents hope to hasten the process. Yet, they unconsciously 
reify the state's pro-fertility ideology in doing so. Only two informants claim they were not 
questioned in this way. One came out to his mother, but she divorced from an unhappy marriage, so 
she welcomed the fact that her son would remain single. Another claimed he was so busy managing 
the multi-national company where he worked that his parents did not bother him about dating and 
marriage prospects. 
 Not surprisingly, most of my informants find the girlfriend and wedding questions a perenial 
vexing problem. I evaded mine by replying that I had to first finish my studies. “Why get married if 
I score poorly and fail to secure a good job? I can't expect my wife to support me, can I?” I told my 
relatives as I manipulated their perceptions of the “correct” gender order to my benefit. I was also 
lucky in that most of my straight peers and cousins married during my long years in graduate 
school. I did not have to attend their wedding dinners or visit them during Chinese New Year, so 
they could not ask me about my wedding plans. However, my consultants do not have the same 
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privilege. The wealthier ones sometimes go on vacation during the two-day official CNY holidays 
and avoid the questioning altogether. Others rationalize their bachelorhood economically, as I do, 
and claim they want to build their careers first. One said, 
 
I was, like, currently, I have no interest in getting married … I see family-planning as trouble 
to myself because it involves a lot of money, and also time and effort … When couples talk 
about money issues, there're tensions between the couples. You know, sometimes the 
problems can't be solved again because of the money issues. That's what I'm worried about 
… [My brother] is now currently getting a new flat. Now, he needs a lot of cash in hand … 
It's kind of a taxing thing, you know, if you were to do such things, because at your current 
financial ability, you're not able to sustain such high costs … You're practically in debt every 
month, every year. Now [my brother and sister-in-law] have to borrow money from banks to 
purchase houses. In the future, they may have kids and they need to spend even more money. 
 
A few were more determined to end the questioning once and for all. One day when a consultant's 
aunt visited his family, she asked him, “So, I heard you have a girlfriend. How's she?” “She died in 
a car accident,” he replied brusquely. That retort earned him a dagger-sharp stare from his mother. 
On another occasion, another aunt commented, “Oh, I heard you got married when you were in 
Taipei.” Again, he answered tersely, “Yeah, we divorced.” This got him another hard glare from his 
mother, but his tactic worked. None of his relatives bothers him with questions about girlfriends and 
weddings anymore. 
 I queried my consultants whether their relatives and friends tried to match them up with 
prospective girlfriends. All of them answered in the negative. Alan, an informant, surmised that his 
parents realize he is mature enough to know the implications of his actions, so they do not intervene 
here. My informants also do not attend the social activities organized by the Social Development 
Unit (SDU), the state match-making agency for university graduates. These events include trips to 
places of interests in Singapore, neighboring Malaysia and beyond, short boat cruises, tea parties, 
self-enrichment courses, and talks that give tips on maintaining and enriching one's relationship. 
Generally, they aim to enable busy Singaporeans to socialize with members of the opposite sex in 
the hope that they will start dating or, better yet, get married. My consultants realize the 
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heteronormative nature of these activities. In fact, Alan finds the SDU advertising brochures 
annoying: 
 
I receive newsletters from them all the time, the latest issue of Duet ... It's automatic 
subscription [upon graduation from university] and it was unfortunate that I was too lazy to 
mail back the opt-out option, so they just keep flooding my mailbox with it. 
  
Alan's attitude towards the SDU reflects a larger nation-wide dismissal of the agency among single 
Singaporeans. They consider the agency a nuisance for interfering in what they think ought to be a 
private matter (see also Teo 2005). To them, SDU stands for “Single, Desperate, and Ugly (or 
Unwanted),” and only those burdened with such unfortunate attributes would attend its events.  
 In reality, both straight and gay singles make use of the SDU's services. Russell, a gay 
consultant who worked as a civil servant in the 1980s, recalled that he felt pressured to attend SDU 
activities after the agency's formation in the aftermath of the so-called “Great Marriage Debate” 
(see Chapter 3). Given their college education, mid-ranking civil servants found themselves targeted 
first. These initial efforts, another gay former civil servant recalled, amounted to harassment: 
 
HR was involved. They had to give the government a list of officers with degrees who 
[were] not married … In a way, they were almost hassling us. They were asking us, “Why 
don't you join? Why don't you join?” Of course, at the end of the day, there was only so 
much they [could] do, because you [could] only [participate in the SDU activities] during 
your private time. 
 
In the end, this consultant did attend the SDU's public speaking courses, but only to enrich himself. 
He claimed that while he was not adverse to meeting new people, he disliked feeling pressured to 
get married. Russell himself refused to go, but he said his colleagues did. I also heard from others 
that their gay friends went, not to meet potential partners, but to participate in SDU contests. One 
even won a refrigerator in a lucky draw. Another informant, who recently stopped working at the 
SDU, told me that straight Singaporeans typically approach the agency's in-house matchmakers for 
help only in their mid-30s. These clients realize they want to marry and settle down, but their busy 
  
181 
careers do not afford them the time to socialize. She estimated that the SDU handles approximately 
300 such cases every year. Otherwise, the SDU events failed to work. She remarked that “those who 
go already know each other. They don't go to make new friends lah. They go because the events are 
cheap” from the heavy state subsidies SDU receives. The above examples demonstrate how citizens 
deploy what Scott (1985) calls “weapons of the weak” to passively resist overt state power and 
subvert the state's matchmaking goals. 
 As much as my informants try to conceal their sexuality from their parents, some parents 
suspect. Having lived together for so long, parents know their children's dispositions intimately. My 
mother used to tell me, “I know what you're up to the moment you shake your tail (i.e. move).” Yet, 
the parents' generally conservative attitudes towards sex and sexuality mean that they prefer to drop 
hints of their suspicions than to ask directly. When I talked to Gary and his long-term boyfriend 
Kenneth about these suggestions over dinner one evening, he remarked: 
 
Of course my mum dropped hints. Kenneth comes and stays overnight quite often, you see. 
And when he does, he sleeps in my room. So one day, my mother asked me all out of a 
sudden, “You know about AIDS, right? You should play safe, you know?” She didn't exactly 
say whom I should play safe with, but yeah, she knows about Kenneth and me. 
 
Occasionally, even supposedly conservative parents can surprise their children, as my father did one 
Friday evening years ago. That night, he was washing the dishes in the kitchen. I went in to tell him 
that I would be going out later with friends. I did not tell him it was with some gay male friends. He 
asked me whether I was going out with my girlfriend. I said no. Then he asked me, “So, you are 
going out with your boyfriend then?” That question caught me completely off-guard. I would have 
answered “no” again, because my gay male friends are just that – friends who are gay and male. I 
did not, however, have the opportunity to reply. My mother overheard the conversation, and she 
jumped in immediately to change the topic. When I told Gary about this incident, he explained that 
my mother was in denial. She must have known on some level of consciousness about my sexuality, 
but she wanted to avoid facing up to reality. That was why she chipped in, lest I confirm my father's 
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curiosity. 
 Conceivably, some gay men succumb to the social pressure to marry. I never met such men, 
mainly because their desire for discretion makes them highly closeted and difficult to contact. 
Several of my informants, however, claimed that they had had sex with such men before. They 
warned me that if I were to involve myself sexually with such men one day, I should not make one 
into a boyfriend. If his wife found out about his extra-marital affairs, I would be branded a home-
wrecker. Even if he did leave his wife for me, who could guarantee he would not cheat on me in the 
future? After all, he cheated on his wife to be with me in the first place. Worse, in their opinion, he 
might even leave me for a woman. Indeed, such men suffer from negative portrayal in both local 
straight and gay popular discourses that castigate them as irresponsible liars who betray their wives 
and children. Gary even remarked, “They already have their home-cooked meals, but they still want 
to eat out.”   
 I did, however, meet men who started having sex with other men after they married. Prior to 
the start of my dissertation fieldwork, I got to know a bisexual man who fit Gary's description. This 
man said he was originally straight, but he started having homosex in secret after his wife gave birth 
to their two children and lost all sexual interests. During fieldwork, I met someone else whose life 
experiences contradict the received wisdom of cheating married gay men. He came out to himself 
after he had his son two years into his marriage. Highly closeted at first, he found a regular non-
boyfriend sex partner known in gay lingo as a “fuck buddy.” This buddy befriended him and helped 
him understand his sexuality better, so he did not experience the confusion and trauma typically 
described in many “coming out” stories. “There was no drama at all,” he assured me. However, he 
did exchange raunchy text messages with this buddy. These messages outed him when his wife 
checked his cell phone one day without his permission. Surprisingly, his wife did not react 
hysterically. She sat him down stoically some days later and asked him whether he wanted a 
divorce. He told me he would have agreed had he been childless. However, he came from a broken 
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family himself – his mother divorced his biological father, and her marriage to her second husband 
also turned out quarrelsome – and he did not want his son to grow up father-less. He and his wife 
decided to stay married to raise their son, though they ceased having sex together after the outing 
incident. He has not come out to his mother or his in-laws, so he still has family dinners with them 
and his wife and son on occasional. The wife knows that her husband will have sex with other men, 
so she forbade him from bringing these men back home. Unexpectedly, however, she also read up 
on safe gay sex on the Internet and made sure that he knows the necessary precautions. Doubtlessly, 
this second ethnographic example is more the exception than the rule. Most women would have 
demanded a divorce immediately upon discovering their husbands' affairs. Rather, I want to contest 
the stereotype of the “cheating” married gay man. To me, the rationale that made each man have 
extra-marital homosex should be assessed in its own terms before we make any moral judgments. 
  Lastly, I argue that gay men can reconcile their homosexuality somewhat with their families 
without having coming out to them. Conservative parents may object to homosexuality due to its 
negative discursive links with disease and moral degeneracy, but they do understand love and 
mutual care in kinship terms. Instead of “coming out,” gay men can “go home” (Chou 2000). Gay 
men who do so invite their boyfriends home where they initially introduce their partners as “normal 
friends.” With increasing visits, their families may realize that the couple shares something that 
transcends mere friendship. By couching their homosexuality in kinship terms that their families 
comprehend, gay men avoid the confrontational trauma of coming out and they still attain familial 
acceptance for themselves and their lovers.  
 In Gary's case above, he successfully “went home” with Kenneth. They never came out to 
Gary's mother, but she signaled her awareness of their relationship by reminding Gary to practice 
safe sex. She did so not to voice her objections, but more out of concern for his health amidst media 
reports that link homosexuality with HIV/AIDS. In 2010, she even invited Kenneth over to her 
Chinese New Year reunion dinner. Held on Chinese New Year's eve at the residence of the oldest 
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living family member (typically one's parents), the reunion dinner is a private affair that sees family 
members traveling back home to eat together, even if they were abroad previously. In this light, 
Kenneth's invitation signifies both a tacit approval of his relationship with Gary, and his acceptance 
into the family by Gary's parents. 
 Russell Heng (2004: 75) provides another example: 
R is a Chinese Singaporean who has migrated to Sydney to live with his gay Australian 
lover, T. Two years into the relationship, R's parents wanted to visit him. R and T were not 
sure how to receive them. Was this the opportunity for R to “come out” or should T and he 
pretend to be flatmates and sleep in separate rooms for the duration of the parents' visit? 
Finally, they decided they should just continue to lead life as they normally did. The parents 
came and enjoyed their stay. They got along very well with T. Nothing was ever said about R 
and T sharing a room with only one bed. Years later R's parents and siblings also migrated to 
Australia. Since then, T is automatically included in the Chinese New Year family reunion 
dinner, family birthday parties, or other important family occasions. T has become a 
recognized member of the family but R never had to say, “Mama and Papa, I am gay.” 
 
“Going home” also applies to non-Chinese-Singaporeans. In another example, Heng (ibid.) states: 
 
G is a Malay (Muslim) Singaporean. He and his Swedish lover, J, have been together for 
more than ten years. G lives with his parents but J visits every weekend and spends the night 
in G's room where there is only one bed. In an Asian context, for people of the same sex to 
share a bed need not arouse any suspicion so it was never clear what G's parents made of his 
relationship with J. The challenge came when J had to return to Sweden and G planned to go 
with him. G told his parents he was going to move to Sweden with J without saying the 
“gay” word. The parents were saddened by the parting of their son but wished him well. By 
then J was already regarded as a member of the family. One day, mother said to G casually, 
“It would be nice if J converts [to Islam].” G believes that this was his mother's way of 
signaling that she knows and even though Islam forbids homosexuality, her wishing that J 
would convert was her way of expressing full acceptance of her son and his partner. 
    
 By citing the above examples, I do not mean that I support Chou's prescription of “going 
home” as superior to “coming out” for Singaporean gay men. The prescription reifies the discursive 
dichotomy between the “individualistic” West and a “consensual” Asia, as though individualistic 
Westerners cannot be consensual nor consensual Asians individualistic. In any case, does “coming 
out” and its individualism really not commensurate with socially oriented Confucianism? “Coming 
out” emphasizes honesty and integrity, moral values that Confucianism also advocates. Moreover,  
Confucianism does not seek to completely efface the individual self. Rather, it recognizes the 
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importance of individual impulses as long as they do not tear society apart. In this light, one can 
justify “coming out” in a Confucianist framework by removing the need to constantly skirt around 
the topic of sexuality, thus bringing parent and gay child closer together.  
 Empirically, “going home” also retards the local LGBT rights movement. Russell told me 
that even though he uses “going home” in his intellectual discussions, he ultimately advocates gay 
men to come out because it eases everyday conversations about sexuality. Unlike English, the other 
languages spoken in Singapore generally lack the lexemes for “coming out” and its related 
concepts. Educated Mandarin-speakers use such terms as chu gui 12 (“come out of the closet”) 
and jiao ao you xing 3456 (“pride parade”). They borrowed these awkward-sounding terms 
from their Taiwanese counterparts who first transliterated them. However, speakers of non-
Mandarin Chinese languages have yet to absorb these new terms into their lexicons. Russell has not 
come out to his parents, but if he were to do so by telling them he wants to chu gui in their native 
Hakka, he would severely confuse them. They would comprehend the new term literally and 
wonder about his rationale for telling them such a banal incident. What was he doing in a closet in 
the first place that made coming out of it so special? Did he look for a favorite shirt that he thought 
he lost, or did he hide from a burglar? “Going home,” Russell reminds me, does not alleviate this 
linguistic problem because “it is too warm and fuzzy” and “it fudges out the need to come out.” 
“Going home” also does not challenge the heteronormative status quo. “Coming out,” in contrast, 
does. It relieves the dearth of words, because those who come out must create new lexemes to make 
the process meaningful to the people they come out to. In turn, these linguistic innovations 
challenge social misconceptions of homosexuality to drive the formation of new political discourses 
of sexual citizenship rights. 
 
Being Good at Being Gay in the Army 
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 The military presents another primary citizen-making site where gay men must negotiate 
their sexuality. Beginning in 1967, all able-bodied male citizens must serve at least two years of 
“National Service.” Unless they defer their enlistment to pursue higher education, they become full-
time soldiers in the Singapore Armed Forces when they turn 16½. Women are not obliged to serve, 
but they may volunteer. While the enlisted men serve mainly in one of the military formations in the 
army, a smaller number serve in the navy, the air force, the police, or the civil defense force instead. 
After they have been discharged from full-time service, laws still oblige them to serve in a part-time 
capacity. Until they reach the stipulated age for full military discharge (i.e. 40 for non-
commissioned officers and 50 for commissioned ones), they must also serve a maximum of 40 days 
a year for 10 years in the reserves. These 10 years need not be consecutive. Reservist soldiers attend 
in-camp training sessions that purportedly keep their military skills honed and updated. Depending 
on the part of the training cycle a reservist unit has advanced to, these sessions can range from 
“low-key” activities that last about a week or less (e.g. live-firing at ranges, and technical skills 
refresher courses) to “high-key” ones that last a month or more (typically full-blown military 
exercises held either locally or overseas). Medically fit reservist soldiers must also take the annual 
Individual Physical Fitness Test that consists of five stations (i.e. standing broad jump, chin-ups, sit-
ups, shuttle run, and a 2.4 km run). Those who pass receive monetary rewards that vary according 
to the quality of the passes. Failures must attend remedial training that can last up to two months, 
depending on whether the attendees pass the physical fitness tests held during this extra training. 
 With so many men serving their military duty every year, NS makes a significant impact on 
Singaporean everyday life. Full-time soldiers must delay their entry into the working world, or the 
university and other post-secondary educational institutions. Reservist soldiers must also rearrange 
their daily schedules to accommodate their in-camp and physical fitness training. Linguistically, 
many Singlish terms originated as military lingo. For instance, company sergeant majors designate 
tasks to subordinates by placing arrows next to the soldier' names on the daily regimental 
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ordinances. This practice gave rise to the term kena arrow (kena = “receive” in Malay), used to 
describe the assignment of a boring or unpleasant task. Another term OTOT, abbreviates “Own 
Time Own Target.” It means to perform a task at one's discretion. It originated from a command 
given during live-firing exercises to shoot at one's own assigned target at one's leisure. Lastly, 
confirm plus chop indicates one's absolute certainty about something. Shortened from confirm plus 
guarantee got chop, the phrase originally means that one has filed all the necessary paperwork, and 
received approval to do something (chop derives ultimately from the Hindi chāp = “stamp” through 
the Malay cap). 
 The state demands military service from its male citizens ostensibly to deter would-be 
invaders who want to exploit Singapore's small geographical size. Despite its national importance, 
my informants profess mixed attitudes towards NS. David, for example, perceives the military as a 
badly managed organization and dismisses it as a waste of time. Recruits only serve for two years, 
so they need not be conscientious about their supposed national duty. Anyone who has served NS 
would have heard of or participated in incidents where someone would sleep while they were on 
duty (/tsyak tswa/, or “eat snake” in Hokkien), feign an illness to avoid grueling tasks (/tshau geŋ/), 
or otherwise act nonchalantly about one's assigned tasks (/b tsap/). Knowing that recruits can at 
most attain only a certain rank (usually Third Sergeant as a non-commissioned officer, or First 
Lieutenant as a commissioned one), and that they wield very little influence as individuals, more 
senior officers sometimes exploit them to gain the attention of their superiors. When I served my 
NS, my unit occasionally ran outside our camp and sing songs along the way to boost our morale. 
During one such run, the unit's commanding officer pondered loudly why he could not hear my 
company sing. Later that evening, my company sergeant major ordered the entire company to stay 
back for another two hours that Saturday to sing. At that time, recruits typically stayed in-camp 
most of the week. They “booked out” to go home for the weekend only at noon on Saturdays. 
Naturally, we read the singing order not only as unfair punishment for something that hardly 
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counted as an offense, but also as the sergeant major's overt attempt to gain the commanding 
officer's favors, and perhaps even a promotion, at our expense. The loud protests that followed 
made the sergeant major change his mind. We still had to sing, but we only did so on Saturday 
morning. This left our “booking out” time unaffected. 
 Despite the military's manpower inefficiency and abuses, many of my consultants think of 
their NS experiences in positive terms. The rigorous military training readied them for the working 
world, they claim, by making them more mature and self-disciplined. Brian said, “It change[s] a 
person … Discipline-wise, I think it does help a lot … It also teaches you to listen to your superiors 
… It prepares you for work where you'll be under somebody. Even if you don't like the person, 
you'll still have to do it, which is what the outside world is going to be.” Ah Ren, a straight  
consultant, conceives of NS as a crucial component in the nation-building process: 
 
I think that National Service becomes a defining sense of national identity, not because the 
government intends it to be so ... but because of the very processes of being stripped away of 
everything and being sent together to serve with other people [with nothing but] your shirt 
and your nationality. I think [it] forces you to investigate your nationality and bond with the 
people you're serving with, 'cos it's mutual suffering lah ... [Here in] Singapore, we talk 
about the four main races [of] Chinese, Malay, Indians [and] Others ... we talk about 
languages, we talk about respect for religion and a few other things, and you go into army, 
there're many people who have never met anybody outside of their religion, their ethnic 
group, their social class. Most of the time, the army is the first time you actually do [meet 
others]. You become Singaporean because then you really see Singapore ... If I randomly 
picked [men] off the street and threw them together, you could not get a better sample of 
what National Service is like other than that. 
 
 In fact, NS functions as Singapore's great social equalizer, because it forces recruits from 
different ethnic and social backgrounds to live, train, work, and suffer together. Otto, a gay friend, 
recalled how he partnered up with a farmer's son during his basic military training soon after he 
graduated from an elite high school. Instead of dismissing his partner as an uneducated bum, Otto 
came to respect him during a field exercise where they manually dug shoulder-deep trenches. Like 
many others in his platoon, Otto never handled a hoe before. He really did not relish the prospect of 
staying up the whole night to dig, and end up with blistered hands the next morning. Luckily, his 
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partner handled digging equipment all his life. The partner offered to let Otto rest, while he dug the 
entire trench by himself. Much to everyone else's surprise, the trench was ready by midnight that 
evening. This help enabled a grateful Otto to start the next day of exercises refreshed, while his 
exhausted platoon mates soldiered on. Otto's tale shows that NS creates an organic bond through 
which Singaporeans, albeit only the male half, can relate to each other across racial, religious, and 
class boundaries. More than any artificial nationalistic campaigns the state could have implemented, 
this bond provides a common base of lived experiences through which citizens can challenge their 
pre-conceived notions about other people of different backgrounds. They forge their own national 
identity this way. As Ah Ren pointed out: 
 
You go into the army, it doesn't mean that your Chinese racism about Indians is going to 
disappear, or your Indian racism about Malays is going to disappear, but at least you get to 
know them when they're there. In some cases, you might find that, “Hey, they're not too 
bad!” 
 
 To gay men, full-time service in the military's highly heteronormative spaces can be a trying 
two years. During my basic military training, a very feminine man whom everyone assumed to be 
gay worked in the quartermaster's office as a store clerk. When I went to the storerooms to fetch 
equipment, I often witnessed him getting teased not only by his peers and superiors, but also by 
recruits whom he technically outranked. His alleged homosexuality did not exempt him from his 
NS. Indeed, laws do not recognize sexuality as a valid reason not to serve. This means that gay 
recruits can remain closeted throughout the two years – I came out only shortly after my active tour 
of duty – or they can officially declare their sexuality at either their pre-enlistment medical 
examination, or any time later. The relative rarity of such cases and their highly confidential nature 
mean that most people know about the procedures that happen thereafter more through rumors than  
actual facts. Driven by a need to clear the mysteries surrounding “coming out” in the military, an 
enlistee called Lim Chi-Sharn not only outed himself, but also published his experiences online 
(Lim 2002a, 2002b). Lim's account cohere with the rumors that I heard, so I take it as representative 
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of what happens should one come out officially to the military. I summarize his story below. 
 Lim enlisted in 1998, but he disrupted his training in the Officer Cadet School shortly after 
to pursue an overseas university education. During his re-enlistment medical examination, he was 
given a checklist of questions, one of which asked him whether he had “any social problems (e.g. 
homosexuality).” He ticked “yes,” but scribbled “I don’t think it’s a problem!” next to the question. 
He reminded the doctor who saw him later of the tick. Caught by surprise, the doctor pulled out a 
thick, dog-eared manual, flipped to the page entitled “Homosexuality and Transsexuality,” and 
started reading earnestly. After questioning Lim whether he had sex with men and whether he cross-
dressed – Lim answered in the affirmative to both queries – he assigned “D” to Lim's Physical 
Employment Status. This physical fitness rating means that pending further review, Lim was 
deemed temporarily unfit for military duty. In a follow-up review, a doctor called Julian Tan asked 
him more questions from a printed list: “How do you feel about NS?”, “Are you a homosexual?”, 
“Do you have a boyfriend?” and most pertinently, “Are you the man or the woman?” Upon Lim's 
protest of the last question's phrasing, the doctor clarified by asking about Lim's sex role. 
 Dr Tan said that the review gauged the degree of Lim's homosexuality using a scale that 
placed heterosexual men on one end, and women on the other. Purportedly, it ascertained the effects 
of Lim's sexuality on his military deployability, and his ability to fit into communal military life. 
Tan did not inquire whether Lim himself felt comfortable serving his NS, but he surmised that Lim 
could not serve in “sensitive” areas. However, he did not clarify what he meant by that. Tan assured 
Lim that the military laws would protect his rights to privacy. Only two people in Lim's unit, the 
manpower officer and the unit's commanding officer, would know the real reason behind his 
physical fitness rating. In reality, the military cannot keep such information as confidential as it 
should. Administrative clerks who otherwise should not be privy to this data may stumble upon it 
by accident when they file someone's personnel documents. Lim also claims that his gay friends had 
their civil service careers outside of the military hampered because of alleged information leaks. 
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This claim echoes rumors that any gay man who comes out to the military will receive a black mark 
in his files that prevents him from working in the government ever again. 
 After the review, Lim received a Physical Employment Status of “C1L3.” This rating 
excused Lim from up to two stations in the annual physical fitness test, even though he did not 
suffer from any disabilities that physically prevented him from taking the entire test. He ceased his 
officer cadet training, as he could now only be deployed for operational (read “administrative”) 
duties in military bases. Indeed, he was posted to the Ministry of Defense headquarters. At the new 
unit, Lim's new manpower officer remarked with a little surprise that Lim did not look gay. He also 
said that because he already had an officially gay recruit working in his office, he would post Lim to 
another branch in the unit. Lim ascertained from the officer that the military policies specify that 
gay recruits must be spread apart. The officer told Lim that no one would harass him as long as he 
observed sexual proprieties on military premises. “There is no bias towards you, you know,” the 
officer assured him. Lim countered insightfully, “"I know that people are probably not biased, but 
the system is." 
 Lim's encounters show that despite the many educated officers who staff the upper echelons 
of the military and write its policies, military personnel still comprehend gender and sexuality in 
antiquated terms. They confuse differences in biological sex with sex and gender roles, such that 
military medical handbooks equate homosexuality with transsexualism, and policies configure gay 
men as feminine in behavior and receptive during sex. These officers display little understanding 
that not all gay men cross-dress, or that actual cross-dressers may in fact self-identify as straight 
(Wheeler and Schaefer 1988). Neither do they see the possibilities of masculine gay men taking 
passive sexual roles, or feminine gay men taking active ones. 
 Lim's account also dispels the myths that surrounds 302, the military medical designation for 
officially gay recruits. Lim (2002b) traces the number to the International Statistical Classification 
of Diseases and Related Health Problems (usually abbreviated as “ICD”), a list of known diseases 
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and medical disorders that the World Health Organization publishes. In it, the WHO codes each 
condition to facilitate medical administration. As a WHO member, Singapore uses the ICD. The 
WHO published its latest ICD revision, the ICD-10, in 1992. However, military policy-writers used 
an earlier revision, the ICD-9 published in 1977, to formulate policies towards gay recruits. The 
ICD-10 does not list homosexuality as a disorder. Strictly speaking, neither does ICD-9. Under the 
code “302,” ICD-9 lists zoophilia, transsexualism, pedophilia, nymphomania, satyriasis, and other 
“sexual deviations” often fallaciously attributed to homosexuality – but not homosexuality itself. 
The fact that the military doctors designate gay men as “302” attests not only to their limited 
comprehension of gender and sexuality, but also to the tardiness with which military bureaucracy 
adopts the WHO's new medical classifications encoded in ICD-10. 
 Purportedly, the military adopted its current policies towards gay recruits to shield the other 
enlistees from their alleged negative influences. Citing Lily Wong-Ip's article, "Understanding 
Homosexual Servicemen" in Council Link, a publication of the military's Counseling Center, Lim 
(2002b) highlights the rationale behind the military's gay policies. Military policy-writers assume 
that “gays would threaten discipline and morale,” that “the male bonding that takes place in combat 
would be jeopardised if its potential for erotic contact were condoned,” and that “gays are subject to 
blackmail in the military context.” Lim refutes all three justifications. Firstly, since homosexuality 
by itself does not provide exemption from NS, generations of gay men must have served without 
disclosing their sexuality, or causing disciplinary incidents. Lim insists that his openly gay presence 
did not affect his unit's work efficiency. Secondly, a person's sexuality has no causal links to his 
capabilities for self-discipline, professionalism, and teamwork. If gay men disrupt group cohesion 
through their alleged eroticism, then military officers should also ban women in an organization 
dominated by heterosexual men (including, ironically, Lily Wong-Ip herself) instead of actively 
recruiting them. Indeed, I was reminded of the illogic of gay men threatening unit cohesion by Lt 
Dan Choi, a US military infantry officer who was discharged after coming out famously on US 
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national television, when he visited my campus on 15 February 2010. He said that cohesion in his 
unit actually improved after he came out, because nobody needed to tiptoe around the issue of his 
sexuality anymore. Lastly, Lim acknowledges that while people with secrets to hide may be more 
easily blackmailed and turned into security liabilities, gay men who openly disclose their sexuality 
should logically become less susceptible to threats. Why then does the Military Security 
Department explicitly forbid openly gay personnel access to classified information and, with that 
denial, to promotion up the ranks? In effect, military ignorance about gender and sexuality creates a 
glass ceiling that contradicts organizational goals to clear up the red tape that chokes the military 
bureaucracy. 
 The military anti-gay glass ceiling appears impenetrable, but gay men have breached it. The 
ceiling bars the advancement of officially gay personnel, but no laws demand that gay men must 
officially declare their sexuality. A gay man may come out to all the people he works with, but as 
long as he does not declare “302,” the MSD will encounter difficulties to recognize him as “gay,” or 
to hold his sexuality against him. His homosexuality remains illegible to the state (Scott 1998). 
During my various fieldwork projects, I met a number of men who breached the glass ceiling with 
some success. One of them, Bryan, attained the rank of staff sergeant (i.e. a mid-ranking non-
commissioned officer) as a career soldier with considerable access to classified information, before 
he was discharged honorably in 2004. He outed himself willingly to those colleagues and superiors 
who asked. He also said that he was neither harassed nor did he encounter problems commanding 
respect from his subordinates. However, he did not officially declare his sexuality, as he did not feel 
the need to. Bryan's treatment clearly did not stem from a gay-friendly environment in the military. 
Rather, he must have worked sufficiently well with his colleagues that his sexuality became a non-
work issue.  
 Furthermore, military policies seem to take a pragmatic, result-oriented approach towards  
gay soldiers. Even an out, loud, and feminine gay soldier may find much room to maneuver in, 
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provided that he passes his physical fitness tests, produces other expected test results, and does not 
hinder his unit's operations. In other words, the ability to measure up to the military's standards of 
masculine performance can deflect the teasing and bullying that a physically unfit gay soldier would 
otherwise attract. Nick, a gay informant, illustrates this point perfectly. At the time I talked to him, 
he had just been discharged from active NS duty. Nick spoke in a loud, slightly feminine voice that 
reverberated through the quiet cafe where we met, and he punctuated his replies with emphatic 
gesturing. We talked about his life in the navy as an obvious bapok and ah qua. Nick never bothered 
to suppress his demeanor, perhaps because he realized the futility of it even if he were to try. 
Despite the teasing he received as a result, Nick disabused his detractors of the stereotype of the 
weak, feminine gay man by attaining the gold standard in his last physical fitness test. This meant, 
among other physical achievements, that he ran 2.4 km under 9 minutes 45 seconds, an astonishing 
feat that only the fittest soldiers could achieve. This led his commanding officer to choose him to 
give a speech to his ship's crew. Nick spoke on the need for more tolerance for sexual minorities in 
the military, which made his staff sergeant “puff his cheeks” and “bulge his eyes out like a bug,” but 
he was otherwise not punished for his audacity. I attribute this lack of punishment largely to Nick's 
excellent test results. Along with its results in the combat proficiency test, the markmanship test, 
and other criteria, a unit's overall physical fitness adds to its competitiveness in an annual Best Unit 
Competition. Nick did not say whether his unit won the contest that year, but his physical fitness 
test scores definitely added to his unit's edge. Had he failed his test, I doubt that his commanding 
officer would have honored him with the speech in the first place. 
 The fact that both Bryan and Nick could thrive in the military despite their being openly gay 
suggests that ignorance about homosexuality afflicts the military more than homophobia. Officers 
make no attempts to turn their gay recruits straight, but they do require all personnel to measure up 
to the high standards for results that they set. Openly gay men who satisfy these demands can in fact 
thrive in the military as they are, and even change the inaccurate opinions their colleagues have 
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about homosexuality. Certainly, they appeal to the Chinese idea of wu masculinity that saturates the 
armed forces. As I argued elsewhere (Tan 2009), homosexuality by itself does not provide sufficient 
cause for dismissal from one's government job in today's Singapore. It may hinder an individual's 
career if he has a homophobic boss, but it must combine with corruption, incompetence, and other 
more pressing problems before the boss can reasonably dismiss a gay employee. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed hegemonic and subordinated masculinities, and the theoretical 
expansions that masculinity scholars must make to relieve the oppressive effects that these two 
meta-concepts have on women. Following this, I discussed the negotiations that gay men make in 
the two key sites of citizen-making at home and in the military. I began with an exposition on the 
social relevance of the seemingly global sexual identity label “gay” in Singapore vis-à-vis the local 
identity labels that gay men also use. Next, I questioned the relevance of “coming out,” a key rite of 
passage in Western gay ontologies, in the Singaporean context. Here, I traced the confrontational 
individualism inherent in “coming out” to the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy, and argued that this 
individualism contradicts the consensual Confucianism that informs Chinese-Singaporeans' social 
behavior. I suggested “going home” as an alternative and less confrontational strategy, but I also 
highlighted its retarding effects on the formation of LGBT rights movement. 
 Lastly, I examined the ways gay men negotiate in the military. With few exceptions, all able-
bodied male citizens must serve two years of National Service, usually in the army. Although the 
military suffers from considerable abuses of resources and personal power, NS also functions as 
Singapore's great social equalizer. By forcing enlistees hailing from different ethnic and social 
backgrounds to live, train and suffer together, NS creates an organic bond that connects all 
Singaporean men. This bond enables these citizens to create their own national identity in ways no 
propagandistic government campaign ever can. However, a gay recruit can find the military's highly 
  
196 
heterosexualized spaces daunting. He can remain closeted, or he can officially disclose his 
sexuality. Through a rare account of the military's “coming out” procedures, I exposed the military's 
general ignorance of gender and sexuality. This does not mean that openly gay men cannot thrive 
there. Evidence suggests that those who satisfy the military's stringent standards of masculine 
performances can find not only considerable room to maneuver in, but also affect positive changes 
in the attitudes towards homosexuality in the people they work with. 
 In the next and concluding chapter, I will discuss possible avenues of future research on 
cultural and sexual citizenship in Singapore, and also predict what may happen to the local LGBT 
rights movement in the near future. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 In this closing chapter, I summarize the arguments that I made so far in the dissertation, and 
map out three possible avenues for post-doctoral research. Looking back, the research proposal for 
this dissertation crystalized over a short period of time. Before I decided to investigate national 
belonging among Singapore gay men, I wanted to examine how these men discursively and 
materially construct and embody their masculinity and sexuality. Yet, that project was shelved in 
April 2007 after numerous proposal drafts, as its theoretical and empirical scope did not seem 
sufficient for a doctoral dissertation. With the final round of my comprehensive examinations 
scheduled in about four months away, I desperately needed a new project. During a brainstorming 
visit to a fellow graduate student's office that clarified the perimeters of my interests – the new 
research must be somehow related to Singapore and gay men – I decided on my current topic. After 
all, like the so many of my fellow citizens, I am never entirely comfortable with being Singaporean. 
I came to appreciate the good life that the governing PAP built for the country over the course of my 
research, but I remain fully cognizant of the fact that this “good life” is only material in nature and 
barely extends to social, intellectual, and political diversity. 
 With this ambiguous sense of national belonging in mind, I framed this dissertation in terms 
of citizenship. I conceptualized this thesis into two halves. Spanning the first three chapters, the first 
half sets the stage for the ethnographic discussion in the second half. In Chapter 1, after comparing 
the usefulness and distinctions of citizenship in its legal, cultural, and sexual forms, I ask how gay 
men react to the state's vision of proper masculinity and femininity. In Chapter 2, I outlined 
Singapore's history of nation-building using a racial lens, starting not from the country's founding as 
a British entrepôt in 1819, but earlier still as a port in the Srivijaya Empire in the thirteenth-century 
CE. I paid particular attention here to how various racial stereotypes arose during British colonial 
rule and their socio-political impact in the current post-colonial period. In Chapter 3, I examined the 
ways the state constructs the “proper” citizen through its policies and discourses. I divided this 
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myriad of state instruments into three large categories that seek to engineer citizens into 
embodiments of their state-designated race-cultures, industrious economic producers, and fecund 
biological reproducers. Such a dissecting illuminates the many inherent racial and gender 
inequalities in these policies. Few (if any can satisfy all of the strenuous demands that these policies 
place on them. The near-impossibility of performing this idealized citizenship explains in part why 
decades of pro-fecundity campaigns have yet to arrest and reverse plummeting birth rates. 
 In the second half, I move towards the ethnography proper. After the theory-heavy Chapter 
3, I describe in a light-hearted interlude (an intellectual palate-cleanser, if you will) how my kiasu 
attempt to secure the best seat in my first foray into the annual National Day Parade came to naught. 
Picking up speed in Chapter 4, I continued the theme of national alienation, and argued that the PAP 
state's over-emphasis on the economy produced a national malaise of cynicism called “the Great 
Affective Divide.” As political apathetic citizens whose sexuality is criminalized, gay men are 
doubly alienated. Local gay rights activists tried to counteract this dearth of national affect. Using 
two case studies of such attempts, I maintained that activists who work with Singapore's 
communitarian ideals and locate gay men as socially embedded individuals tend to achieve better 
results than those who focus on gay rights as individualistic and socially dislodged human rights. In 
Chapter 5, I examined how gay men manage their gendered and sexual identities as both gay and 
men in the two key citizen-making sites of the family home and the military. I argued that while 
they know of the political importance of “coming out,” most gay men remain closeted to their 
immediate family members, mostly to avoid shaming their parents. In the military, the short tour of 
duty and an ignorant work environment founded upon antiquated concepts of gender and sexuality 
give gay men even fewer incentives to come out. Rather, the identity of gay soldiers as men 
subsume their sexual identity during the two years. Many recruits get discharged disgruntled about 
military practices, but a few recognize the crucial role that the military plays in the shaping of an 
organic national identity. 
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 Citizenship thematically structures this dissertation, but insofar as citizenship critically 
supports the modernity project, this dissertation also inevitably comments on the meanings of 
modernity. What sort of modernity does Singapore exhibit then? Is Singapore really, as cultural 
studies scholar Audrey Yue observes, a queer case of “modernization without modernity”? It 
certainly appears so. Citizens can vote, but the current system of Group Representation 
Constituencies poses high barriers to entry to the Parliament to opposition parties, even as PAP 
leaders claim that the GRCs guarantee parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities (Tan 2005). 
Citizens also enjoy only limited freedoms of speech and of assembly, and the state still detains 
without trial through the much-criticized Internal Security Act. Indeed, Singapore fits the hallmarks 
of an illiberal democracy that Fareed Zakaria (1997) identifies (see also Plattner 1998). 
 Despite Singapore's current illiberality, I disagree with Yue. Singapore is undeniably 
modern, as it has always been cosmopolitan. Some five hundred years before Raffles even set foot 
in Southeast Asia, Singapore (as Temasek) already engaged the global as a Srivijayan trading port. 
Located at the southern terminus of the Straits of Melaka, Temasek serviced ships plying the 
monsoon-driven trade routes between China, India, and beyond. Raffles' arrival revived this role, 
and Singapore continues to function as a major trading port even today. We can only deny 
Singapore's modernity if we subscribe, as Yue undoubtedly did, to the Eurocentric view that posits 
Euro-America and its foundations in liberal democracy as the one and only available model of 
modernity for everybody else to emulate. Yet, if the anthropological record already provides ample 
examples of non-Western modernities in China (Rofel 1999), Japan (Inoue 2003), Zambia 
(Ferguson 1999), and elsewhere, why cannot we see Singaporean modernity as alternate too?  
 Indeed, Singapore's alternate modernity requires a re-formulating of what we comprehend as 
cultural citizenship. Previously, Siu (2005) highlighted the horizontal, transnational aspects of 
national affect to expose the limits of the over-simplistic bottom-up and top-down models that 
Rosaldo (1997) and Ong (1999) proposed respectively. In my study, I offer a fourth model, one that 
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profoundly stresses on the constantly negotiated vertical aspects of the same affect. In Singapore, I 
argue that citizens trade in their political acquiescence for material comfort. Relinquishing the right 
to determine the contours of their citizenship to the state, they can only react to the state's decisions. 
Discursively infantilized and feminized in relation to the father-state, citizens can protest in outrage 
or make impassioned appeals to the political leadership's sense of right and wrong, but success is 
never guaranteed. In the elections that followed the 1983 racist Great Marriage Debate, for instance, 
the PAP lost enough votes to make Lee Kuan Yew realize he committed a major error. Even then, 
the party only toned down but never abandoned its pro-fecundity policies. Reacting to a larger legal 
overhaul, activists in the 2007 campaign to normalize homosexuality had much better luck, despite 
opposition from those gay men and lesbians who feared that such actions would make the state 
clamp down on the vibrant gay entertainment scene. Although homosex still remains illegal, the 
campaign raised public awareness of the issue, and ended with the Prime Minister himself staking 
his personal honor on a promise to not enforce the anti-sodomy law. In a coincidental but intriguing 
continuation of the colonial past, this exchange of political rights for material well-being parallels 
with the situation faced by concubines and the men who kept them. As a social class, concubines 
were subjected to the men's whims. Certainly, the men could abandon them, or even sell them to 
other men without prior consultation. Yet, concubines gained prestige and access to valuable 
material resources through their associations, and many siphoned off the men's wealth to enrich 
themselves and their kin (Andaya 1998; Jones 2010). 
 
So, What Now? 
 Now that this thesis has come to an end, I shall cast my gaze towards the distant, misty 
horizon of the future and attempt to fathom what may come to pass. Certainly, the PAP will remain 
a major (if not pivotal) actor in all domains of social life in Singapore. As one can plainly see in this 
dissertation, Singapore would not have been the thriving, economically thriving city-port that it is 
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today were it not for the PAP. Indeed, generations of Singaporeans (especially those born after 
1965) know of no other government. Since the political stability the party provides accounts for 
much of the current economic prosperity, it makes little sense to remove it solely because of its 
authoritarian governance. Any soci0-political benefits accrued would most likely pale in the face of 
the economic decline such a removal would herald. 
 Yet, Singapore's economic prosperity also ironically contributes to the absence of an organic 
sense of belonging among citizens. At its core, Singapore exists for commerce, but the unrelenting 
pursuit of economic excellence – which includes constant reminders to embody “proper” 
citizenship, and the PAP constructing for itself the image of the all-powerful father to whom the 
citizen-children owe their unquestioning loyalty – alienate the citizenry. If the PAP wants to be the 
father, then it should also behave benignly as one and cease its heavy-handed way of dealing with 
disagreement. The basic national ontological crisis that underlies Singapore's existence, however, 
means that the PAP cannot give up its quest for economic supremacy and state-citizen relationships 
cannot improve. So, can this paradox be resolved? According to Alex, a field informant, it can. In a 
radical re-imagining of state-citizen relationships, he suggests that since PAP leaders already run the 
country as if it were a company, then they should take the next logical step and make this 
“Singapore, Inc.” discourse official. Political leaders would be cast as the board of directors, 
citizens as permanent workers and share-holders, and foreign labor as employees hired on 
temporary contracts. In fact, such a discourse would also engender national belonging. After all, 
workers do take pride and ownership in the companies they help build in real life. The discourse's 
only caveat, Alex reminds me, is that the politicians must cease their frequent intrusions into the 
lives of private citizens. Real-life company directors do not tell their employees what language(s) 
they should speak, how “Chinese” or “Malay” they should be, or how many children they should 
have, and neither should politicians. Like directors, they should just focus on improving on the 
company's overall productivity. 
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 The PAP's continuing relevance also does not signal a slowing down or even a freeze on gay 
rights activism to legalize homosexuality. Local activists have demonstrated a surprising capability 
to innovate in Singapore's restrictive social environment, and make the most out of each state-
permitted small step towards social liberalization. In the near future at least, they will continue to 
display such creative flexibility. Changing global acceptance of gay men and lesbians, at least in 
other advanced economies, will aid the activists' cause. The PAP resists the trend now, but it must 
eventually legalize homosexuality. Persistent resistance sustains an illiberal social environment that 
deters global capital and labor flows, so it will only threaten economic growth and the party's 
political legitimacy. If nothing else, the PAP will decriminalize homosexuality out of self-
preservation. The only question is how long gay Singaporeans must wait for the inevitable to 
happen. 
 In terms of research, I see three possible avenues for post-doctoral inquiry. The first one 
extends from my current research on national affection among Chinese gay men to the cultural 
citizenship of gay men from the minority ethnic groups. Malay and Indian gay men suffer not only 
from their stigmatized sexuality, but also from the sinocentrism implicit in state laws and policies. 
For instance, public housing laws limit the number of Malay and Indian residents in any given 
neighborhood to prevent the formation of inward-looking ethnic enclaves. In effect, these laws 
normalize Chinese ethnicity, while rendering Malay and Indian ones as unruly and in need of 
management. Given the problemization of a significant portion of their cultural identities, do Malay 
and Indian gay men see themselves as Singaporean citizens? How do they act out their sexualized 
ethnic identities in space? In my current research, the informants occupy the dominant social 
position as middle-class Chinese, so they may be unable or unwilling to see the pernicious effects 
that the minoritization of sexuality and ethnicity have on non-Chinese citizens. As such, pursuing 
this above line of inquiry will enable me to piece together a better picture of Singapore's 
ethnoscape, and to better articulate the theory of ethno-normativity that I outlined earlier in Chapter 
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2. 
 The second line of possible post-doctoral research seeks to examine state dynamics from the 
inside through the civil service. Consisting of numerous ministries, statutory boards, and 
government-linked private companies, the state is a major (if not the biggest) employer in 
Singapore. As bureaucrats situated between the upper government echelons that make national 
decisions and the ordinary citizens whom they purportedly serve, civil servants mediate state-
citizenry relationships. Previous studies conducted in the West revealed, through Niskanen's (1971) 
seminal public-choice theory, that bureaucrats undermine the public's interests to expand their own 
budgets and spheres of influence (see Blais and Dion 1991 for an update). Herzfeld (1992) further 
argues that modern-day bureaucracies are no more “rational” nor less “symbolic” than the 
traditional societies that anthropologists study. Rather, we can only properly comprehend these 
organizations when we see their links with local concepts of opportunity, personal character, 
individual responsibility, and inter-personal relationships. Bearing Niskanen and Hetzfeld in mind, 
how are we to make sense of the Singaporean civil service? Do self-interests motivate Singaporean 
civil servants as much as they do Western bureaucrats? To what extent can civil servants mediate 
decisions made by their superiors in the upper echelons of government? More importantly, does this 
mediation have any national consequences? 
 The last avenue of post-doctoral research resurrects my original rejected dissertational topic 
to examine gay masculinity and Bear culture in Taiwan. Over the past decade, a minority among 
generally slim and smooth-bodied gay men became increasingly visible in Taiwan's capital city of 
Taipei. Calling themselves Bears, these men typically sport short-cropped crew cut hair, some form 
of facial hair, and large, sometimes gym-trained muscular, bodies. Testifying to the Bears' 
popularity, Taipei now boasts the Little Bear Village (xiao xiong chun in Mandarin), a vibrant and 
lively collection of Bear-oriented bars just behind the famous city landmark of the Red House, and 
a Bear-themed dance party every last Saturday of the month. This party attracts revelers from all 
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over East and Southeast Asia, the numbers of which swell dramatically when the party coincides 
with the annual gay pride parade, the year-end celebrations, and other special events. 
 How are we to make sense of this new cultural phenomenon? Why does it take root and 
flourish in Taipei and not any other Asian city? Furthermore, how does it inform our understanding 
of the globalization of ideas (in this case, those of masculinity and sexuality)? After all, the idea of 
the “Bear” originates from the United States, where it nominally refers to a larger-framed, hirsute 
gay man. Rejecting the hyper-masculine gay clone of the 1970s that Levine (1998) describes, Bears 
strive, above all, to look like regular guys by embodying a supposedly more authentic working-class 
masculinity. Even though they cannot agree on what “Bear” entails exactly (Hennen 2008), most 
identify facial / body hair and a stocky body as two key defining somatic characteristics (Bunzl 
2005). Interrogating the figure of the Bear further, Hennen (2008) makes two crucial arguments. 
Firstly, he reveals the implicit middle-class whiteness encoded within the symbol of the Bear, as the 
Bear's “authentic” masculinity harks back to older Victorian ideas that pit “pure” nature against 
“impure” civilization. More importantly, he argues that Bears simultaneously repudiate and reify 
hegemonic masculinity. While they reject the heterosexuality located at the core of the concept, they 
also reinforce it by attempting to eradicate all visible differences they have with heterosexual men.  
 However, Chinese men (and East and Southeast Asians in general) typically lack body hair. 
How then do the Bears among them envision their Bearness? Following Louie's (2002) crucial 
observation that any scholarly discussion of Chinese masculinity (and indeed, I insist, any 
masculinity within the Chinese sphere of cultural influence) must invoke the idea of wen-wu, a dyad 
whose cultural meanings center on two opposite but complementary poles of literary achievements 
(wen) and martial prowess (wu). As I already discussed in the previous chapter, the importance of 
wen and wu varied over time. In China's Ming (1368 – 1644 CE) and Qing (1644 – 1911 CE), wen 
masculinity was associated with elite men (Wu 2004) while its wu counterpart was associated with 
non-elite ones (Sommer 2002). These close associations between masculinity and class exist still 
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exist today (Louie 2002), even though the extent to which they hold true remains unclear. Louie 
himself does not give ethnographic examples to his wen-wu philosophizing, so my pursuit of this 
line of research promises to provide vital empirical data on the dynamics of gender in a modern 
Chinese society. 
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